The determinants of vote choice in Portugal by D'Oliveira, Manuela
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
The determinants of vote choice in Portugal
Thesis
How to cite:
D’Oliveira, Manuela (1989). The determinants of vote choice in Portugal. PhD thesis The Open University.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 1989 The Author
Version: Version of Record
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
DJ< qo397
\) NRES "Tl<.\CTEJ)
THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL
by MANUELA O'OLIVEIRA
A",,~(s r\\Ambe·(; m702.o3'10
Da~ of subm,ss1O\'l : 'S~ m~ \'\~
1)a~ cf ~at'd: 2J)~ Qc.tobtv 1'18'1
THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL
A thesis submitted to THE OPEN UNIVERSITY
by MANUELA D'OLIVEIRA,BSc (London)
in partial fulfilment
of the requirements
for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY (PhD)
in the subject of SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
on 30 April, 1989
I
Acknowledgements
I am deeply indebted to all who have given me their help
and support. There have been many. The volunteers who
distributed the questionnaires, the respondents who
patiently completed them, the many friends and colleagues
with whom I discussed the research and contributed with
their opinions.
I wish to single out a few.
My supervisor, Dr. Kerry Thomas, who steered me 2,000 Kms
apart with incisive comments; any deviation from which I am
entirely responsible for. Dr. Martin Levoi, Lecturer,
Psychology discipline, The Open University, for his
unfailing help with the computer analyses. Prof. Judith
Greene, Head of the Psychology discipline, The Open
University, for her encouragement and support.
Also, Prof. Armando Rocha Trindade, Rector of the
Universidade Aberta, Portugal, for the facilities put at my
disposal during the field work. Mr. John
Mallon,Representative of The British Council, Portugal,
again for all the facilities put at my disposal in the
final stages of the write-up.
My colleagues Ana Sofia Peralta Leitao and Maria
Mendon~a for typing and retyping the manuscript
infinite patience and efficiency.
Finally, my daughter Maria Joao and my son Pedro who so
gallantly shared me with this eight year old rival. And,
most especially, Eduardo, without whom the work would have
never been accomplished.
Am~lia
with
TO ALL MY SINCERE THANKS.
EXl2
HIGHER DEGREES OFFICE
LIBRARY AUI'HORISATION FORM
STUDENT: MAN U cL-A :h' Ol.\ 1/8 ~4
DEGREE: ?~j)
SERIAL 00: M 702. 0370
TITLE OF THESIS: '"'i1te )1;Tal2. n I I\II'\-Nl's 0 F vOTE C+10 ( CS I tV
--eORTU 6-14 L
I con£inn that I am willing that my thesis be made available to readers
and maybephotocopied, subject to the discretion of the Librarian.
SIGNED: .y DATE: .3 C) • Li· 8 <=t
ABSTRACT
The Reasoned Action model was applied in Portugal to study
the factors which determine vote choice among Portuguese
voters. Covering three elections (the 1980 Presidential
election, the 1982 Local elections and the 1983 General
election) the study was started six years after the
Revolution of 25 April 1974 which restored Democracy after
48 years of the Salazar-Caetano Dictatorship.
The Reasoned Action model, successfully tested in one
American Presidential election and in one British General
election, assumes that voting intentions are directly
related to a) attitudes towards voting for each candidate
or party based on knowledge voters possess about important
issues and about the candidates or parties stands on them,
and b) social influence factors based on voters' beliefs on
the opinions of trusted referents as to whom they should be
voting for.
The results obtained in the three Portuguese electoral
studies give strong support to the thesis that in spite of
their undemocratic background Portuguese voters like their
American and British counterparts make reasoned choices
based on their knowledge of important issues and of the
differences between the candidates' or parties' stands on
such issues. As in the American and British studies the
weight of the attitudinal component of the Reasoned Action
model was found to be a much more significant determinant
of voting intentions than its social influence component.
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THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE IN PORTUGAL
Introduction
Voting behaviour has been the subject of continuous study
in the United States and Great Britain for many decades.
Social psychologists in these countries have developed
models of voting behaviour of increasing complexity in an
attempt to explain how voters arrive at electoral decision.
Making use of one such model, the Reasoned Action Model
(Fishbein & Coombs, 1974), the object of this research was
to enquire into the determinant factors which affect voting
decision making among Portuguese voters, and in so doing,
ascertain whether Portuguese voters, in view of their non-
democratic tradition, appear to be influenced by factors
different from those which affect their American and
British counterparts.
American and British voters have enjoyed stable democratic
life for many decades. In the 50 years prior to the 1974
Revolution, Portugal was ruled by a Dictatorship. In 1974,
the country jumped from a one-party to a multi-party
system, from oppressive silence enforced by brutal force,
to freedom, irrepressive freedom of expression, of assembly
and of choice.
Tbe research covers three elections: the presidential
election of 1980, the local elections of 1982 and the
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general election of 1983. Between 1974 and the
presidential election of 1980 there had already been seven
elections: four general elections, one presidential
election and two local elections. Prior to the 1980
presidential election, the political instability and
uncertainty, and the divisions within the left had created
conditions for a strong recovery on the part of the right
wing political forces.
The American conservative Firsher Ames once wrote:
"Authoritarian government is like a splendid ship with all
sails set; it moves majestically on, then it hits a rock
and sinks forever. Democracy is like a raft. It never
sinks, but, damn it, your feet are always in the water".
The Portuguese voters were learning to live with their feet
wet.
The study is organised in ten Chapters and five Appendices
as follows:
Chapter I
Chapter II
- Electoral issues in the context of political
developments
- A survey of the main social psychology
models of voting behaviour
Chapter III - Using the model of Reasoned Action to study
the determinants of vote choice among
Portuguese voters
2
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
- Applications of the Reasoned Action model in
American and British elections: implications
for the Portuguese studies
- Method and procedure
Description of the samples used in the three
Portuguese elections
Chapter VII - Results of the tests of the Reasoned Action
model in the three Portuguese elections
Chapter VIII - The best predictor of voting behaviour
Chapter IX - Awareness of voters: political knowledge and
normative influence
Chapter X
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Appendix 4
Appendix 5
- Conclusions and epilogue
- The Dictatorship: a brief account
- The post-revolutionary years - calendar of
main events
- Descriptive measures related to Chapter VIII
- Descriptive measures related to Chapter IX
- Texts of the questionnaires
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CHAPTER I
ELECTORAL ISSUES IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Introduction
The main argument of this thesis is that in their voting
behaviour Portuguese voters make reasoned choices based on
knowledge of current electoral issues and of the stands
candidates and parties have on them.
Electoral issues are thus key features of the three surveys
carried out to test the argument of the thesis in each of
the three types of elections which are held in Portugal:
Presidential elections, General elections
Government elections.
and Local
The surveys were started in 1980, six years after the
Revolution. By and large, the quick succession of confused
and confusing political developments had been based on
concurrent fights for power between the Right and the Left
and within the Left itself, amidst a great deal of
additional unrest created by the many fringe parties on
both extremes of the political spectrum.
After their initial political proclamations, the four main
political parties were themselves going through a period of
readjustment and realignment. This realignment was being
achieved through the clarification and redefinition of
important issues concerning the socia-economic framework
and the institutional inter-relationships of the incipient
Portuguese democracy.
4
By 1980, such issues had come to the fore and their
settlement became dependent upon the direction of the vote
in the 1980 Presidential election, the first covered by
this study.
The centrality of electoral issues to the argument of the
thesis requires their immediate presentation and
discussion. This, however, can only be achieved with
reference to the main political and electoral developments
which occurred in Portugal since the Revolution.
The aim of Chapter 1 is thus twofold. First it aims at
directing attention to electoral issues, the key elements
of the study; second, it aims at situating the issues
within their terms of reference, i.e the
political scene.
Portuguese
To achieve its aim the chapter covers 57 years of political
life in Portugal from the beginning of the Dictatorship in
1926 to the General election of 1983, nine years after the
Revolution of 1974, and is divided in five sections.
Section 1.1 gives a brief account of the two post
revolutionary years from the date of the Revolution, 25
April 1974, to the date of the first General legislative
elections, 25 April 1976. There are two Appendices
associated with this Section. Appendix 1, traces a brief
history of the 48 years of dictatorship, from 1926 to 1974.
Appendix 2, presents a calendar of the main events which
took place during the first two post-revolutionary years.
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Section 1.2 describes the main political developments from
the General election of 1976 to the General election of
1980.
Section 1.3 describes the main political developments from
the General election of 1980 to the General election of
1983 setting the scene of the three electoral surveys
carried out for this study: the 1980 Presidential election
survey the 1982 Local elections survey and the 1983 General
election survey.
Section 1.4 presents and discusses the electoral issues
selected for use in the three surveys and is followed by a
brief summary in Section 5.
Section 1.1 The post-revolutionary years - from April
1974 to April 1976
The Revolution of 25 April 1974 put an end to nearly 50
years
Caetano
of the authoritarian rule of Professors Salazar and
in Portugal (1). As far as the immediate
antecedents of the Revolution are concerned it will suffice
to say that the military - The Movimento das Forcas Armadas
acted primarily to put an end to their 13 year old
involvement with the wars against the freedom movements in
the African colonies of Guine-Bissau, Angola and
Mozambique. The end of the wars was the uniting factor
(1) For a brief descriptionof the years of Dictatorship,
refer to Appendix 1•.
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among the military. The fall of the regime was the
necessary prerequisite for the fulfillment of their
aspiration.
The officers who overthrew the regime, however, conscious
of the social injustices and economic underdevelopment
fostered by the Dictatorship, wanted, also, to ensure the
establishment of a new political order in the country. The
new political path which the officers wanted for Portugal
was clear about its aims: the establishment of democratic
rule, taking "the road to Socialism" as the only means to
achieve social justic~ and economic development. The
country had an illiteracy rate in the order of 35%, a GNP
per capita superior only to Turkey in the European table
and had been subjected to 48 years of psychological and
physical repression.
The immediate aftermath of the Revolution was characterised
by a mass euphoria in most of the bigger populational
centres of the country. The Movement of·the Armed Forces
(MFA) had instantaneous popular support and left the most
sceptical observers in no doubt as to the strength of
popular feeling against the dictatorship, especially in the
cities.
The military Junta which took over on April 25 was
determined that power should be handed over to civilians as
soon as possible. Universal free elections were fixed for
April 1975 to elect a Constituent Assembly who would sit
for one year with the sole responsibility of drafting a new
7
Constitution. Three elections were to take place following
the approval of the Constitution in 1976: a general
election to elect the first legislative Parliament, a
presidential election and local elections.
Meanwhile the country was to be governed by a provisional
government formed by representatives of the main political
forces, the military and prestigious independents. As it
happened there was a succession of provisional governments
amidst understandable political unrest (2). However, the
first free universal elections did take place on April 25,
1975 and the Constituent Assembly was elected reflecting
the wishes of the electorate. The distribution of the vote
among the political parties which contested the election is
shown in table 1.1. The figures in brackets show the
number of representatives each party elected.
(2) For a chronological listing of the main events which
occurred in the post revolutionary period, refer to
Appendix 2, the Post-revolutionary years - Calendar of main
events.
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TABLE 1.1
Distribution of the vote in the 1975 Election
CENTRO DEMOCRATICO SOCIAL
CDS - (Christian-Democrats)(I)
PARTIDO POPULAR DEMOCRATICO
PPD - (Social Democrats)(2)
PARTIDO SOCIALISTA
PS - (Socialists)(3)
MOVIMENTO DEMOCRATICO PORTUGUES
MDP - (Left-wing Socialists)
PARTIDO COMUNISTA PORTUGUES
PCP (Communists)(4)
UNIAO DEMOCRATICA PORTUGUESA
UDP - (Maoists)
MOVIMENTO DA ESQUERDA SOCIALISTA
MES - (Intellectual Socialists)
Various leftist parties
No of seats in
Parliament
8.4% 16
26.2% 81
37.9% 116
4.1% 5
12.5% 30
.8% 1
1.0%
3.5%
(In "As Eleicoes no Portugal de Abril", 1980)
The electorate gave a clear mandate to the left wing
p~rties in an election where voting, which is not
5.6% were spoiled or blank votes.
compulsory, reached a record level of 91.7%, of which only
The PS (socialists), the MDP (leftwing socialists), the PCP
(communists) and the UDP (maoists) combined won 152 of the
249 seats in the Assembly. The centre-right (PPD) and the
right (CDS) obtained 97 seats altogether.
(1) Member of the Union of the Christian Democratic Parties
(2) Member of the International Liberal Movement
(3) Member of the Socialist International
(4) Part of the International Communist Movement
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The socialists (PS), although more popular in the urban and
coastal districts found countrywide support. The
communists (PCP) drew their support from the rural regions
South of Lisbon and from the industrial belts of Lisbon,
Setubal and Oporto. The MDP (leftwing socialists) and UDP
(Maoists) drew their support from the urban areas,
especially Lisbon. The PPD (Social Democrats)'s strength
was found mainly in the North and Centre, whereas the
stronghold of the CDS (Christian Democrats)'s vote was
mainly concentrated in the Northeast (3). The following
schematic map of Portugal shows the main concentrations of
the Parties' vote.
NORTH
OPORTO
PPD
PS
CDS
CDS
+
PPD
WEST
PS
PPD EAST
LISBON
SETUBAL PCP
ALGARVE PS
SOUTH
Fig. 1 Schematic map of Portugal showing concentration of
parties' vote
(3) The populationis unevenly distributed.Discountingthe
big cities of Lisbon, Oporto and Set~bal,whichaccount for
over one third of the 10 million inhabitants,the largest
population indices are found in the Northwestand in the
Central coastal regions, The South of Lisbon regions,
with the exceptionof the city of Set6bal,andthe Northeast
are thinly populated•.
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In spite of the continuing political unrest (see Post-
Revolutionary years - Calendar of Main Events, Appendix 2)
and the considerable difficulties faced by each one of the
succeeding provisional governments, the new Constitution
was drafted and approved, on April 2, 1976.
By and large, the principles of the new Constitution are
akin to those of other Western Parliamentary democracies.
The republican form of government, the separation of Church
and State, and the rights, freedoms and safeguards of
citizens cannot be amended. But the Portuguese Constitution
of 1976 also committed the couniry to Socialism. In so
doing it enshrined a number of principles which caused
great and grave friction between the Right and Left wing
parties, namely, the principle of collective ownership of
the main means of production, and of natural resources, the
abolition of monopolies and large estates, collectivization
of land and national economic planning.
The Constitution contained a paradox. On the one hand it
upheld the principle of a multi-party type of Western
democracy; on the other, it prescribed an economic. model
which the Right could hardly be expected to subscribe to.
The christian democrats (CDS) voted against the,
Constitution. Surprisingly, however, the social democrats
(PPD) voted in favour. As later events were to confirm,
the endorsement of the Constitution by the social democrats
was an act of political strategy rather than of belief.
Their vote of approval acknowledged the more generalised
11
left wing leanings of the electorate and avoided the risk
of
bid
immediate, open confrontation with the left.
for time, since the Constitution included
It was a
provisions
for changes and amendments to be introduced every five
years. Such changes, however, can only be introduced if
approved by a two-third parliamentary majority.
The Constitution also includes a detailed account of
electoral procedures.
Presidential electoral procedures: The President is elected
by absolute majority in direct, universal, elections. If
no candidate obtains an absolute majority (over 50% of the
votes) at the first ballot, a second ballot takes place
between the two most voted candidates in the first ballot.
General Elections: the franchise is universal, registration
is automatic and compulsory. The 250 parliamentary seats
are a110ted amongst 22 constituencies called Districts.
Each District is allotted a number of seats according to
the number of voters registered. Voting is by party list
in each District and the distribution of seats within each
District follows the d'Hondt method of proportional
representation. Under this method, on the first count, the
party with the largest vote in the District takes a seat.
Its total is divided by two and parties' votes are compared
again. The list with the largest number of votes takes the
next seat. Each time a party takes a seat, its original
total is divided by the number of seats it has already won
12
plus one. Distribution continues in this manner until all
the District seats have been allocated.
Local elections: in the local elections the d'Hont method
is applied within each Municipality, an administrative sub-
division within Districts. The number of Municipalities
varies between Districts since, by and large, it depends on
the geographical distribution of the population.
Section 1.2 - Political developments from April 1976 to
October 1980
1.2.1 The General Election of 1976
According to the Portuguese Constitution, the normal life
of a Parliament is four years, unless the Government loses
a vote of confidence and Parliament is unable to provide an
alternative Government.
The election of the first legislature took place on
25, 1976. Three of the four main parties, i.e. the
(Christian Democrats), the PPD/PSD (Social Democrats,
April
CDS
who
had now added a second name - Partido Social Democrata - to
their original name - Partido Popular Democratico - and the
PS (socialists) ran on their own. The PCP (communists)
formed an alliance with the MDP (left wing socialists)
called Alianca Povo Unido, APU.
In comparison with 1975, the 1976 election results show
little vote switching between the parties. Only the CDS
13
(Christian Democrats), relatively to 1975 showed a
considerable increase of approximately 68% in votes.
Table 1.2 compares the percentages of the vote obtained by
the four main political groups in the 1975 and 1976
elections. The numbers in brackets show the number of
seats obtained by each group.
TABLE 1.2
Percentage distribution of the vote among the four
main political groups in the general elections
of 1975 and 1976
PARTIES 1975 RESULTS 1976 RESULTS*
CDS
(christian democrats) 8.4% (16) 14.1% (42)
PPD/PSD
(social democrats) 28.2% (81) 26.3% (73)
PS
(socialists) 37.9% (116) 35.0% (107)
APU
(communists + MDP) 16.6% (35)** 14.6% (40)
* (In "As Eleicoes no Portugal de Abril", 1980)
** the results shown with respect to the 1975 election
represent the sum of the percentages and number of seats
obtained by these two political groups in that election.
It is interesting to note the influence of the d'Hondt
method of proportional representation on the number of
seats obtained in relation to the national percentage of
the vote obtaineq by each party. The method favours larger
14
parties, particularly in smaller districts but it also
favours parties whose support
concentrated (Goldey, 1983).
is geographically
After the election, the Socialist Party was asked by the
President to form a minority government. This minority
government ran into difficulties. Distancing themselves
from the communists, the socialists sought the support of
the christian democrats with whom, for a few months,
entered into a governmental platform. This platform was
dissolved and after losing a vote of confidence in
Parliament the Government was dismissed by the President.
Parliament was unable to provide a stable alternative. The
President, using powers bestowed to him by the
Constitution, tried to restore stability by appointing a
government of his own initiative. This "national-
government of experts ploy behind independent premiers"
(Goldey, 1983) failed twice. A third government was formed
to prepare the country for interim elections. These took
place nine months before the normal full term of
Parliament, in December 1979, and were followed in October
1980 by another general election. in accordance with
constitutional regulations.
By December 1979, the christian democrats, the social
democrats, and the very small Monarchist Party had formed
an Alliance, the Alian~a Democratica, AD. The Socialist
Party together with small socialist groups, had also formed
and electoral Front called Frente Republicana Socialista
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(FRS). The above two alliances, together with the APU
alliance already formed between the communists and the MDP,
(the APU alliance) were the main political groups
contesting the elections of 1979 and of 1980.
Table 1.3 shows the results of the 1979 and 1980 elections
together with the 1975 and 1976 elections for easier
reference and Table 1.4 shows the distribution of seats in
Parliament resulting from each election.
TABLE 1.3
Percent distribution of the vote in the 1975, 1976,
1979 and 1980 Elections (Parliament)
1975 1976 1979* 1980**
CDS 8.4 14.1
PPD/PSD 26.2 26.3
AD (CDS+PSD) (34.6) (40.4)AD 45.1 47.1
PS 37.9 35.0
FRS (PS+sma11 27.1 28.0
parties)
MDP 4.1
PCP 12.1
APU (PCP+MDP+ (16.6) 14.6 19.0 17.0
Independents)
UDP (maoists) .79 1.7 2.2 1.4
* (In "Diario da Repub1ica,I Serie, N. 295, Monday 24
December 1979)
** (In "Diario da RepGb1ica",I Sirie, N. 295, Monday 3
November 1980)
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Table 1.4 shows the distribution of seats in Parliament
after the above elections:
TABLE 1.4
Distribution of seats in Parliament in the 1975, 1976,
1979 and 1980 Elections (Parliament)
1975 1976 1979 1980
CDS 16 42
PPD/PSD 81 73
AD(CDS+PSD) (97) (115) 128 135
PS 116 107
FRS(PS+small 74 74
parties)
MDP 5
PCP 30
APU(PCP+MDP+ (35) 40 47 41
Independents)
UDP(maoists) 1 1 1 1--------------------------------------------
TOTAL 249 263 250* 250
* Between the 1976 and 1979 elections Parliament decided to
fix the total number of seats in 250. Number of seats were
proportionally distributed among the electoral districts as
a function of the number of registered voters in each
District.
(Adapted from "0 Jornal", 29 April 1983, and "Expresso", 23
April 1983. The 1975 result excludes an independent from
Macau who did not sit).
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The AD alliance between the CDS and the PPD/PSD (and the
small Monarchist Party) obtained a clear victory in the
interim elections of 1979 and increased its majority in the
Elections of October 1980. The losers were, undoubtedly,
the socialists who lost a great deal of their initial
popularity after their two and half years in Government.
Such was the parliamentary representation of the political
groups and the strong position of the AD government when
the country prepared for the second Presidential election,
in 1980, the first of the elections covered by this study.
Before the political context in which the 1980 Presidential
election took place is discussed the following subsection
gives a summary of the main events related to the first
Presidential election held in 1976.
1.2.2 - The first Presidential Election of 1976
The President's term of office runs for five years. With
the new Constitution approved in April 1976, the President
who during the dictatorship, was a mere puppet figure
subordinated to the Dictator, assumed greater importance.
The President became the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and held the right to veto any Bills approved by
Parliament which were deemed to be unconstitutional. (Until
the first Constitutional revision in 1982, the President
was advised on constitutional matters by the Conselho da
Revolucao. . (Revolutionary Council) composed of
representatives of the MFA (the Armed Forces Movement).
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The 1982 constitutional revision dissolved the Conselho da
Revolucao, and created in its place the Constitutional
Tribunal,
political
President).
a body composed of representatives of the
parties and independents headed by
The use of the veto by the President to
main
the
block
the approval of unconstitutional Bills is on the one hand a
safeguard to ensure that the Constitution is respected. On
the other hand, it can become a source of institutional
conflict between the Presidency and the Government and/or
Parliament.
The first Presidential election took place in June 1976.
General Ramalho Eanes, the officer who took decisive action
during the events of November 1975 (see Calendar of Events)
ran for office with the backing of the CDS (christian
democrats), the PPD/PSD (social democrats) and the PS
(socialists) although some socialists supported Admiral
Pinheiro de Azevedo, the Prime Minister in the last
Provisional Government. The Communist Party presented its
own candidate, Octavio Pato, and the parties of the extreme
left supported Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, the hero of the
April Revolution, former head of COPCON (see Calendar of
Events), Otelo enjoyed still a great deal of popular
support among the left as the percentage of votes obtained
by him indicates. Table 1.5 shows the distribution of the
popular vote among the candidates:
19
TABLE 1.5
Distribution of the vote among the 1976*
Presidential candidates
PARTY SUPPORT
CDS,PSD,PS
PCP
UDP, extreme left
Others
CANDIDATE
Eanes
Pato
Otelo
Azevedo
PERCENTAGE OF VOTE
61.5
7.6
16.5
14.4
* (Adapted from "0 Jornal")
General Ramalho Eanes was thus elected at the first ballot
with a clear, absolute majority of 61.5% of the popular
vote. If,
politically
political
himself as
at first, he might have been considered as
naive and open to manipulation by his main
supporters, Ramalho Eanes soon established
an independent President set to respect and
force both Parliament and Government to respect the
Constitution.
Section 1.3 - Political developments from December 1980 to
April 1983
1.3.1. The electoral campaign for
election of December 1980
the presidential
When the Presidential campaign opened officially three
weeks before the election on December 7, the AD government
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had just seen its majority in Parliament highly reinforced
by the results of the general election of October 1980.
During the AD first nine months in office, a series of
serious conflicts occurred between the Government and the
President. Highly critical of the Constitution,
especially with respect to the provisions limiting private
enterprise and the size of the public sector, the AD
government sought to implement Bills which were considered
to be unconstitutional by the President and his advisory
body on Constitutional matters, the Conselho da Revolucao.
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The President, Ramalho Eanes, used the veto to block such
proposals to much annoyance and vociferation on the part of
the AD leadership.
Withdrawing their former support to the President, the AD
parties proposed and backed a more acceptable and pliable
candidate. They chose an obscure Army General, Soares
Carneiro, a figure of little impact and campaigned
vigorously on his behalf.
The President, who ran for a second term of office received
the support of the Socialist Party, although the Secretary
General of the Party (the Prime Minister of the Socialist
Government dismissed by Eanes) withdrew his personal
support.
The communists presented their own candidate only to gain
access to the media to explain to their electorate the
reasons for recommending the vote in the President when
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their candidate withdrew. Contrary to the AD assertions
regarding the
enjoy support
President's communist bias, Eanes did not
among communist voters. These had never
forgotten his role in the November 1975 coup (see Calendar
of Events) which they considered anti-revolutionary and a
setback to the socialist cause.
Otelo, the popular revolutionary hero, ran again counting
on the support of the extreme left and hoping for a
percentage of the communist vote as he had obtained in the
1976 election.
There were two more candidates but neither received support
from the main parties.
The campaign was vigorous. The AD leadership heavily
involved and committed to the election of its candidate,
without which the AD plans for reforms could not succeed,
sought to discredit the President accusing him of favouring
the communists and creating the conditions for a communist
take over. The AD was quite open about their reasons for
choosing Soares Carneiro. They argued that in order to
achieve economic development and prosperity the country
needed political stability, and that the latter could only
be established if the Institutions, i.e. Presidency,
Parliament and Government, shared the same ideals and
worked in harmony. Their attacks against the Constitution
were virulently linked to what they considered to have been
a communist manoeuvre to control the country.
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The Socialist Party formed a national movement to give the
President's campaign the logistic and political support it
needed. The President campaigned actively throughout the
country and abstained from personal attacks against the AD
and its candidate. His main message was that, in spite of
the political instability and institutional conflict, the
democratic institutions were functioning. This, he
considered, was due to the fact that the Constitution was
being respected. His campaign was almost didactic in that,
it sought to explain how the democratic institutions worked
and the importance the Constitution had to hold them
together. His position was that irrespective of the justice
of the arguments voiced by any political party at anyone
time against the Constitution, its text and spirit had to
be respected until changes were introduced by democratic
means, i.e. by a two-third majority in Parliament, every
five years.
The communists' campaign was based on two central lines. On
the one hand, the PCP seeking to discredit the AD
candidate, made public accusations of the General's
handling of a prison camp in Angola, during the colonial
wars, where, allegedly, torture had taken place. On the
other hand they warned against the possible return to
"fascism" if the AD succeeded in electing a President
incapable of assuming an independent role.
The electorate wanted political stability. It had just
returned the AD to power with an increased majority
23
obviously tired of the continuing strife within the left.
It now faced the choice between the AD candidate who
offered immediate institutional stability, and the
President, supported by the left, a stern figure, given to
few smiles, who during his first mandate had dismissed a
minority government, had appointed unpopular governments of
his own initiative and had entered into conflict with a
majority government by exercising the Presidential veto on
some of the government's more fundamental proposals in his
plan for reform.
In short, to win, the AD candidate needed just under 3% of
the vote provided the AD electorate remained solidly behind
the AD leadership. The President, on the other hand needed
just over 5% of the vote provided all who had voted for the
socialists and the APU in October voted for him.
Would AD voters remain loyal to the leadership and vote for
the AD candidate? Would socialist voters follow the
Socialist party line and vote for the President or would
they follow the party's Secretary General position,
undefined as to how to vote but nevertheless unsupportive
of the President? Would communist voters and sympathisers
follow the advice of the PCP leadership and vote for the
President, would they abstain or vote for Otelo as many did
in the 1976 Presidential election?
Four days before the election, the AD Prime Minister, Sa
Carneiro, leader and main founder of the PSD party, died in
a plane crash ju~t after taking off from Lisbon airport to
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go to a campaign rally in Oporto. With him travelled the
Defense Minister, Adelino Amaro da Costa, the number two of
the christian democrats, who also died.
Some political observers attributed the victory of the
President in the first round of the elections to these
tragic deaths. However, the data collected for this
research prior to the accident suggests otherwise as it is
discussed in Chapter IX.
Table 1.6 shows the percentage of the vote in the two
Presidential Elections of 1976 and 1980.
TABLE 1.6
1976 and 1980 Presidential Elections
(percentage of vote)
PARTY SUPPORT CANDIDATE 1976
Extreme left Otelo 16.5
PCP Pato 7.6
PS+PSD+CDS Eanes 61.5
PS (+APU) Eanes
PSD +CDS Soares Carneiro
(Turnout) (75.4)
1980
1.5
56.4
40.3
(84.2)
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The candidate supported by the extreme left wing, Otelo
Saraiva de Carvalho had the 16.5% of the vote obtained in
the 1976 Presidential election severely reduced to 1.5% in
the 1980 Presidential election.
Ramalho Eanes, who in the 1976 election with the support of
the socialists (PS), the social democrats (PSD) (PSD) and
the christian democrats (CDS) had obtained 61.5% of the
vote, had this percentage reduced to 56.4% in the 1980
Presidential election with the support of the socialists
(PS), the communists (PCP) and their allies in the APU
alliance.
Soares Carneiro, the candidate supported by the right wing
alliance, AD, formed between the social democrats (PSD) and
the christian democrats (CDS) in the 1980 Presidential
election obtained 40.3% of the vote, approximately 7% less
than the percentage obtained by the AD in the 1980 General
election which took place two months prior to the
Presidential election.
1.3.2 - The AD Govern.ent fro. Deceaber 1980 to January
1983
With the death of the Prime Minister and of the Defence
Minister, two key figures of the AD Alliance, the AD
government suffered a severe blow. The Prime Minister was
succeeded by Pinto Balsemao, a lawyer and prominent
journalist, co-founder of the Social Democratic Party.
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Pinto Balsemao was a more compromising and less abrasive
politician than his predecessor and relations with the
President improved. However, unlike his predecessor he was
unable to control the factions within his own Party, the
PSD. Internal conflict, the ambitions of the christian
democrats who aspired at enlarging their influence in the
Government and the continuing deterioration of the economy
contributed to the rapid loss of much of the impetus the
Alliance had known during Sa Carneiro's leadership.
As foreseen by the 1975 Constitution, which allowed for
amendments to be made to its text every five years, some of
its articles were amended in 1982. Although enjoying an
absolute majority in Parliament, the AD did not have the
two-third majority needed to introduce their own
amendments. In the circumstances they had to compromise
with the other parties represented in Parliament,
especially with the socialists, and were unable to
introduce the drastic changes they wanted in economic and
labour regulations.
The AD government, weakened by the continuing in fighting,
was unable to take counteractive measures to prevent a
grave economic crisis. This they blamed on the fact that
the changes introduced in the Constitution in those aspects
related to the relative weight of the public and private
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sectors and the liberalisation of private enterprise had
been so limited. Corruption, political intrigue and
favouritism were widespread.
The AD alliance was dissolved in December 1982. In
January, the PSD Prime Minister was replaced by Mota Pinto,
who in 1978 had led one of the governments formed by the
President.
The President dissolved Parliament and elections were
called for April 1983.
1.3.3. The electoral campaign for the General Election
of 1983
The right wing coalition had not brought the desired
political stability and failed to achieve much needed
economic development. All parties, including the Social-
Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party, agreed
that, due to the economic crisis, the gulf between the
better-off classes and the less privileged was widening.
There were increasing signs of severe hardship and
widespread social injustice.
All parties underlined their campaigns with the same theme,
i.e. the need to solve the economic crisis and the
promotion of social welfare.
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The former AD partners (christian democrats, CDS, and the
social democrats, PSD) wanted to distance themselves
the political instability and weakness of their
former
from
party
government. In their wall posters, speeches
political broadcasts, they insisted on the need
joint
and
to
restore old values such as morality, firmness of purpose,
order and authority. In other respects the electoral
platforms of the CDS and the PSD were also very similar.
Both parties strongly supported the introduction of changes
in labour laws to allow for greater flexibility in the
hiring and firing of labour, and continued to base their
economic strategy on radical constitutional changes to
allow the reduction of the public sector and the
liberalisation of private enterprise.
The reduction of the public sector and the introduction of
changes in labour laws clearly divided the right wing from
the left wing parties. Within the left, however, the two
issues also produced a division. The socialists favoured a
more open and conciliatory attitude towards changes than
the communists who continued to argue that a reduction of
the public sector and interference with labour legislation
were against the spirit and text of the Constitution.
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In agreeing that some changes needed to be introduced in
these two sectors, the socialists advocated that in so far
as the labour sector was concerned, such changes should be
negotiated by a forum of representatives from the
government, parties, unions and employers the Social
Contract. This suggestion was well received by both the
christian and social democrats and the smaller Trades Union
Congress, the UGT. However, the communists and the larger
Trades Unions Congress, the CGTP-Intersindical put up great
opposition denouncing the suggestion as a means to weaken
the position of workers.
During the campaign, the socialists announced their
intention to carry out, if elected, 100 measures in their
first 100 days in office. These measures covered all
sectors of the economic and social life of the country. It
would be impossible to describe all of them. In general
terms, the 100 measures reflected the Socialists'
preoccupations with social welfare. harmonious labour
relations and economic recovery. On the latter, though,
the socialists were quite clear that to achieve it, in the
first two years of government they would be forced to
introduce strict austerity measures to straighten the
economy and bring inflation down from around 33% per annum
to more acceptable levels, more in line with the inflation
levels in other European countries.
The communists' campaign also reflected their great concern
with the economy and with the general deterioration of
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living conditions. But unlike the socialists who were
advocating austerity measures to tackle the economic
crisis, the communists called for the immediate restoration
of the purchasing power.
According to the communists, the solution to the economic
problems was not to be found in the reduction of the public
sector and the liberalisation of labour laws. They saw the
solution as lying in massive state investment in the
country's natural resources, i.e. hydroelectric power,
mining, agriculture,
diversify production,
etc. Such investment, needed to
would create jobs and reduce the
country's increasing reliance on imports, especially food
imports.
Like all previous campaigns, the 1983 General election
campaign was noisy, full of public meetings and carrying
massive displays of party propaganda in every available
space. Most issues became every party's issues, i.e.
labour harmony, protection of workers' rights, increased
welfare, development of national resources, creation of
jobs and drop in inflation rates, etc. The controversy
about the public sector and the liberalisation of labour
laws remained, by and large, the two issues on which
division between the Right and the Left was most apparent.
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The general feeling was that no party would receive a
majority of votes and that, therefore, after the election a
coalition would have to be formed. The social democrats,
unlike their former AD partners the christian democrats,
made it clear that under no circumstances would they form a
coalition with the christian democrats again. However, the
social democrats, without committing themselves, were not
unsympathetic to the formation of a joint post electoral
platform with the socialists, who, for their part, remained
aloof and uncommitted.
Table 1.7 shows the distribution of the vote in the 1983
General election among the main parties and the number of
seats each party won in the Parliament. For comparison
purposes and easier reference, the table also shows these
results in the 1980 General election and in the 1976
General election the last election in which the CDS and PSD
parties ran on their own prior to the formation of the AD
alliance.
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TABLE 1.7
Percentage distribution of the vote and number of
seats won by each party in the 1983 General election
(the % distribution of the vote and number of party seats
in the 1976 and 1980 General election is also shown
for easier reference)
% Distribution of the vote Number of seats
1976 1980 1983* 1976 1980 1983*
AD 47.1 134
(CDS+PSD) (40.4) (39.8) (115) (105)
CDS 14.1 12.6 42 30
PSD 26.3 27.2 73 75
PS 35 28 36.1 107 74 101
APU 14.6 17 18.1 40 41 44
UDP 1.7 1.4 .5 1 1
263 250 250
* (In "Diario da Republica",I Serie, N. 121, Thursday 26
May 1983)
By and large, the 1983 General election results returned
the parties to their 1976 positions. The CDS lost 1.5% of
its share of the vote but the PSD increased its share by
almost 1%. The Socialist party in 1983, in comparison with
1976, increased its share of the vote by just over 1% and
the APU, in 1983, obtained 3.5% more of the votes it had
obtained in 1976, due, perhaps, to the losses suffered by
the small parties on its left.
33
Although the impetus of the AD alliance was broken, it is
clear that CDS and PSD voters remained loyal to their
respective parties in spite of the alliance's failure. It
is probable, therefore, that the disenchantment with the AD
was more acutely felt by the socialist voters who had
switched their vote in 1979 and 1980.
1.3.4. The Local Elections of 1982
Independent local government was undoubtedly one of the
most fundamental changes introduced by the Revolution of
April 1974.
Until the Revolution, local government was one of the
instruments used by the regime to ensure the maintenance of
the status quo. The advent of elected local government
from 1976, independent from national government, brought
development and a substantial amelioration to the quality
of life of local populations up and down the country.
Electricity and water supply, housing, local transport,
provision of creches, old age homes, playground facilities,
health centres etc etc., increased dramatically.
In broad terms party distribution in local elections
follows closely the national distribution (see table 1.8).
However, given the more localized nature of the elections,
i.e. candidates for a start are known to the voters, and
the work achieved by the various local authority bodies is
more easily assessed, voters, on the whole appear to be
less passionately divided according to party lines than
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during general election campaigns. Also, turnout
percentages indicate less interest on the part of the
electorate in Local elections. For example, the turnout in
the Local elections of 1979 was 73.9%; by comparison, in
the General election held in the same year turnout was
87.4%.
In the local elections of 1982, the survey was carried out
in the Municipalities of Coimbr~, Lisbon and Barreiro. The
Presidency of the Municipal Chambers (Town Halls) of Lisbon
and Barreiro were at the time in control of the AD and APU
respectively. The Presidency of the Municipal Chamber of
Coimbra had been in control of the Socialist party until
the 1979 Local elections, when the Socialist party lost it
to the AD alliance. The socialists, however, retained a
great deal of influence in the Chamber.
Table 1.8 compares the party vote between the General
election of 1979 and the Local elections of 1979 in the
cities of Coimbra (200 km north of Lisbon), Lisbon and
Barreiro (25 km south of Lisbon in the district of
Setubal).
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TABLE 1.8
Comparison between the percentages of the vote
obtained by the AD, the PS and the APU in the
General election and Local election of 1979 in the Municipalities
of the cities of Coimbra, Lisbon and Barreiro
City of Lisbon 44.1
(District of
Lisbon)
24.5 23.5
1979 Local*
election
(Town Halls)
AD PS APU
46.9 23.4 25.1
Municipalities
(Town Halls)
1979 General
election
(Parliament)
AD PS APU
City of Coimbra 39.4
(District of
Coimbra)
City of Barreiro 15.4
(District of
Setubal)
34.3 17.8 43.2 32 19.2
18.6 57.5 13.1 19.3 62
* (In "As Elei~~es no Portugal de Abril", 1980)
Section 1.4 - Electoral issues used in the three electoral
surveys
1.4.1. Issues selected for the 1980 Presidential election
The selection of the ten issues used for the 1980
Presidential election survey was based on the issues raised
by the ongoing conflict between the AD government and the
incumbent President Ramalho Eanes, and the arguments put
forward by the AD leadership in support of institutional
harmony as a safeguard of political stability.
36
The ten issues were:
1. A President should a be impartial
2. A President should respect the Constitution
3. A President should use his right to veto bills judged to
be unconstitutional
4. A President should risk political instability rather
than give in to a government who act against
the Constitution
5. A President should give unconditional support to the
government
6. A President should support a dictatorial form of
government
7. A President should support political stability
8. A President should support political instability
9. A President should support Revolution
10. A President should support a military coup
1.4.2. Issues selected for the 1982 Local elections
The ten issues selected for the 1982 Local elections tended
to be of a social welfare nature reflecting the general
needs of the population both in urban and rural areas.
Seven out of the ten issues used concern such questions.
Two of the remaining three address themselves to problems
which were being reported by the newspapers concerning
corruption charges made against a few town councillors.
The tenth issue raised the point of the general lack of
contact between councillors and local populations during
mandates.
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The ten issues were:
"In the municipality where I live "...
1• ... housing should all be provided with piped water,
electricity and sewage.
2•••• priority should be given to solving housing
shortages
3. ••• more sport and socio-cultural facilities should be
provided
4 •••• more playgrounds and creches should be built
5•••• more schools should be built
6 •••• the important thing is to elect honest and hard
working councillors who are interested in improving
living conditions
7 •••• local authorities should be accountable as to
the manner public funds are administered
8 •••• transport problems should be solved
9 •••• priority should be given to pollution control
10 •••• Councillors should maintain frequent contacts with
local populations so that the most pressing problems
are identified and solved
1.4.3 Issues selected for the 1983 General election
The selection of issues presented difficulties. The main
one was due to the lack of differentiation between the main
parties' positions on most of the issues raised, as
explained in Section 1.3.3.
38
In view of the generally accepted principle that urgent
measures were needed to solve the economic crisis and
promote social welfare and justice, the eight issues
selected were presented as corollaries to that principle.
The eight issues selected were:
"to solve the crisis and promote social welfare and
't' "JUs ~ce •••
1•••• the social contract between government employers and
Unions should be celebrated. (issue proposed by the
Socialist party, supported by the christian and social
democrats and opposed by the communists)
2. ••• patriotism and order should be strengthen (values
which underlined the christian democrats' campaign)
3 •••• social welfare policies based on the right of all to
health, education and housing should be promoted (issue
presented in great detail by the socialists within their
100 measures manifesto, supported by all the other
parties)
4 •••• the public sector should be reduced (issue supported
by the social democrats and christian democrats; half
supported by the socialists who criticised the extent
and radical nature of the two right wing parties' stands
and bitterly opposed by the communists)
5. ... government should rule with purpose, authority and
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morality (values which underlined the social-democrats'
campaign)
6. a new government should embark on a programme of
development of the country's natural resources, in order
to diversify production and create new jobs (issue
proposed by the communists but widely supported by all
the other parties)
7•••• changes in Labour Laws including the strike law
should be introduced (issue supported by the social
democrats and christian democrats; half supported by the
socialists who criticised the extent and radical nature
of the two right wing parties' stands and bitterly
opposed by the communists)
8. ••• a new government should increase the purchasing
power of the people (issue proposed by the communists
and supported by the right wing parties; the socialists
did not on account that austerity measures needed to be
introduced to curb inflation, before the country could
embark on an economic recovery).
Section 1.5 - Summary of Chapter I
This chapter reviewed the main political and electoral
developments that took place in Portugal between the 1974
Revolution and the General election held in 1983 to provide
the necessary framework for the issues used to probe into
the political awareness of Portuguese voters.
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Extensive reference will be made to the selected issues and
to their background in the Chapters devoted to the
presentation and discussion of the results of each of the
three surveys. The theoretical basis of the research will
now be presented and discussed.
The following three chapters are devoted, therefore,
description of the main social Psychology models of
behaviour (Chapter II); a detailed account of the Reasoned
to a
voting
Action Model (Chapter III) and examples of the applications
of the model in Britain and the United States (Chapter IV).
41
CHAPTER II
A SURVEY OF THE MAIN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY MODELS
OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR
Introduction
When individuals cast their votes in an election what are
the main influences which have impinged upon them to make
them pick one particular party or candidate out of a number
of choices?
From the first day of our lives, we live in a social
environment. We receive from it socially structured
knowledge (Bruner and Sherwood, 1981) which in adulthood is
coloured
(Kraus,
However,
by its particular values, motivations and norms
1980; Zajonc, 1980; Taffe1 and Forgas, 1981).
we are more than passive receivers of knowledge.
We are recreators and creators of knowledge, ideas and
representations at the individual and social level (Berger
and Luckman, 1967; Moscovici, 1981). Furthermore, we
develop particularised preferences, dictated not only by
our emotions but also by our reason. Therefore, the
factors which influence vote choice, like any other choice,
are to be found in our social environment and in our own
cognitions.
The important question is, to decide which factors play a
more determinant role in vote choice, whether those related
to the socialization processes, social norms and
expectations of the social environment or those related to
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the individuals' own rational processes and attitudes, i.e.
the creation and recreation of knowledge and
representations by themselves.
The bulk of research on voting behaviour has been carried
out in the United States where, in the last fifty years or
so, systematic attempts have been made to understand and
predict electoral choice. More recently, researchers in
Great Britain have taken up the challenge posed by what
should be the most important process of decision making at
a social level in a democracy.
In the United States, two models of voting behaviour
dominated research from 1944 until the late seventies: the
Columbia Model (Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, 1944, and
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee, 1954); and the Michigan
Model (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960).
Research findings supported the view of social influence
rather than individual cognitions as the determinant factor
in vote choice. The findings differed, though, as regards
to the type of social influence directly linked to vote
choice.
Later models, such as the Reasoned Action Model,
by Fishbein et al (1976) in the United States,
Cognitive Model developed by Himmelweit et al
Britain, support the relevance of social
developed
and the
(1982) in
normative
influence on vote choice but consider that
individuals' cognitions, i.e. political knowledge, playa
more determinant role. The authors of these two later
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models acknowledge the influence of a model of voting
behaviour developed by a political scientist (Downs, 1957),
the Rational Voter Model. In the following sections, this
model is presented as a brief bridging reference between
the two distinct periods in psychological research on
voting behaviour.
All the models of voting behaviour described in this
chapter make use of one concept, central to the
understanding and explanation of human social behaviour,
i.e the concept of attitude. Social psychology has
provided two definitions of attitude which will be referred
to and discussed later on in this chapter and in chapter
III. For the moment it is important to refer the common
element of the two definitions, namely that an attitude is
an expression of what a person feels towards her world, be
it an object, an event, and idea or a behaviour. It is
also important to stress that a person's attitudes do not
develop independently of the particular social environment
in which she lives. Her attitudes are, therefore formed by
the combination of social influence factors and of her own
cognitions and representations.
General references made to "attitude" in the description of
the voting behaviour models that follows should not depart
from these consideranda.
This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.1
describes the earlier models of voting behaviour, i.e the
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Columbia and Michigan models. Section 2.2 presents a brief
account of the Rational Voter Model developed by Downs.
Section 2.3 is devoted to the later models of voting
behaviour: the Reasoned Action Model which will be
presented and discussed in chapter III will only be briefly
introduced here, and the Cognitive Model. Section 2.4
gives a brief summary of the chapter.
Section 2.1. The earlier Models - Columbia and Michigan
2.1.1. The Columbia Model
Using the panel method of interviewing, the Columbia
researchers interviewed the same group of 600 respondents,
once a month, over a period of seven months, prior to the
American presidential elections of November 1940 and 1944.
The questions put to respondents were wide ranging and
allowed for the study of the decision making process while
respondents were actually making up their minds. It was,
thus, possible to discover if specific events during the
campaign had had an effect on decision and whether people's
decisions were affected by the information they were
exposed to, i.e~ the media, other people's opinions, etc.
It was also pOSSible, after the election, to ascertain
whether respondents had voted according to their expressed
decision prior to the elections, i.e whether intentions
were upheld by behaviour.
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In spite of their initial intention to concentrate on the
study of attitudes in the specific context of voting
behaviour, i.e. attitudes to parties, candidates, issues,
Lazarsfeld et al switched their focus of attention to
other variables which, as the interviews
appeared to be central to vote choice.
progressed,
This change in their initial focus of attention was due to
an important preliminary finding which suggested that
attitudes towards parties, candidates and issues changed
not through knowledge acquired through reading or hearing
about them but through personal face to face contacts with
other people. In other words people's attitudes appeared
to be influenced by the opinions of others and ~ere
therefore, maintained or changed due to the effect of some
social processes which the Columbia researchers set out to
define.
Attitude formation and maintenance towards political
parties was found to be the result of "social application",
i.e. group membership on the basis of social class, ethnic
group, religious groups and other informed associations in
which a person participates. In view of the fact that by
and large, voters continued to vote as they always had and
as the families had, party identification was seen as a
consequence of group membership, since an individual's
positive or negative attitudes towards the parties resulted
from whether the group or groups to which he belonged
supported the parties or not.
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According to the findings, within groups the same attitudes
were developed and maintained by the influence some people
were able to exercise on the other group members. These
opinion leaders were found to be the only group members who
possessed an ideology, in any conscious way, and were able
to translate their ideas into decisions about their
actions. Ordinary people appeared to accept and follow
passively the ideas of the opinion leaders .in their group.
However, some people did change their attitudes during
electoral campaigns. This change in their attitudes was
found to be due to the effect of cross pressures, that is
the conflicting opinions between the various groups a
person is affiliated to. As Lazarsfeld et al put it:
"••• an upper class Catholic may find that his
affiliation pulls him in one direction, while
position pulls him in the opposite direction.
religious
his class
And when
concrete situations, such as an election campaign, require
him to make a definite decision, he must also decide which
of his group loyalties should take priority." (Ibid, 1948,
p.xxv).
Summing up and as it can be seen in Figure 2 next page the
Columbia researchers considered that social group influence
was the most important determinant of party identification,
either through the influence of past voting habits
determined by parental vote and reinforced by the opinions
of the groups to which a person belonged, or through the
result of inter group cross pressures.
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information sources
external influe~ces I(in the voter's
environment'
reference group A. reference group B
parental
vote
opinion leader
reference group C
opinion leader opinion leader
..... J.....
resolution of
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I
political attitudes party identification_~='·""""··'·'··'·'i·=·t',:"·"'·"··"'·"·'··" .
group process
internal influences
(in the voter's mind) past
voting
habits
Figure 2 Patterns of influence determining how the
"ordinary voter" will vote: The Columbia model (arrows
indicate directions of influence)
In turn, party identification was found to be the only
determinant of vote choice. Although political attitudes
i.e attitudes toward the parties, candidates and issues,
were found to correlate with vote choice, the Columbia
researchers considered that they only did so because they
were determined by party identification. Party
identification therefore, was found to influence vote
choice and political attitudes in a similar way.
The Columbia findings, attributing to attitudes a
secondary - indirect role, influenced many years of voting
behaviour research. And yet, Lazarsfeld, Berelson and
Gaudet (1948) made specific references to a factor which
can assume great importance in vote decision processes.
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They noted that the two Presidential elections covered by
their research had taken place in a calm political climate
in which few issues had split the main parties, and
wondered what their model would have looked like if the
political climate had not been so calm. Would political
attitudes have been assigned a different role?
2.1.2. The Michigan Model
In 1960, Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes of the
University of Michigan's Survey Research Centre, published
"The American voter", a book devoted to a 'new way of
looking into vote choice'.
Instead of the panel method of interviewing used by the
Columbia group, the Michigan researchers collected their
data by means of nationwide surveys of representative
samples of voters during the campaigns for the 1956
presidential election, the 1958 congressional election, and
also, but to a limited extent, the 1952 presidential
election.
Party identification, revealed by the consistency with
which voters vote for the same party across elections, was
found to be the major determinant of vote choice.
Identification, however, was not found to be the result of
a decision process based on ideological and political
awareness. The attachment to a particular party appeared
to be due to the influence of past voting habits and early
political socialization experiences. The latter, in turn,
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were determined by the background of voters, i.e. social
status, social mobility, parental vote, etc. Political
socialization and voting habits shaped the individual's
system of values and personal goals although these did not
contribute directly to vote choice.
Political
result of
attitudes were only considered to develop
party identification. In other
as a
words,
individuals appeared to hold political attitudes only in so
far as they reflected those adopted by the party they
identified with.
In their original model, the Michigan group assumed that
information sources such as the media, the stands of
politicians,
or immediate
the opinions of friends, etc., had no direct
effect on vote choice. Subsequently this
considered to be too strong (Butler and
Key, 1966). The influence of information
assumption was
Stokes, 1974;
sources was later included in the model, as having a weak
and indirect effect on the shaping of party identification.
In the weaker version of the model, political
which in the earlier version were considered
consequence of party identification, are
attitudes,
to be a
viewed as
primarily determined by past voting habits although able to
receive some influence from information sources, i.e the
media, politicians' stands, opinions of friends etc.
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The two following figures depict the pattern of
in vote choice suggested by the strong and weak versions of
influences
the Michigan model.
external Influences
(In the voter's
environment)
background factors
(sex. social status. social mobility.
parental vote etc.)
I
past soclalizmg expenences
·············..·············..····················t····· .
past habits ----_;_---_personal goalsI .nd vaiues
party Identlflcallon ------- .. political altitudes
Internal influences
(In the voter's rnmd]
.................................................................................................................
behaVIour
Figure 3 The Michigan model of vote choice (original
"strong form").
background factors
Isell. social status. social mobility.
parental vote etc I
external Influences 1 informatIOn
(m the voter's sources ••••••••••• :.1
environment)
···~~·=:T·~p~::~:~···················!··
past habits ~personal goals :
land va:.'.lues ....... !::mternal mfluences1m the voter's mind) , :
party Identification political anltudes ••• i
behaviour
Note: Contmuous Itnes denote strong Influences. broken lines denote weak
Influences. Arrows show the direction of Influence.
Figure 4 The Michigan model of vote choice: general
version of the modified "weak" forms of the model
(Humphreys, P. (1985), Unit 17/18,
Psychology Course, The Open University,
D307 Social
pp.30 and 35).
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2.1.3 A comparison of the Columbia and Michigan models
The two models suggest, through different types of social
influence (group dynamics in one and early socialization in
the other), that party identification is the major factor
affecting voting decision. In both studies, political
attitudes are considered to be dependent upon party
identification. Attitudes towards parties, party leaders
and the parties' stands concerning electoral issues were
considered to be consequences rather than determinants of
party identification.
The Columbia researchers had, however, considered the
possibility that attitudes could have a role to play if
election campaigns were centred around important issues.
They also hinted at the importance that clear arguments on
the part of politicians could have on the decisions made by
voters, as later research findings suggested (Key,
In their opinion the policies discussed by the
during the election campaigns of 1940 and 1944, were
expressed and articulated by the parties. By and
people appeared uninterested in political issues and
electoral decision had not been affected by them.
1966).
parties
poorly
large,
their
In "The American voter", the Michigan group were much more
critical of the voters' lack of interest. They viewed the
American voter as an apathetic, uninformed individual with
only a modest understanding of specific issues and quite
52
ignorant of matters of public policy. In their
conclusions, they wrote:
"Our failure to locate more than a trace of 'ideological'
thinking in the protocols of our surveys emphasises the
general impoverishment of political thought in a large
proportion of the electorate". (pp.542-543).
Some researchers suggest that the disinterest shown by
American voters might have been due to the political
context in which the elections were fought, a factor which
was not taken into account by the Michigan group (Lindzey
and Aronson, 1969, pp 324).
Referring to the 1956 American presidential election,
covered by the Michigan study, Nie, Verba and Petrocik
(1976, p.a.), call it "an unfortunate baseline" and wonder
whether 1956 was an "atypical year with few crucial
divisive issues". Later, Himmelweit et al (1985) pointed
out that the Michigan surveys "fitted the calm period of
the 1950's when few issues divided the electorate."
In spite of the atypical context in which the elections
covered by the Michigan surveys may have been fought, which
by itself may explain the researchers conclusions regarding
the lack of political thought on the part of the majority
of the electorate, the basis on which voters were found to
be lacking in ideological ability should be questioned.
The Michigan group viewed the ideological ability of voters
from a perspective of the type of ideological knowledge
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which is assumed to underlie the political thinking of
party leaders, politicians and political scientists. They
expected ideology to encompass political content as well as
"content outside the political order as narrowly defined
social and economic relationships, and even matters of
religion, education, and the like", and to be a "highly
differentiated attitude structure" where "the parts are
organized in coherent fashion". (pp.192, "The American
Voter).
The generalised
Campbell et al
lack of ideological
(1960) was supported
thinking found by
by later research
results from tests of political socialization theories
based on cognitive development (Adelson and O'Neill, 1966;
Merelman, 1969). Such results indicated that only a
minority of the population possess a coherent attitude
structure on which they base their political actions. In
other words, only a minority reached the highest stage of
being 'ideologues' (Converse, 1964).
More recently, a study carried out to assess the patterns
of support for democratic and capitalist values in the
United States (Chong, McClosky and Zeller, 1985), supported
Converse's view. Chong et al found that only an elite
displays an effective knowledge of and coherent
structures to these values. The attitudes of the
public, on
recogni tLon
the other hand, "reflect only
of the general principles underlying
attitude
general
a faint
the two
traditions". (p.431)
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One problem with such approaches to the development of
political
only make
thinking is the assumption that individuals
political choices when they are in
can
full
possession of comprehensive and highly organized political,
social and economic knowledge. The general impoverishment
of political thought found by such studies may be more
apparent than real since it may have more to do with the
strict, albeit correct, definition of ideology against
which people's ideological thinking is measured, than with
the capacity which people may have to judge among political
alternatives.
By and large, individuals can and do make rational
decisions with respect to goals they want to achieve
possessing incomplete, diffuse or fragmented information.
They rely upon the internal representations they have built
about the world as they know it, i.e. their cognitive
scripts (Schank and Abelson, 1977) which represent coherent
and stable interpretations of sequences of events. When
faced with a choice between competing alternatives, the
crucial factor is that they are able to assess the
differences which distinguish the options available to them
in relation to what they, themselves, want.
Section 2.2 Downs Model of the Rational Voter
The notion of the rational voter was introduced by Downs
(1957) in his book "An economic theory of democracy". The
model developed by Downs is based on economic rationality
and draws paraLleLa between economic concepts such as
ss
'utilities' opportunity costs and pay-offs and the
Althoughvariables which underlie vote decision processes.
the model refers to psychological variables, i.e.
attitudes, evaluations, which underlie decision processes,
such variables are not introduced and discussed within a
psychological framework. They retain the subjective value
which in economic theory is related to 'cash value'
(Humphreys, 1985) rather than assuming the subjective value
of psychological attributes, i.e. the affective, cognitive
and conative elements which influence human behaviour or
action.
Downs considered both why people should vote and the
reasons which led them to pick one party rather than
other. According to Downs, people vote on account of two
main reasons. First because they perceive it as their duty
as citizens to participate in the democratic life of their
country; and second because they are given a choice between
alternatives, a choice which can 'maximize utilities and
minimize regret'. In other words, people understand that
electoral outcomes are important in that they can affect
their lives.
Parties on the other hand, run for elections because they
formulate policies which they want to implement. In order
to achieve their goals, parties need to win votes, more
votes than their opponents. According to the model, the
choice voters face, therefore, is not a choice between
parties, but rather a choice between parties' platforms.
56
Party identification, the most important determinant of
vote choice according to the Columbia and Michigan
findings, has only a marginal role to play in Downs' vote
decision model. The rational voter model ascribes to party
identification a labile role directly dependent upon the
individual voter. According to the model, the voter will
identify with a particular party as long as the party's
policies conform with the voter's expectations. The result
of an election is seen as an equilibrium between voter's
decisions and parties policies, in an analogous way to the
consumer who wants to maximize his utilities and the firms,
who in providing the goods for the consumer to buy, want to
maximize their profits. "Parties' purpose is to win votes,
they will spell out the aims and costs of proposals only in
so far as this is necessary for this purpose given the
actions of the opposition parties" (Downs, 1957). In other
words, parties 'advertise their goods' bearing in mind
their opponents 'advertising' campaigns.
According to Downs theory, evaluation of parties' platforms
together with some image of the parties are the only
determinants of vote choice. When parties' stands on
issues do not conform with the expectations of people who
have previously voted for them, the parties are likely to
lose their support. Vote switching should, therefore, be a
consequence of a mismatch between voters' expectations and
parties' platforms.
57
The Downs' model, however, has only received occasional
empirical support (Fishbein and Coombs, 1974). In one of
such studies, Key (1966), using Downs model, compared
attitudes of vote switchers to those who remained with the
same party across seven different elections. Consistent
with the model's expectations, findings showed that vote
switchers' attitudes no longer fitted those of the voters
who continued to vote for the same party.
factor which appeared to affect rational
choice on the part of voters was the
Furthermore, the
and responsible
clarity of the
parties' positions and the amount of information available
concerning the alternatives.
Downs' model is important on two counts. First, it
highlighted the importance of issues in electoral campaigns
and the impact of information concerning electoral
alternatives. In asserting the importance of parties'
stands vis-a-vis voters' choices, the model conferred to
voters the ability to make a choice which is not confined
to the restricted sphere of social influence but open to
the influence of voters' own likes, beliefs and
expectations.
Secondly, the model has had great influence, in the change
of perspective adopted in later social psychology models of
voting, especially the two models discussed in the next
sections, one of which, The Reasoned ~ction model,
underlies the thesis.
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Section 2.3 The later models - The Reasoned Action Hodel
and the Cognitive Hodel of Vote Choice
While research on voting behaviour continued, based on
versions of the Michigan model, two new models were being
developed and tested. One, the Reasoned Action Model
(Fishbein et aI, 1974, 1978 and 1980) was developed by
American researchers and tested both in the United States
and in Britain. The second model, the Cognitive Model of
Vote Choice (Himmelweit et aI, 1982) was derived by British
researchers across a longitudinal study covering a period
of 23 years.
In the next section, the Reasoned Action Model, which will
be fully presented and discussed in Chapter III, will only
be briefly introduced. The final section of this Chapter
presents the main features and findings of the Cognitive
Model.
2.3.1 The Reasoned Action Hodel of Voting Behaviour
The Reasoned Action Model (Fishbein et aI, 1978) is
composed of two interconnected sub-models: the attitudinal
model and a decision making model based on intentionality,
called the intention model.
The attitudinal model is based on a psychological theory of
attitude developed by Fishbein in 1967 and tested in the
American presidential election of 1964 (Fishbein and
C~ombs, 1974). The intention model (Fishbein and Ajzen,
1975) describes the psychological mechanism through which
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attitudes are translated into action, i.e. the prediction
of behaviour.
The overall theory of reasoned action which underlies the
model makes one basic assumption, that human beings are
usually quite rational and make systematic use of the
information available to them, and it argues that people
consider the implications of their actions before they
decide to engage or not to engage in a given behaviour
(Fishbein et aI, 1980, p.5). According to the theory,
people, in their actions, are guided by their attitudes but
the immediate precursor is their intention to perform or
not to perform them.
This theory of attitude makes an important distinction
between beliefs and attitudes.
Considering attitude as an unidimensional concept
(Fishbein, 1967: Osgood, Suci & Tannenbaum, 1957:
Thurstone, 1931), Fishbein and Coombs (1974) describe it as
the 'amount of affect for or against' an object, i.e. the
amount of liking or disliking, or the indifference an
individual feels towards an object and not as a combination
of feelings, beliefs and actions. The amount of affect can
be evaluated positively or negatively or be neutral (Osgood
et al 1957).
A belief, on the other hand, assumes a connection between a
concept and another concept to which it may be temporarily
or permanently associated (Fishbein, 1967: Fishbein and
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Coombs, 1974). Paraphrasing Fishbein and Coombs' example,
a person may be asked to consider the following statement:
'Mrs Thatcher opposes nationalizations'. The person may
believe the statement to be true, i.e. that 'Mrs Thatcher'
and' nationalizations' are related as the statement implies
or untrue, i.e. that such relation between the two objects
about such relationship. The verification
nothing
of the
does not exist. Or, still, the person may know
statement as true or untrue depends, however, on the amount
of information the person has about the suggested
relationship. If the information the person possesses
about the relationship does not permit her to verify the
statement, categorically, in either direction, it may still
allow her to consider it as probably true or probably
untrue. The operational definition of a belief is, thus,
the probability or improbability that a particular
relationship exists between the object of belief (Mrs
Thatcher) and some other object (nationalizations).
The beliefs held towards the attitude object (i.e. Mrs
Thatcher) are compared against the person's own evaluations
of the other objects (i.e. nationalization, etc) with which
the attitude object is being associated. Thus, in the
attitudinal model, attitudes towards objects are considered
to be the product of a combination between beliefs and the
independent evaluations of the objects themselves, i.e. the
belief that Mrs Thatcher holds a particular view regarding
nationalization, and the person's evaluation of the concept
'nationalization' itself.
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Apart from the distinction between attitudes and beliefs
and the weight of beliefs in the formation of
attitudes, the theory of reasoned action makes a
distinction, namely that between attitudes towards
(i.e. attitude toward Mrs Thatcher) and attitudes
general
further
objects
towards
behaviours or actions (i.e. attitude towards voting for Mrs
Thatcher).
According to the theory of reasoned action attitudes
towards objects do not usually directly determine action
with respect to that object. The direct determinant of
behaviour is the person's intention to perform it or not to
perform it. In the case of electoral decision, intention
to vote is dependent upon the person's attitude towards
voting and also upon a normative, social influence element
reflecting the opinion of trusted others as to whether and
how the action should be performed. (The actual behaviour
is, of course, ultimately dependent upon transient
variables such as the weather, health, time, etc.).
The Reasoned Action Model by focusing on the determinants
of attitude to acts and social influence, takes account of
the factors which are likely to have greater effect on
voters' decisions in the period prior to elections: on the
one hand, the voters' own evaluations of electoral issues
and their beliefs regarding the parties' stands on them; on
the other, the value voters attribute to the opinion of
trusted others. The relative weight of the two components
on the electoral decision, i.e. the rational component
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reflected in the attitudes towards voting for the various
parties and/or candidates, and the normative component, is
an empirical question.
However, the model does not exclude the importance of other
factors found to be determinants of vote choice by both the
Columbia and the Michigan studies. Social influence
through group membership and demographic variables
(Columbia model) is represented, although indirectly, in
the normative constraints which might have a greater effect
on voters' decisions than attitudinal factors (Fishbein and
Ajzen, 1980, pp.177). The effect of party identification
(Michigan model) is also assumed to be indirect, mediated
by the attitudinal and normative components of choice
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 1980, p.178).
2.3.2 The Cognitive Model of Vote Choice
The Cognitive model was derived from a major longitudinal
study carried out in Britain from 1951 to 1974, using a
cross sectional sample group of boys who, in 1951, were 13-
14 years of age. Their progress was followed across a 23
year period, from adolescence to 1959, the first election
in which they voted, and from 1959 to 1974, during which
period the group provided data related to five of the six
general elections which took place in Britain.
The study was carried out by a group of researchers,
Himmelweit et aI, at the London School of Economics, and
the model is often referred to as the L.S.E. Model. In
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their book "How voters decide" (1985) Himmelweit et al
describe the study and present and discuss the results on
which the Cognitive Model is based. They also use three
additional data sources from Sarlvik and Crewe's surveys of
the general elections of 1974, 1979 and 1983.
Acknowledging the contribution of both the Michigan and the
Downs Rational models to the Cognitive Model, Himmelweit et
al (1985) write:
"Although
the voter
models centred on the 'economic rationality' of
take into account party and candidate
performance, they tend to concentrate on the final decision
process only, and ignore the influences that lead to
particular evaluations of issues. In the Michigan model
the past does enter: party identification is thought to
have its roots in early socialization and in attachment to
subsequent reference groups, with time and habit of voting
increasing that attachment. But in both models too little
account is taken of the social context in which the
elections are fought, the cultural values of the society of
the day and the life history of issues, i.e. the way
political ideas develop, crystallize and are put into
practice and, in the process, transformed. Nor is the role
of the individual's value system considered, how assessment
of specific proposals is coloured by their broader
perspective on society".
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Figure 5 The Cognitive model of vote choice (Himmelweit et
al., 1985, "How voters decide", pp 11)
The Cognitive model, therefore, combines elements
to early
related
socialization processes and past voting habit
the
effects with the rational processes which take place when
voter has to make
alternatives,
a choice between electoral
and extends the network of to
include the voters'
influences
own value the socialsystems and
Context in which elections take place.
Figure 5 illustrates the complex network of influences and
their suggested strengths in vote choice.
Within this global cognitive mode, the L.S.E. group include
a sub-model 'the consumer model' to explain the processes
which take place at the time voters make up their minds.
Figure 6 shows the components of the consumer model.
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Figure 6 The Consumer model - the decision mechanism of
the Cognitive model.
The consumer model is concerned with the factors which in
the general cognitive model immediately precede and are
considered as the most direct determinants of vote choice,
i.e. political attitudes, beliefs and evaluations of
parties and party leaders, party preference and party
identification.
The term 'utility' borrowed from economic theory is not
used in the same sense as in economics. In economic theory
'utility' i.e. the subjective value of a commodity, is
defined in relation to its 'objective' cash value. In the
consumer model, the term 'utility' is defined in relation
to the attributes which characterize, psychologically, each
of the electoral alternatives (Humphreys, 1980).
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In the consumer model the choice of a party among the
electoral alternatives is a function of the relative
preferences a voter has for each party and the likelihood
of desired policies being implemented. Such preferences
depend in turn on the voters' attitudes to issues, and on
the probability that parties implement desirable policies
and will not implement undesirable ones.
The data collected by the L.S.E. group across the 23 years
provides a wealth of information regarding the influence of
each component of the cognitive model as a whole in the
processes directly and indirectly related to vote choice.
The detailed and interconnected analyses of components,
i.e. sociological, social influence, value systems,
attitudinal and cognitive are highly informative in a way,
that, perhaps, only a longitudinal study of such dimension
and characteristics can provide.
Himmelweit et al argue the validity of the model on the
basis of four major findings which indicate that attitudes
rather than social influence and early socialization
effects are the main determinant factors of vote choice.
First, the sample showed a high degree of volatility from
election to election indicated by the low correlations
obtained between past vote and vote choice. Only 30% of
the sample, across all elections, voted consistently for
the same party: 16% for the Conservative party, 10% for the
Labour party, 2% for the Liberal party and 2% never voted
(pp.3S). Such h~gh volatility in vote choice would not be
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expected to occur if early socialization were to have a
determinant effect on vote choice.
Secondly, voters were able to perceive correctly the
differences between the parties' stands on non-consensus
issues (pp.113). This finding assumes extreme importance
in the validation of any model of vote choice when voters
decide which way to vote they not only need to have an
opinion
parties
concerning the electoral issues but also know the
stands on the same issues. To be rational,
electoral decision must rest on knowledge of the
differences between the stands of each party.
Thirdly, an evaluation of the separate and combined effects
of past voting history and attitudes on vote choice
revealed that full knowledge of an individual's past voting
history, gathered at the time of each election and not on
recall, "comes close to being as good an indicator of that
person's future vote as his attitudes" (pp.84). However,
attitudes when added to the full voting history of the
individual enhance prediction. The percentage of correct
classification yielded by two discriminant analyses on the
1984 vote of the longitudinal study rose from 71% to 80%
across all voters when 1974 attitudes were added to past
voting history.
Since attitudes appear to make a contribution to vote
choice over and above voting history it is pertinent to
suggest that past voting and therefore vote choice is
shaped by attitudes.
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Finally, in order to establish unequivocally a causal link
between attitudes and behaviour, the L.S.E. group set out
to show that when an individual voter expressed attitudes
which were at variance with those expressed by the majority
of those voting for the same party, the likelihood of him
defecting to another party in a subsequent election
increased. This test was carried out comparing data
obtained by the British Election Survey (Sarlvik and Crewe,
1983) with the longitudinal study data (Himmelweit et a1).
Out of 82% of voters who in the 1974 election had shown a
good fit on attitudes to issues only 18% voted for a
different party in 1979. Of the 69% who in 1974 had shown
a poor fit, 31% voted for a different party in 1979
(pp.103).
The attitudinal component, i.e. the combined effect of the
voters attitudes towards electoral issues and their beliefs
concerning the parties' stands on these issues, was
to be the major determinant of vote choice.
influence and sociological variables were found to
little effect on the prediction of vote choice.
found
Social
have
The
results do not support, therefore, the Michigan findings
but are comparable with those obtained with the tests of
the Fishbein's model of reasoned action. The latter will
be discussed in detail in the following chapter.
2.3.3 A comparison of the Cognitive and Reasoned Action
Models
The Cognitive model and the Reasoned Action model have
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important similarities and differences. They both take
account of the importance of the social environment and
background of voters, of electoral issues and electoral
contexts, although these are subjugated to attitudes as
determinants. They both postulate a decision mechanism
which deals directly with the choice voters have to make,
i.e. the Consumer Model in the Cognitive Model, and the
Intention Model in the Reasoned Action Model. The main
differences lie precisely in the way these
mechanisms are considered to operate.
decision
The decision mechanism of the Cognitive Model, i.e the
consumer mod~l postulates that attitudes to issues together
with beliefs about the likelihood of parties implementing
them yield a measure of preference for party. It is this
reasoning, which just before elections, can predict actual
voting.
The decision mechanism of the Reasoned Action Model, i.e
the intention model considers attitudes to issues and
beliefs regarding the parties stands on them as only an
influence on one of the two components of choice, i.e.
voters' attitudes towards voting for each party. The other
component of the decision to vote is under normative
control. In the intention model decision is not
exclusively under the control of attitudes. The predictive
measure of actual voting, i.e. intention, is a weighted
measure which indicates which of the components has more
weight in the decision to vote for a particular party. The
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way the components are weighted can change for different
voters, for different elections, for different historical
periods, for different cultures, etc.
The consumer model and the intention model are both
expectancy-value attitude models. "Expectancy", another
name for a belief, is a probabilistic expectation about any
future happening. "Value", in this sense, means feeling or
evaluation. There are various types of expectancy-value
attitude models.
The consumer model, the sub-model within the Cognitive
Model which predicts vote choice, is based on behavioural
decision theory (Edwards, 1954) and is usually described as
a decision theoretic model. According to behavioural
decision theory when a person has to choose between
alternatives,
probabilities
The consumer
she chooses the alternative with higher
of producing the most favourable outcome.
model takes into account the person's own
cognitions of the election context and the likelihood of
the person, through her choice, improve, deteriorate or
maintain the existing status quo. The Model can predict
which choice a rational personal should make.
The intention model, the sub-model within the Reasoned
Action Model, is an earlier example
attitude models. Although closely
of expectancy-value
related to decision
theoretic models, is mathematically less consistent and
robust. It predicts vote intention by taking into account
the overall feeling of favourability or unfavourability a
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person holds with respect to each alternative. However, it
is simpler to administer. In the particular case of
Portugal, the intention model was considered to have a
distinctive advantage over the more robust consumer model.
For, unlike the consumer model, it provided a simple and
direct way of assessing the contribution of social
influence factors vis-a-vis the weight of attitudinal
factors in the decision making processes of an electorate
little accustomed to facing alternative electoral choices.
And this was crucial.
Section 2.4 - Summary of Chapter II
This chapter started by making an important point, namely
that vote choice had to be dependent upon the influence of
the social environment on voters' and voters' own
cognitions and representations, i.e their own knowledge of
electoral issues and their attitudes towards the political
elements directly related to their vote choices.
Probably due to the calmer political climate of the time,
the earlier models concluded that voting behaviour was
dependent upon social influence factors which shaped the
only direct determinant of vote choice, i.e party
identification.
In contrast, the later models, tested perhaps in less calm
electoral periods, concluded that attitudes played a more
important role in voting behaviour but did not exclude the
importance of social influence factors. Indeed, the
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Reasoned Action Model which was applied in this research,
suggests that the relative weights of the social influence
component and of the attitudinal component of vote choice
vary according to voters, elections, cultures and
historical periods. It is to a fuller discussion of the
components of the Reasoned Action Model that we now turn.
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CHAPTER III
USING THE MODEL OF REASONED ACTION TO STUDY THE
DETERMINANTS OF VOTE CHOICE AMONG PORTUGUESE VOTERS
Introduction
In both the United States and Britain, the life history of
issues mirrors the passage of time, the success and
failures of past governments and provide the electorate not
only with a basis for deciding which are the most pressing
problems which need to be tackled but also who, among the
parties, appears to be the best equipped to solve them in a
particular social, political and economic context, at a
particular time. The explanation for significant vote
switching from election to election is found, therefore, in
the ability of the electorate to determine the important,
salient issues, and which party is most likely to implement
their solution.
In spite of the obvious shortcomings of the Portuguese
political scene in this respect, from the first election in
1975 to the third general election in October 1980, the
electorate showed increasingly stronger signs of vote
switching. If a comparison between the composition of the
first legislative Parliament in 1976 and that of the
Parliament elected in 1980 is made, in global left/right
terms, the result is a complete reversal, with a leftwing
majority being replaced by a rightwing majority.
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What was the basis for such rapid and massive electoral
change? "Irrational" behaviour based on the influence of
normative factors, i.e. opinion of group leaders within the
family, the circle of friends or the church, or was there
evidence that voters were making reasoned choices even if
based on the confused, information available to them?
These signs of vote switching among the Portuguese
electorate provided the basis for assessing voting
behaviour in terms of reasoned choice and investigate the
relationship between this reasoning component of vote
choice and that related to social influence.
As stated in Chapter II, the Reasoned Action model provided
a simple framework for the research. In this chapter the
Model and its elements are presented in detail, together
with descriptions of its applications in voting behaviour.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 3.1
presents the assumptions on which the model is based.
Section 3.2 describes the relationship between attitudes
and behaviour and through a practical example the
connection between beliefs, as determinants of attitudes,
and behaviour. Section 3.3 using the practical example
introduced in section 3.2 describes the role of social
influences on intention and behaviour. Section 3.4
provides a brief summary of the chapter.
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Section 3.1. - The assumptions of the Reasoned Action Hodel
The following diagram shows how the two components of the
model, i.e. the attitudinal model and the intention model
and how their elements are interconnected, as well as the
role of other variables which are assumed to indirectly
related to the decision process and behaviour, i.e. the
external variables.
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Figure 7 The Reasoned Action model
The model makes three fundamental assumptions. First, that
behaviour is directly dependent upon intention to perform
or not to perform the behaviour. Second, that intention is
directly dependent upon the attitude towards performing the
behaviour and also upon a subjective norm related to
whether or not the behaviour should be performed. Third,
that the determinants of attitude to act and thence
intention are, in turn, determined by the individuals'
knowledge of the world, i.e. electoral issues, party
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platforms and voters' own beliefs and the extent to which
the opinion of trusted others are important to them.
All other variables are considered to be external, in the
sense that they do not play a direct role in the shaping of
intention to perform a given behaviour. Demographic
variables, general attitudes toward objects in the world,
the personality traits of individuals, in other words,
'what the individuals already are' are held as background
constants. They influence the way knowledge is acquired
and integrated, the evaluations made about issues in
general, the beliefs about the world, the relationships
established with social referents and the value of such
relationships as guides for action.
Section 3.2 Attitudes and behaviour
Contrary to many conceptions of attitude in which feelings,
beliefs and predispositions to act are somewhat vaguely
combined to form attitudes (Allport, 1953; Krech and
Crutchfield, 1948; Katz and Holland, 1959; Rosenbery et aI,
1960), in the Reasoned Action model attitude is defined as
"a person's evaluation of any psychological object" i.e.
the measure of affect a person's holds toward an object
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp.27) or a behaviour.
This unidimensional view of attitude has distinctive
advantages
approach.
over the more traditional multidimensional
The advantages are related both to problems with
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attitude measurement on the one hand and to problems
concerning
behaviour.
the relationship between attitudes and
Most of the research carried out to explore the link
between attitudes and behaviour, following a
multidimensional attitude approach failed to measure the
three components of attitude, i.e. affective (feelings),
cognitive (beliefs) and conative (overt actions). Most
studies only tapped the affective component and the low
relation found between attitudes and behaviour was
circularly explained by the non-inclusion of the other two
components in the study.
From a multidimensional perspective, the relat~onship
between attitudes and behaviour was found to be weak.
Research under this perspective led to the development of
various theories of attitude organization and change known
as consistency theories (Heider, 1944, 1958) out of which
was developed the theory of cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957). According to this theory the three
components of attitude, i.e. feelings, beliefs and
behaviour should be consistent with each other.
When they are not i.e. when the individual experiences
cognitive dissonance, the individual will try to eliminate
the unpleasantness caused by dissonance and change occurs.
For example, if a person's behaviour is inconsistent with
her beliefs, the person will either change her beliefs or
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her behaviour in such way as to achieve consistency between
her beliefs and her actions.
However, research to test cognitive dissonance theory has
involved, by and large, paradigms which have forced people
to behave in a way inconsistent with their beliefs.
Results showed that people tend to change their beliefs and
make them consistent with their actions but they have
failed to show the extent to which feelings and/or beliefs
influence behaviour. Ajzen & Fishbein (1980) reviewing the
literature only refer to three studies dealing with the
effect of attitude change on behaviour. The three studies
reported no change in behaviour caused by a change in
attitudes.
The problem concerning the hypothetical causal relationship
between attitudes and behaviour in the sense that behaviour
is determined by attitudes has permeated most of social
psychology research on attitudes and attitude change. In
spite of the fact that results of experiments reveal that
this relationship is weak, the notion is appealing perhaps
in view of its very strong intuitive basis. The reduction
of behaviour to a single overt action, as it is the case in
experiments, together with the compounded definition of
attitude, which itself includes a behavioural component
understood as either the behaviour itself or verbal
expressions as to what the behaviour would be, fail to
take account of the influence of context, knowledge,
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normative constraints and other variables, which can
influence both behaviour and attitudes at any given time.
As Freedman, Carlsmith and Sears (1970) concluded
"•••attitudes always
with them,
produce pressure to behave
but external pressures andconsistently
extraneous considerations
inconsistently with their
change in attitude tends
can cause people to behave
attitudes. Any attitude or
to produce behaviour that
corresponds with it. However, this correspondence often
does not appear because of other factors that are involved
in the situation (pp. 385-386)".
If experimentally, the relationship between attitudes and
behaviour is found to be weak but nevertheless, on
intuitive grounds, this relationship remains strong, the
problem may be due, as Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) suggest,
to errors in determining the appropriate variables which
link particular attitudes to particular behaviours. . "To
predict a single behaviour we have to assess the person's
attitude toward the target at which the behaviour is
directed". (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, pp.27 chapter 2).
What Ajzen & Fishbein propose is that any behaviour can be
predicted from attitude provided that the measure of
attitude
study.
corresponds to the measure of behaviour under
Therefore, any study on the influence of attitudes
on behaviour has to take account of which issues in any
given context at any given time can be used to predict the
behaviour.
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Ajzen & Fishbein illustrate the complexity of measuring
behaviour by drawing attention to the confusion often made
between outcomes of behaviour and behaviour itself, between
inferences made about behaviour and actual behaviour, and
between single behavioural acts and behavioural categories,
i.e. the different single acts which, together, are
indicative that a particular behaviour can occur.
By drawing attention to such differentiations Ajzen &
Fishbein highlight the importance of defining a behavioural
criterion or set of criteria in order to establish whether
one wants to deal with outcomes of behaviour or actual
behaviours, how to accept inferences about behaviours as
instances of the behaviours themselves and how many
inferences are necessary to characterize each behaviour.
In measuring voting behaviour, for example, consideration
should be given to the difference between the simple act of
voting in general, and the simple act of voting in a
particular election. An individual may think that
democratic participation is, generally speaking, a good
principle but choose not to vote in a particular election
in view of the specific electoral context, for example not
having a suitable candidate to vote for or being ill or
away or not bothered to face adverse weather conditions,
etc., etc. From the decreasing turnout in recent American
elections which in some elections is less than 50%, it
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should not be inferred that over fifty percent of Americans
do not believe in the validity of democratic universal
suffrage. In order to ascertain the cause of such non-
participatory behaviour it would not suffice to ask the
electorate whether they intended to vote in a particular
election. The electorate would have to be asked a more
general question, i.e. if they accepted the principle or
not.
Once the behaviour of interest is defined, i.e. voting in
general and/or voting in a particular election it is
important to consider and define four behavioural elements:
1) the action, i.e. the act of voting in the election, 2)
the targets at which the behaviour is directed, i.e. the
candidates running in the election, 3) the contexts, i.e.
where one lives, votes, the weather at the time of the
election etc and 4) the time, i.e. a single point in time,
as for example just before the election and or at various
pOints in time during the electoral campaign.
The important point to make is that in order that an
adequate relationship between attitudes and behaviour is
established it is not sufficient to enquire about attitudes
towards the targets at which the behaviour is directed but,
on the contrary, it is imperative that attitudes toward the
behaviour itself as defined by its four elements of action,
target context and time, are tapped. The attitudes to the
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behaviour in question, however, are assessed through
beliefs held about important issues which are considered to
be directly related to the behaviour.
3.2.1. Beliefs as the determinants of attitude - the
attitudinal model (an expectancy-value model)
Fishbein & Ajzen (1980) argue that a person's attitude is a
function of his salient beliefs at a given point in time.
Each belief associates a given object with some attribute,
an attribute which is dependent upon the information he has
about the object at any given time.
As explained in chapter II, Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of
the relations between beliefs and attitudes is a form of
expectancy-value model. An expectancy-value model is "a
descriptive model which is applicable to any set of
beliefs, whether they are salient or non-salient, new or
old" (pp.222). Although the underlying model of the
theory of reasoned action is not strict on this point
Fishbein and Ajzen consider that a person's attitude toward
an object can only be rigourously determined by her salient
beliefs.
Another point to note is that although in the theory of
Reasoned Action salient beliefs are considered to determine
a person's attitude, the use of the model itself does not
establish a causal relation between beliefs and attitudes,
it only establishes a relation.
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The equation which describes the model is
A - b x e
i i
i-I
Where A - attitude toward an object, action or event
b - beliefs concerning the attributes of the
object
e - evaluations made concerning the attributes
of the object or the consequences of the
action or event
n - number of salient beliefs
Persons holding the same beliefs regarding the parties'
stands in an election, i.e. persons who believe that the
parties will carry out the same given policies can have
different attitudes towards the parties, since their
attitudes are also dependent upon their own evaluations of
those policies. Likewise, persons holding different
beliefs regarding the parties' stands may have the same
attitudes. It follows, therefore, that knowing a person's
attitude towards an object, action or event provides no
information in itself regarding either the beliefs he holds
with respect to the object or the consequences of the
action or his own evaluations of the attributes associated
with the object. In order to ascertain how a person's
attitude is formed it is necessary to examine the
particular constitution of belief and evaluation in each
instance of the set of salient belief statements.
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Given the informational basis of an expectancy value
model it is worth considering the limit suggested on the
number of belief statements used to characterize an object,
action or even. This limit of five to nine maximum belief
statements conforms with the limited capacity a person's
has in processing information at any given time (Miller,
1956; Mandler, 1967). The way the expectancy-value model
is constructed corresponds to this limitation. The model
assumes that the number of salient belief statements a
person elicits regarding an object are arranged
hierarchically in terms of their probabilities. Within
this hierarchy, each additional belief statement
contributes successively less to the total attitude,
tending the evaluation to level off after five to nine
statements.
Contrary to what might be expected, therefore, i.e. that
increasing the number of belief statements would yield an
improved measure of attitude, the hierarchical nature of
the model renders an increase beyond the consideration of
nine belief statements redundant, as far as an individual
is concerned. In surveys, when it is necessary to tap
everyone's beliefs the number of belief statements used is
usually greater.
3.2.2. Beliefs, attitudes and voting behaviour - an exa.ple
As we have seen according to the theory of Reasoned Action
attitudes guide behaviour. In turn, attitudes toward an
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object are determined by beliefs acquired about the object,
i.e. the associations which are established between the
object and various characteristics, qualities and
attributes.
association
According to Ajzen & Fishbein (1980), this
between objects, actions and events and
attributes gives rise, automatically, to the formation of
attitudes. "More specifically, we learn to like (or have
favourable attitudes toward) objects we believe have
positive characteristics, and we acquire unfavourable
attitudes toward objects we associate with
characteristics". (pp.63, Chapter 6).
negative
According
time a
to the theory of Reasoned Action, at any given
person attends to a restricted number of
characteristics with respect to any given object. These
characteristics or attributes of an object, generated by
each individual are defined as the individual's salient
beliefs
beliefs
in respect to the object, and are these
which are the immediate determinants
salient
of the
individual's attitude toward the object itself, be it an
object, an idea, a behaviour etc.
In voting behaviour the relation between salient beliefs
and attitudes towards voting for the candidates and of
parties can be exemplified as follows. The aim of an
election is to choose among alternatives the parties and/or
the candidates who, once elected, will be seating in
Parliament, form the Government, be the next President etc.
according to the specific purpose of the electoral act.
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If voting in the election is not compulsory, voters face a
choice. They either choose to vote or not to vote in the
election, depending upon their attitudes towards voting in
that particular election. There may be a number of reasons
for people deciding not to vote. Some may know that they
will be away on election day and will therefore be unable
to cast their vote. This is a decision determined by
external factors, i.e time of the election. Others,
however, may make a conscious decision directly related to
their feelings about voting in the election, i.e their
attitudes toward voting in the election. Some people may
have decided never to vote in any election. Others,
however, may vote in some elections and not in others. In
such cases, the decision to vote or not to vote in the
election is dependent upon factors which are directly
related to the particular election, i.e. the issues at
stake vis-a-vis the electoral alternatives who, if elected,
can pursue policies aimed at bringing the issues to a
successful solution. A voter may decide not to vote in a
particular election because he or she does not believe that
any of the candidates and or parties can solve the
problems, i.e. the issues, which the voter believes to be
most important.
By implication, when voters decide to vote in an election,
they do so because they believe that there are important
issues which need to be tackled, and that, among the
candidates and or parties, it will be possible to pick
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those who will be able to do something about, if not all
the issues, at least some of them.
In other words, people are aware of important issues
they believe should be solved in a particular way.
which
An
election provides an opportunity for a solution of those
issues. Since people cannot directly solve the issues,
they will have to consider, in accordance with the declared
electoral aims of the candidates and or the parties, which
among these, once elected, are more likely to tackle the
issues in the desired manner.
How is this connection between voters salient beliefs and
voting for the electoral alternatives measured? To
illustrate this point the steps that should be taken to
measure the connection between voters salient beliefs and
their attitudes towards voting for each electoral
alternative are described in the following example in a
General election.
Prior to the General election, a number of respondents is
asked to state the electoral issues which each one of them
considers to be the most important for the new government
to tackle. The number of salient issues would vary among
respondents and there would be differences in the actual
issues referred to. Although, in theory, the connection
between respondents' salient beliefs and their attitudes
toward voting for each electoral alternative should be
measured individually, it is possible to standardise the
procedure by compiling a single list of the issues most
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frequently mentioned by the respondents in general and use
this list to measure the connection between beliefs and
attitudes among all respondents.
Once the set of salient beliefs is formed, respondents are
asked to evaluate each belief on a seven point, good-bad
scale. Although all beliefs in the set are considered to
be important, some will be of more importance than others
to each respondent. The differences in the degree of
importance are taken into account by the evaluation each
respondent accords to each belief.
The evaluation of each belief is thus cans idered in terms
of its consequences. When respondents are asked to
evaluate, for example, "nationalizations" on a seven point,
good-bad scale, they are being, in fact, asked to assess
the value of the outcome of a policy of nationalizations,
i.e. whether nationalizations are extremely good, very
good, good, nor good nor bad, bad, very bad, or extremely
bad. A set of modal salient beliefs assessed in this
manner would give an indication of the respondent's
attitude towards the main electoral issues, i.e. the
problems which the respondent believes must be tackled and
an indication of the policies needed to tackle them.
Since the respondent is himself unable to implement the
policies necessary to solve the problems he has to assess
the probabilities of each party, once elected, adopting
the required stands to solve the issues. In other words,
respondents believe that parties will or will not ·adopt the
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stands they themselves think should be adopted for all or
only part of the issues. The combination of evaluation of
the salient issues together with the measure of strength of
the respondent's beliefs regarding each party and/or
candidate's stand on each issue yield a measure of the
respondent's attitude towards voting for each party and/or
candidate, i.e. it gives an attitudinal measure directly
related to his voting behaviour.
Consider as an example that the respondent was asked to
evaluate four salient electoral issues and has two parties
to chose from. Consider also that the fours issues were
that the government shOUld:
1. abolish dir~ct taxation
2. reduce the working week to 4 days
3. reintroduce capital punishment
4. extend national conscription to women
To evaluate the outcome of the issues the respondent is
given the seven point good-bad scale already referred to.
To express his beliefs concerning the stands the two
parties were likely to adopt on the issues if elected, the
respondent is given seven point scales which determine the
degree of certainty of the respondent with respect to the
position of the two parties on each of the four issues.
Suppose that in the evaluations of the four issues the
respondent indicated that he believed that the abolition of
direct taxation would be an extremely good (+3) measure,
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that the reduction of the working week to four days would
be a good measure (+1) that the reintroduction of capital
punishment would be neither good nor bad (0) and that the
extension of national conscription to women would be an
extremely bad measure (-3). Suppose also that when the
respondent was asked to state his beliefs concerning the
likely stands of the two parties, i.e party X and party Y,
he indicated that he believed that if party X were to be
elected it would be extremely unlikely (-3) that party X
would abolish direct taxation, unlikely (-1) that party X
would reduce the working week to four days, very likely
(+2) that party X would reintroduce capital punishment and
extremely likely (+3) that party X would extend national
conscription to women; with respect to party Y suppose that
the respondent indicated that he believed that if elected
it would be very likely (+2) that party Y would abolish
direct taxation, extremely likely (+3) that party Y would
reduce the working week to four days, unlikely (-1) that
party Y would reintroduce capital punishment and extremely
unlikely (-3) that party Y would extend national
conscription to women. The following table sets out the
strengths of the respondent's evaluations of the issues and
his beliefs concerning the parties' stands on the issues.
Issues Evaluations
of outco.es
Beliefs concerning the parties stands
on the issues
Party X Party Y
1 + 3 - 3 + 2
2 + 1 - 1 + 3
3 0 + 2 - 14 3 + 3 - 3
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From the respondent's evaluations of outcomes, i.e. the
evaluations of the measures which should be adopted to
tackle the issues, it is apparent that the respondent had
different feelings for each issue. Whereas he strongly
believed that direct taxation should be abolished (+3) his
beliefs towards the reduction of the working week to four
days although favourable were less strong (+1); he showed
indifference towards the reintroduction of capital
punishment (0) by stating that the policy would be neither
good or bad and showed very strong beliefs (-3) against the
extension of national conscription to women.
It is also apparent that the respondent believed party X
and party Y had different stands on the issues. Whereas he
believed party Y to have stands very similar to his own on
the issues, he believed party X's stands to be quite
the opposite of those he believed should be adopted.
According to the Reasoned Action Model the respondent's
attitude towards voting for Party X and for Party Y is
measured by the sum of the products of the respondent's
evaluations of the issues themselves and his beliefs
concerning the parties' stands, i.e.
Issue Party X Party Y
1 - 9 + 6
2 - 1 + 3
3 0 0
4 - 9 + 9
-19 +18
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Whereas concerning Party X the respondent's attitude toward
voting is very negative (-19), concerning Party Y his
attitude towards voting is highly positive (+18). In other
words because of the perceived stands of Party Y on the
four issues being so similar to the views of the respondent
it becomes highly likely that the respondent will vote for
Party Y.
Section 3.3 Social influence on intention and behaviour
In the previous section the determinants
viewed as an unidimensional measure of
discussed in terms of an attitudinal model
expectancy-value model.
of attitude,
affect, were
based on an
The model
itself to
of Reasoned Action, however,
an attitudinal explanation
does
of
not limit
behaviour.
Further, behaviour is considered to be directly related to
intentionality, i.e. the person's wish or intention to
carry it out, and this also involves social influences.
Thus according to the Reasoned Action model the intention
to perform a given behaviour is a function of the person's
attitude towards performing it (itself a function of the
beliefs and evaluations of specific outcomes) and the
effect of social influence on the person concerning the
performance of the behaviour, i.e. the person's subjective
norm.
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Subjective norm
The influence of the social environment on intentions and
behaviour is understood in terms of the perceptions a
person has of what most people who are important to her
think she should or should not do. This perception mayor
may not reflect what those people the person trusts
actually think. Whether such perceptions are correct or
incorrect is not important. The important question is that
for the person they are and in so being that they might
actually influence behaviour.
In order to establish the extent of social influence
factors on intentions and behaviour respondents are asked
to indicate on a prescriptive (should/should not perform
the behaviour), seven point scale their degree of
certainty/uncertainty or indifference as to the opinion of
trusted others (i.e. family, friends, church, etc.)
The combination of subjective norms and attitudes toward
performing a given behaviour, i.e. voting for a particular
party in an election give the strength of a person's
intention to vote for that party. The intention model is
expressed as
BI - A + SNB
wI
Where BI - behavioural intention
AB - attitude toward performing the behaviour
w2
SN - subjective norm
wI & w2 - empirically determined weights
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In the working example presented Section 3.2.2. we have
seen how beliefs held with respect to important issues and
with respect to the stands the parties were likely to adopt
on them determined the respondent's attitude towards voting
for party X and party Y.
Following the example through, suppose, using a seven point
scale of +3 to -3, we asked the respondent to state his
beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others on whether
he should vote for party X and for party Y; that in order
to do this we used four categories of trusted others, i.e.
parents, spouse, best friends and workmates and obtained
the following results:
Categories of Party X Party Y
trusted others
parents +2 -3
spouse +3 -3
friends -2 +3
workmates 0 0
+3 -3
The respondent's behavioural intention to vote for party X
and party Y would be
Party X
attitude social influence
Party Y
attitude social influence
BI - -19 +3 +18 -3
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However, in order to determine the weight of each component
on behavioural intention the respondent has to be also
asked to state how strong was his intention to vote for
party X and for party Y. Suppose that in this particular
case the respondent had stated quite definitely (+3) that
he intended to vote for party X. It becomes clear,
therefore that in spite of the respondent's knowledge of
the electoral issues and of the parties' positions on them
vis-a-vis his preferred outcomes for the issues, the
respondent felt that it was more important to vote
according to what he believed his parents and his spouse
thought he should do. In other words, the weight of social
influence factors on his intention to vote was greater than
the weight of his own cognitions and reasoning processes.
Although the model of reasoned action postulates that
attitude towards performing a given behaviour and
subjective norms determine intention and behaviour it
should be made clear ~he mediating nature of intention on
behaviour. Provided correct measures are derived,
intention to perform a given behaviour is always predicted
from attitudinal and subjective norm measures. However, the
relation between the latter two measures. and behaviour may
not always hold. Intention has only a mediating role on
behaviour since the actual performance of the behaviour may
be also dependent upon the four elements behavioural
elements, i.e. action, target, context and time.
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Section 3.4 Summary of chapter III
The model of Reasoned Action is concerned with the
prediction and, potentially, with the explanation of
behaviour. It is a simple model directly concerned with
the immediate determinants of behaviour. It states that
when people act their actions are determined both by the
knowledge they have acquired about important aspects
directly related to their actions and by the knowledge they
have concerning the feelings trusted others hold about the
actions
people's
differ
themselves. The weight of these two elements on
intentions to behave in a specific manner may
according to personal characteristics and/or
behavioural contexts.
The applications of the model in the 1976 American
Presidential election and in the 1974 British General
election are briefly described in the next chapter. Making
use of these descriptions the chapter will also set the
scene for the Portuguese surveys.
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CHAPTER IV
APPLICATIONS OF THE REASONED ACTION MODEL IN AMERICAN AND
BRITISH ELECTIONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PORTUGUESE STUDIES
Introduction
The aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to give an
account of the results of electoral research carried out
both in the United States and in Britain which used the
Reasoned Action model to predict and explain voting
behaviour in these two countries; and second to set the
scene of the Portuguese research against the American and
British backgrounds.
However, before
Reasoned Action
an account of the applications
model in the USA and the UK is
of the
given,
attention should be drawn to a crucial difference between
the electoral systems of the two countries, since such
difference has important implications in the use of the
model and the hypotheses which are generated.
When voters in the USA vote in a Presidential election
they, usually, have to choose between a number of
candidates two of which are endorsed by the two main
political parties, i.e. the Democratic Party and the
Conservative Party. The presidential candidate who wins
the election appoints his government directly, choosing its
Ministers from among persons who have not been elected by
universal suffrage.
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Although the two main candidates are likely to advocate
policies which follow the policy lines of their respective
parties, they are perceived as having a large degree of
independence from their party bases. Attitudes toward
voting for the presidential candidates are, therefore,
expected to be more determinant of intention to vote than
attitudes toward voting for parties.
In Great Britain, a government is formed by the leader of
the party who won the election, from among the party
candidates elected to Parliament in their
constituencies, where, by and large, each party
is well known to the local population.
respective
candidate
In such electoral system, voters who normally identify with
a particular party may in some cases actually prefer the
candidate of another party. However, voting for the
preferred local candidate could increase the chances of
helping to elect a government of a non-preferred party.
Because of the implications of their vote in the formation
of a government, attitudes toward candidates in the British
electoral context may be unrelated to attitudes toward
voting for the candidates.
In the British electoral system during General
attitudes toward voting for parties, and not
toward voting for presidential candidates as
elections
attitudes
in the
American Presidential case, should be more determinant of
intention to vote.
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The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 4.1
provides a brief description of the methodology and results
of the application of the Reasoned Action model in the 1976
American Presidential election; Section 4.2 provides a
brief description of the methodology and results of the
application of the model in the October 1974 British
General election; Section 4.3 summarises the results of the
two applications. Section 4.4 provides the link between
the applications of the model in America and Britain and
its application in the Portuguese context setting the scene
for the following chapters.
Section 4.1. The use of the Reasoned Action Model in the
1976 American presidential election
The study was based on interviews with residents of
Champaign County, Illinois. The sample of respondents was
drawn t~ represent different levels of various demographic
variables such as socio-economic status and education.
Salient belief statements were first drawn from a small
sample of the 88 respondents and the questionnaire proper
was prepared to include:
1. measures of intentions to vote for each Presidential
candidate
2. attitudes toward voting for each Presidential candidate
3. subjective norms toward voting for each Presidential
candidate
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4. beliefs concerning the stands of each Presidential
candidate toward each belief statements
5. evaluations of the objects of each belief statement
6. normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted
others toward voting for each Presidential candidate
7. motivation to comply measures to indicate the extent to
which respondents were influenced by the opinion of
trusted others in the decision to vote for each
Presidential candidate
8. direct measure of attitude to each Presidential
candidate
9. party identification
The questionnaire was administered one month and again
week prior to the election. In the week following
election, respondents were asked to reveal for whom
had voted.
one
the
they
In the 1976 American Presidential Election, the two main
candidates were Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter. Although the
other candidates' names also appeared in the questionnaire,
the results were analysed and discussed in relation to the
two main candidates.
One week prior to the election 45% of respondents indicated
their intention to vote for Carter and 41% indicated their
intention to vote for Ford. 18% were undecided between
Carter and Ford. After the election, 43) of respondents
were found to have voted for Carter and 43% of respondents
were found to have voted for Ford. The correlation between
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differential voting intentions and actual voting for the
two candidates was r-.80.
The differential intentions were accurately predicted from
the model using a weighted combination of differential
attitudes toward voting for the two candidates and from the
differential subjective norm with R-.83.
Beliefs that voting for Carter and Ford will lead to
certain outcomes related to the perceived stands of the
candidates on electoral issues, and evaluations of these
outcomes were used to estimate attitudes toward voting for
each candidate. Prediction of the differential attitude
scores from these estimates was found to be quite accurate,
with r-.79. The predictive power of expected outcomes
concerning the implementation of particular policies by
either candidate together with the evaluation of such
policies by respondents, does lend support to the main
assumption made by the model of reasoned action i.e. that
voters, in general, have knowledge about electoral issues,
know what they themselves want and what the candidates'
positions vis-a-vis the issues are.
Differential subjective norms, based on normative beliefs
and motivation to comply measures, were also found to
correlate with differential intentions, r-.73.
However the relative contribution of attitudinal factors
and of subjective norms to intention, although significant
on both counts, was found to favour a choice of candidate
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based on beliefs about outcomes and evaluations of those
outcomes rather than a choice based on normative factors.
The attitudinal weight was found to be w-.61 and the
subjective norm weight w-.27.
In this study the social influence component of intention
was derived by considering normative beliefs and motivation
to comply measures together. It was found that motivation
to comply measures did not reveal any differences in the
degree to which Ford and Carter voters were motivated to
comply with any given referent. In other words, whereas
respondents were able to indicate how trusted others wished
them to vote they gave no significant indication as to a
felt need to comply with their wishes.
When the effect of variables such as attitude to the
Presidential candidates and party identification was
considered, variables which are considered external and
only having an indirect effect on intention, it was found
that although significant, their effect was lower than the
effect of the model's components. For example the
correlation coefficients of the following external
variables
candidate,
with voting intention were: attitude to
r-.58; attitude to party, r-.56; party
identification, r-.62; prior voting history,
r-.55 and educational
r-.40;
liberalism-conservatism,
r-.32.
level,
Evidence of the knowledge respondents use in their
assessment of the candidates' stands on electoral issues
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was given by an analysis of their evaluations of the issues
and of their beliefs concerning the stands attributed to
the candidates. Out of the ten belief statements
identified as major electoral issues, five presented
significant differences between those intending to vote for
Carter and those intending to vote for Ford. There were
also five significant differences in the stands attributed
to Ford and Carter. Only in two corresponding instances
between the evaluation measures of belief statements and of
the perceived stands of each candidate did Ford and Carter
voters showed significant differences. Such findings
demonstrate that voters in an election favour some of the
policies presented and oppose others and chose the
candidate who is more likely to implement those which are
favoured.
However, Fishbein et al (1980) point out that there were
"many instances of respondents who vote for a given
candidate despite their beliefs that with respect to some
issues there would be a distinct advantage in voting for
the opposition candidate". Such evidence shows that
voters may see advantages and disadvantages in voting for
different candidates. Ultimately, however, voting
preference is determined by the balance of advantages and
disadvantages voters associate with each candidate.
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Section 4.2 The use of the Reasoned Action Model in the
October 1974 British General election
The study was carried out in four constituencies in the
industrial North of England, chosen according to a pre-
determined set of criteria. Sex, age and socio-economic
status were variables in the sampling of the 376
respondents. Interviews took place during the five days
preceding the election and respondents who met sampling
requirements were asked to complete the self-completion
questionnaire.
the election.
All questionnaires were collected prior to
In the week following the election,
respondents were contacted again and most of them indicated
their vote choice.
Belief statements were not elicited from a sample of the
respondents as in the American study. Instead, 16 items
were selected from the published manifestos of the three
main parties, i.e. the Conservative, the Liberal and the
Labour parties, and from press coverage during the first
week of the electoral campaign. Given the importance of
local constituency issues in the British electoral system,
it may have been interesting to assess voters' evaluations
and party stands on local issues vis-a-vis national ones.
However, since in a general election, voters are not only
voting for a particular local candidate but also to elect a
government it may be sufficient to tap national issues.
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The questionnaire proper contained among others the
following measures:
1. attitudes toward voting for each candidate
2. subjective norms toward voting for each candidate
3. beliefs concerning the stands of each candidate on each
issue
4. beliefs concerning the stands of each party on each
issue
5. beliefs concerning the stands of each party leader on
each issue
6. evaluations of the object of each policy issue.
7. normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted
others toward voting for each candidate
8. motivation to comply measures to indicate the extent
to which respondents were influenced by the opinion of
trusted others
9. direct measures of attitude to parties, candidates and
party leaders
Since due to a clerical error measures of intention were
inadvertently omitted from the questionnaire actual vote
choice assessed immediately following the election was used
to assess the predictive power of the components of the
model of reasoned action and the effect of external
variables.
Attitude toward voting for the Labour Candidate
.85 with actual vote, and the correlation
correlated
for the
subjective norm was .63 The attitudinal component carried
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more weight (w-.77) than the normative component (w-.12),
which in fact was not found to have a significant effect.
The correlations of voting for the Conservative candidate
were .81 and .69 with attitudes toward voting for the
candidate and subjective norms, respectively. The
attitudinal component carried again more weight (w-.64)
than the normative component (w-.27) in actual vote choice.
However in the case of the Conservative candidate the
normative component was found to have a significant effect
(p<.Ol). The inclusion of the normative component improved
prediction of voting for the Conservative candidate
slightly (from r-.81 to R-.84) but did not improve it in
the case of the Labour candidate (R-.85).
Beliefs that voting for the two main parties' candidates
will lead to certain outcomes and evaluations of these
outcomes were used to estimate attitudes toward voting
each candidate. Prediction of the attitude scores
these belief based estimates were found to be
significant showing correlations of .65 and .58 for
for
from
quite
the
Labour and Conservative candidates, respectively.
prediction of the attitude scores with respect to
for the party leaders and the party from the same
However,
voting
belief
and evaluation measures were found to be more accurate,
especially in the case of voting for the parties.
Correlations between overall attitude toward voting for the
Labour party leader and for the Labour party were .68 and
.74, respectively; correlations between overall attitude
toward voting for the Conservative party leader and for the
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Conservative party were .62 and .67, respectively.
These results contrast with those obtained in the American
survey. Whereas in the American elections, attitude toward
voting for the Presidential candidates achieved higher
correlations than those obtained in relation to
parties, in Britain the reverse is true. Attitudes
voting for the parties are better predictors of
behaviour than attitudes toward voting for the
constituency candidate or even for party leaders.
the
toward
voting
local
It may be argued that party leaders in Britain hold an
equivalent position to that of Presidential candidates in
the USA, and that, therefore, attitudes towards voting for
British party leaders should have been found to better
predictors of voting intentions then attitudes towards
voting for the parties themselves.
However, these differences between the predictive power of
attitudinal measures in the two countries can perhaps be
explained in terms of the differences between the British
and American electoral systems.
In the USA, when voters vote for a Presidential candidate
they are directly increasing the probabilities of that
candidate being elected. In Britain, the only voters who
can vote directly for a party leader are those who live in
the party leader's constituency. For a party leader to be
elected to Parliament it is necessary that he/she receives
the majority of votes in his/her constituency. However, in
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order that a party leader becomes Prime Minister, it is
necessary that his/her party wins the majority of seats in
Parliament, i.e. that his/her party candidates defeat the
other parties' candidates in the majority of
constituencies. In these circumstances, it is
understandable that attitudes towards voting for parties in
Britain become better predictors of vote choice than
attitudes towards voting for party leaders.
Subjective norms (excluding the motivation to comply
component) were found to be highly correlated with
respondents' voting behaviour, showing coefficients of .63
and.69 with respect to the Labour and Conservative
candidates. However, when the weight of subjective norms
in the prediction of vote choice was assessed in
combination with the weight of attitudes towards voting for
the candidates, it was found that although subjective norms
carried a significant weight in predicting a person's vote
for or against the Conservative candidate, w-.28, the
normative component did not appear to have a significant
weight, w-.12 in the prediction of voting for or against
the Labour candidate.
In the British elections, as in the American elections, the
attitudinal
significant
Labour and
component was found to have a much more
weight, i.e •• 77 and .64 with respect to the
Conservative candidates. Inclusion of the
normative component improved slightly the prediction of
voting for or against the Conservative candidate, from a
109
zero order correlation coefficient of r-81 to R-84. But
its inclusion, as expected, did not improve the prediction
in respect of the Labour candidate, with the zero order
regression coefficient of r-.85 being unchanged to R-.85.
It should be noted that the analyses carried out in the
British survey differed from the method used in the
American study. In the American study, the model was
analysed as a model concerned with choices among
alternatives (pp.179, Fishbein et aI, 1980) and thus
results were obtained considering both candidates together.
But as Fishbein et al (1978, pp.58) say, strictly speaking
the model is not so much concerned with
"but rather with attempting to
choices among
explain thealternatives
formation of an intention to perform or not to perform a
specific behaviour", i.e. voting for or not voting for a
particular party or candidate.
Based on research in decision theory (e.g. Edwards, 1954,
1961), researchers in the British surv~y tested the "single
behaviour" notion and concluded that the model could be
applied both to choice situations and to single behaviours
(pp.58).
The effect of external variables such as direct attitudes
toward party, party leaders and candidates was found to
carry no significant weight in prediction of vote choice
(pp.60). The same was found in relation to other external
variables such as age, sex, education, income and socio-
economic status. These findings lend support to the
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model's assumption that external variables should not
affect behaviour directly but only indirectly by
influencing the attitudinal or normative components, or the
relative weights of the latter. By partialling out the
relationships between the external variable and the model's
two components, if the effect of the external variable is
indirect, the correlation between the external variable and
behaviour intention, which may otherwise be high, should be
reduced to non-significance. In the British study the
effect of all external variables was found to be non
significant (pp.62).
Evidence of the knowledge respondents use in their
assessment of the candidates' stands on electoral issues
was given by an analysis of their evaluations of the issues
and of their beliefs concerning the stands attributed to
the candidates.
The mean evaluation of each of the 16 issues as a function
of party identification produced significant differences in
14 of the issues. This indicates that people differed with
respect to the policies which were being presented by the
two parties' manifestos. According to results voters held
remarkably accurate beliefs about the positions of the two
major parties on most issues (pp.38). These two findings on
their own could be interpreted as showing that voters
merely acquired a knowledge of the parties stands and
evaluated the issues according to their party line.
However, there were issues which voters, irrespective of
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party identification, evaluated similarly and in contrast
with their parties' stands, showing, as in the American
study, that voters assess the advantages and disadvantages
of voting for each party with respect to what they
themselves want and make their voting choice on the basis
of a balance between the advantages and disadvantages
offered by each party.
Section 4.3 Summary of the American and British tests of
the Reasoned Action model
The two studies reported in the previous sections presented
some methodological differences, i.e. sample size and
composition, the method used to choose belief statements,
i.e. elicited salient belief statements and non-salient
party manifesto statements and the use of the model
underlied by two different ratiorials, both as an analytical
tool to predict choices among alternatives and as an
analytical tool to predict single behaviours.
The implications of different electoral systems were also
highlighted, especially in the hypotheses made concerning
the relative predictive power of attitudinal measures.
On the other hand results lent strong support to the model,
directly relating attitude to vote for or against
candidates/parties and subjective norms to the formation of
intention and actual vote. Both studies show that the
normative component carries much less weight than the
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attitudinal component in the formation of intention to vote
for a particular referent.
The studies also show that within the subjective norm
component measures of the motivation to comply with the
opinion of trusted others do not add any significant weight
to measures indicating knowledge on the part of voters
concerning
two studies
the voting preferences of trusted
also illustrated the indirect
others.
effect
The
of
external variables on the two components of the model.
In comparison with the earlier Columbia and
models, the results of the tests of the Reasoned
Model revealed, contrary to the Columbia and
findings, not only the indirect effect
identification but also the subsidiary role of
Michigan
Action
Michigan
of party
social
influence factors on vote choice.
The results, like those obtained by the L.S.E. longitudinal
study, clearly show that voters do reason about the
advantages and disadvantages of voting for each
candidate/party vis-a-vis the important policies they wish
to see implemented.
Section 4.4 The Portuguese Scenario
The model was tested in two long established stable
democracies where, two main parties have been able to
provide alternative governments. Successive generations of
voters have lived in democracy and have been used and
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exposed to political debate over issues which affect their
lives.
The Portuguese scenario presented sharp differences. The
lack of democratic tradition meant that everyone,i.e.
parties, party leaders and voters alike, was going through
a period of self-instruction about the very democratic
processes which were jointly being developed. There were
no established democratic structures, no precedents, no
tried ways to be used as guidance and support, no history
of issues.
Unlike in the American and British scenarios, in Portugal
there were four main parties and countless fringe parties.
Also in Portugal the Portuguese Communist Party had very
strong holds in the rural south, in the industrial belts
around the big cities and more importantly in the Unions.
In the aftermath of the first two post-revolutionary
periods the fight for power involved not only a fight among
those parties interested in the consolidation of a
parliamentarian democratic system but also a fight between
them as a whole and the communists in spite of the fact
that the latter had abided by democratic rule. Electoral
life, therefore, involved choices between two distinct
value and economic systems as well as between variations
within one of those two systems.
Also, in the UK and USA Churches do not have a direct
influence in the political process and religious belief may
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only affect voters indirectly. In Portugal given the power
of the Catholic Church and its long established influence,
church guidance could be having a direct effect on voters'
decision.
The Reasoned Action model bases voting decision on rational
processes (linked to electoral issues and parties' stands)
and on social influence. Electoral issues, are not
isolated from election to election. On the contrary, they
have a life history of their own reflecting the way
political ideas develop, crystallize, are put into practice
and in the process, are transformed (Himmelweit, 1985,
p.8).
Bearing in mind the rapid sequence of Portugal's electoral
events since the overthrow of the dictatorship and that the
main issue for the right wing an~ socialist parties was the
defeat of the communists and vice-versa, an issue that
affected every aspect of political and social life, it is
clear that there was no time, let alone stability, for the
development, crystallization, practice and transformation
of political ideas.
The lack of a relevant number of well differentiated
issues, together with the fact that people were unable to
list issues they considered important was particularly
worrying.
In fact, when attempts were made to compile a list of
salient issues invariably, part of the respondents referred
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to the need to defeat the communists whereas others
referred to the need to defeat the right wing.
However it should be noted that it was precisely because of
these differences between both the British and American
scenarios on the one hand and the Portuguese scenario on
the other, and not in spite of them, that Portugal appeared
to provide an exceptionally challenging ground to test the
general applicability of the Reasoned Action model.
Chapter V ~escribes the Method and Procedure used in the
three Portuguese elections covered by this study. The
methodological framework falls short of the rigorous
standards which should have been applied. Nevertheless the
procedures used represented, at the time, the only
solutions which seemed possible within the constraints and
obstacles posed by the difficult but extremely exciting
climate in which the field work was carried out.
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CHAPTER V
METHOD AND PROCEDURE
IntroductLon
The Method and Procedure chapter is divided into three
sections and one Appendix. Section 5.1 describes the
methodology used to obtain representative samples for the
three electoral surveys. Section 5.2 details the measures
and scales used in the three questionnaires. Section 5.3
repeats each list of electoral issues selected for each of
the three elections already presented and discussed in
Chapter I. The section also provides a general
introduction for the four Results chapters which follow.
Appendix 5, associated with this chapter, includes a
translated version of each election questionnaire.
Section 5.1. Sampling procedures and the distribution of
questionnaires
5.1.1 Sampling procedures
Difficulties concerning access to electoral rolls prevented
a rigorous sampling of the population. Added to these
difficulties there was a general mistrust of opinion polls
of any type and of probing into opinions about political
matters unless these were discussed among friends.
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There was no tradition of opinion surveys and the problem
was no doubt aggravated by the fact that under Portuguese
Electoral Law the publication of opinion polls and voting
surveys is forbidden (1).
In such circumstances volunteers among friends,
acquaintances and work contacts in both private and
sector institutions were asked to distribute
public
the
questionnaires among colleagues, friends, relatives of both
sexes and of all age groups.
The choice of volunteers was considered crucial and as far
as it was possible they were representative of the party
political spectrum, age groups, sex socia-economic and
educational backgrounds.
5.1.2 The distribution of questionnaires
In the beginning of each election campaign, volunteers made
pre1iminary contacts with respondents to prepare for the
distribution and collect the questionnaires.
The distribution of the questionnaires took place during
the last week of the electoral campaigns. Respondents
completed the questionnaires and returned them to the
volunteers at least two days before the election date.
(1) In the last few years, althoughElectoralLaw continues
to forbid the publicationof poll results during the
electoral campaigns, many newspapers publish regularly
opinion surveyson politicalmatters and peopleappear to
be more relaxedabout expressingtheir own views.
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(However, in the first election covered in the Braga
district, questionnaires were all returned four days prior
to the election date to allow the researcher to come up to
Lisbon in time to distribute questionnaires among
volunteers in Lisbon and collect them prior to the
election. Due to the death of the two AD leaders the
distribution of questionnaires in the Lisbon area was
abandoned). Volunteers delivered the questionnaires to the
researcher on the eve of the election day, at the latest.
No questionnaires were accepted on the day or after the
elec tion •.
The 1980 Presidential election questionnaires were
distributed in the district of Braga in the North of
Portugal. Distribution took place both in the city of
Braga and in rural areas of the district.
The district of Braga was chosen for the first survey due
to the fact that the division of its electorate among the
main political parties compared very closely with that for
the whole country. In the 1980 General election, held two
months prior to the Presidential election, the distribution
of the popular vote in the district of Braga compared with
that for the whole country was as follows:
BRAGA WHOLE COUNTRY
AD (right wing
alliance)
47.2% 47.1%
FRS (socialist
alliance)
31.8% 28%
APU (communist
alliance)
13.1% 16.9%
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Two hundred questionnaires were distributed but only 101
were returned completed. One hundred were used. The
questionnaire excluded was answered by a respondent who did
not intend to vote for either of the two main presidential
candidates.
The 1982 Local elections questionnaires were distributed in
three cities: Lisbon, the capital; Coimbra, a University
city near the coast, 200 km North of Lisbon; and in
Barreiro, an industrial city, 25 km South of Lisbon.
The Municipality of Lisbon was controlled by the AD
although the alliance did not have absolute majority in
the Chamber. In the 1979 Local elections the distribution
of the vote among the main parties had been as follows: AD
(right wing alliance) - 47%; PS (Socialist Party) - 23% and
APU (communist alliance) - 25%.
The Municipality of Coimbra was also controlled by the AD
closely followed by the Socialists who had been in control
until the 1979 Local elections.
In the 1979 Local elections the distribution of the popular
vote among the main parties had been as follows: AD (right
wing alliance) - 43%; PS (Socialist Party) - 32%; and APU
(Communist alliance) - 19%.
The Municipality of Barreiro was controlled by the APU who
enjoyed absolute majority in the Chamber. In the 1979
Local elections the distribution of the popular vote among
the main parties had been as follows: [AD (right wing
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alliance) did not run as such. Instead, the two main
parties of the Alliance, CDS (christian democrats) and PSD
(social democrats) ran separately] CDS (christian-
democrats)- 3%; PSD (social democrats)- 10%; PS
(socialists- 19%; and APU (communist alliance)- 63%.
Approximately 300 questionnaires were distributed, 100
questionnaires in each city. One hundred and eighty four
were returned completed. Of these only 173 were used. Due
to an oversight, during the collection of the
questionnaires no attempt was made to identify the city
where they had been distributed and, therefore,
were made between· the three groups
no
comparisons
respondents.
of
The 1983 General election questionnaires were distributed
in Lisbon. The distribution of the vote in the 1980
General election in the city of Lisbon among the main
parties had been: AD (right wing alliance)- 45%; FRS
(socialist allianie)- 26% and APU (communist alliance)-
21%. Out of the 300 questionnaires distributed only 184
were returned completed. Of the 184 questionnaires
returned only 157 were used.
No post electoral surveys were done after each of the three
elections to ascertain how respondents had in fact voted.
Due to the method adopted to distribute the questionnaires
it would have been difficult to control that only the
respondents who had completed and returned the
questionnaires would take part in the post election survey.
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Furthermore, by and large, volunteers were reluctant to go
back to respondents and ask them to divulge their vote
choice, even though postage paid envelopes could have been
made available for answering sheets to be sent direct to
the researcher.
Section 5.2 The questionnaires
5.2.1 The measures used in the questionnaires
The questionnaires prepared for the three elections (see
Appendix 5) followed closely the self-completion booklet
used by Fishbein et al (1974) in the British study. Each
questionnaire was preceded by a brief introductory note
giving the name of the researcher and explaining the object
of the research. Questions required cross type answers
only and therefore the questionnaires could not be
identified.
The questionnaires contained the following measures:
1. intention to vote in the election;
2. intention to vote for each presidential candidate
(Presidential election questionnaire) or for each main
party (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
3. attitudes towards voting for each presidential candidate
(Presidential election questionnaire) or for each main
party (Local and General elections' questionnaires);
4. attitudes towards each of the presidential candidates
(P~esidential election questionnaire) or towards each of
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the main parties (Local and General elections'
questionnaires);
S. attitudes towards the victory of each presidential
candidate (Presidential election questionnaire) or towards
the victory of each main party (Local and General
elections' questionnaires);
6. evaluations of the object of each issue;
7. beliefs concerning the stands of each presidential
candidate on each issue (Presidential election
questionnaire) or concerning the stands of each party on
each issue (Local and General electiuns' questionnaires);
8. Normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted
others towards voting for each presidential candidate
(Presidential election questionnaire) or towards voting for
each party (Local and General elections' questionnaires).
Three categories of "trusted others" were used: most
trusted relatives, best friends and the Church.
Motivation to comply measures were included only in the
1980 Presidential electiun questionnaire. They were
dropped in view of the fact that many respondents either
failed to answer the relevant sections of the questionnaire
or expressed angry comments about their implications.
Respondents were also asked to provide information on party
affiliation, past voting behaviour, sex, age and level of
education by means of multiple-choice scales.
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5.2.2 The measuring scales
Apart from the multiple-choice scales respondents were
asked to use to indicate their party affi11iation, past
voting behaviour, sex, age and level of education, two
types of scales were used: likely-unlikely scales and
semantic differential scales.
Likely-unlikely scales
Seven point likely-unlikely scales were used to measure
intentions to vote in the elections and intentions to vote
for the presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential
election or for the parties in the 1982 Local elections and
1983 General election. The likely-unlikely scales were
also used to measure beliefs about the presidential
candidates' or the parties' stands on electoral issues and
beliefs about the opinions of trusted others.
Respondents were asked to consider each belief statement
and each intention statement and indicate their measure of
agreement, disagreement or indifference with it by ticking
one of three choice squares: "yes", "no", "don't know".
They were asked to move on to the next statement if they
had ticked the "don't know" square. If they ticked either
the "yes" or the "no" square they were asked to tick one of
the three choice squares in answer to a question about the
probability of the statement being true or untrue. The
choice probabilities indicated above each square were:
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"high"; "fifty-fifty"; and "low". Scoring from +3 to -3 was
attributed as follows:
"yes" / "high" - +3
" / "fifty-fifty" - +2
"/ "low" - +1
"no" / "high" - -3
"/ "fifty-fifty" - -2
"/ "low" - -1
"don't know" - 0
Examples "I intend to vote in the forthcoming
of intention (Presidential) (Local) (General)
statements: election"
Example of
scale used:
Yes No Don't Know
If you answered "don't know" please
move to the next section. If you
answered either "yes" or "no" please
indicate by ticking one of the
following squares the probabilities
of the statement being true or untrue.
High Fitfty/fifty Low
"I intend to vote for ••• (name of
candidate or party depending upon the
type of election) (N.B separate state-
ments were given for each name)
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statements:
1) Beliefs about candidates or parties'
stands on issues:
"If elected, Ramalho Eanes, will be an
impartial President".
Examples
of belief
2) Beliefs about the opinions of trusted
others:
"My family thinks I should vote for the
Socialist Party".
Semantic differential scales
Seven-point semantic differential scales were used to
measure attitudes and to evaluate electoral issues.
of scales +3 to -3.
Range
Attitude measures:
a) attitude towards candidates in the Presidential election
was measured by six semantic differential scales: good-bad;
wise-foolish; beneficial-harmful; honest-dishonest; strong-
-weak: competent-incompetent.
In view of results, in the subsequent election
the number of semantic differential scalesquestionnaires
was reduced to three: beneficial-harmful; honest-dishonest
and competent-incompetent.
b) attitude towards voting in the Presidential elections
was measured by three semantic differential scales: good-
bad; wise-foolish; beneficial-harmful.
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In view of the results, in the subsequent election
questionnaires, the number of semantic differential scales
was reduced to one and changed into "positive-negative".
This change was suggested by people who read the
questionnaire and were asked to express an opinion as to
its clarity. In Portuguese, the use of the adjectives
"positive" and "negative" to qualify feelings toward
behaviours is quite comparable to the affect measure of
"good" and "bad".
c) attitude towards voting for each candidate in the
Presidential election and for each party in the other two
elections - same as for b) above.
d) attitude towards the victory of each candidate in the
Presidential election was measured by three semantic
differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish; beneficial-
harmful.
Evaluation measures
To evaluate each electoral issue used in the 1980
Presidential election questionnaire respondents used three
semantic-differential
beneficial-harmful.
scales: good-bad; wise-foolish;
In view of the results, in the subsequent election
qUestionnaires, the number of semantic differential scales
was reduced to one.. good-bad •
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5.3. Electoral issues
The choice of issues was presented and discussed in Section
of Chapter I. The list of the selected issues for the
three elections is presented here for easier reference.
Issues selected for the 1980 Presidential Election
The ten issues selected were as follows:
1• A president should be impartial
2. A president should respect the Constitution
3. A president should use his right to veto bills judged
to be unconstitutional
4. A president should risk political instability rather
than give in to a government who act against the
Constitution
5. A president should give unconditional support to the
Government
6. A president should support a dictatorial form of
Government
7. A president should support political stability
8. A president should support political instability
9. A president should support Revolution
10. A president should support a military coup
128
Issues selected for the 1982 Local Election
The ten issues selected were as follows:
"In the municipality where I live •••
1. housing should all be provided with piped water,
electricity and sewage.
2. priority should be given to solving housing shortages.
3. more sport and socio-cultural facilities should be
provided.
4. more playgrounds and creches should be built.
5. more schools should be built.
6. the important thing is to elect honest and hard working
councillors who are interested in improving living
conditions.
7. local authorities should be accountable as to the manner
public funds are administered.
8. transport problems should be solved.
9. priority should be given to pollution control
10. Councillors should maintain very frequent contacts with
local populations so that the most pressing problems are
identified and solved.
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Issues selected for the 1983 General Election
The eight issues were selected as follows:
"To solve the crisis and promote social welfare and
justice •••
1. the social contract between government, employers and
unions should be celebrated.
2. patriotism and order should be strenghtened.
3. social welfare policies based on the right of all to
health, education and housing should be promoted.
4. the public sector should be reduced.
S. government should rule with purpose, authority and
morality.
6. a new government should embark on a program of
development of the country's natural resources in order
to diversify production and create new jobs.
7. changes in labour laws including the strike law should
be introduced.
8. a new government should increase the purchasing power of
the people.
Since, as explained in Chapter I, a post-electoral
coalition appeared inevitable, the 1983 General election
questionnaire included an attitude measure of feeling
towards the four possible coalitions: socialists and
communists (highly unlikely but not impossible); socialists
and social democrats (highly likely); socialists, social
democrats and christian democrats (unlikely that the
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socialists and social democrats together failed to win
majority and would therefore need the christian-democrats);
social-democrats and christian-democrats, in an AD revival
(possible but highly unlikely so soon after the collapse of
the alliance).
Respondents' feelings towards the four possible post-
electoral coalitions were assessed by means of a "good-bad"
seven point semantic differential scale.
The results obtained in the three election surveys are
presented and discussed in the following four chapters,
i.e. chapters VI to IX.
The way
closely
the four Results chapters are structured follows
the main objectives of the thesis i.e. the
investigation of the main determinants of vote choice among
Portuguese voters under1ied by the assumption that voters'
knowledge of important polit·i·cal issues and social
influence factors have major effects on voting intentions.
Thus, after a brief description of the samples used in the
three Portuguese elections in Chapter VI and the
presentation of the results of the tests of the Reasoned
Action model in the three elections in Chapter VII,
Chapters VIII and IX are devoted to the two most important
levels
level
of analysis within the context of the thesis: the
concerned with the predictive power of the measures
used by the Reasoned Action model vis-a-vis other measures;
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and the
respondents'
level concerned with the contribution of
political knowledge and of the opinion of
trusted referents to their vote choices.
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CHAPTER VI
DESCRIPTION OF THE SAMPLES USED IN THE THREE PORTUGUESE
ELECTIONS
Introduction
Chapter VI presents a brief description of the samples used
in the three Portuguese elections. The chapter is divided
in three sections. Section 6.1 describes the sizes of the
samples and their characteristics in terms of the following
variables: sex, age, level of education, number of
respondents in each voting group and percentage of
respondents affiliated in a party. Respondents' past
voting habits are described in Section 6.2. Section 6.3
presents a brief summary of the chapter.
Section 6.1 - Samples description
Table 6.1 gives a description of the samples used in the
three elections in terms of size, sex, age, level of
education, number of respondents in each voting group and
number of respondents affiliated in a party.
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Sample size
quite
al for
size of the three samples, although small, compares
favourably with the sample size used by Fishbein et
the 1976 American Presidential Election 76
The
respondents -, and with the size of the sample used by the
Fishbein et al study, in Britain, of 328 respondents for
the General Election of October 1974. The British sample
was larger in view of the requisites imposed by the
country's electoral system.
Sex and age
The percentage of respondents in each sex group is quite
acceptable. The disparity results, to a large extent, from
the reported reluctance on the part of women to fill in the
questionnaires. The age distribution of respondents has a
higher incidence on the 25 to 44 years of age group which
is also the group with higher number of voters.
Level of Education
The samples are biased in favour of the University level of
education. This could indicate that respondents with a
higher level of education were less reluctant to fill in
the questionnaires.
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Table 6.1
Description of the samples in the three elections
Presidential
Election(80)
Sample size 100
Males 59%
Sex
Females 41%
Age 18/24 32.5%
25/44 52.0%
45/-- 15.5%
Level
of
Education
Primary
Intermediate
'0' Level
'A' Level
Tech.School
University
11.5%
16.5%
17.0%
18.0%
37.0%
Number of
Respondents
in each
voting group
Local General
Elections(82) Election (83)
17-3 157
52.7% 54%
47.3% 40.5%*
16.9% 26.5%
59.3% 54.1%
23.8% 19.4%
14.2%
4.4%
16.3%
15.7%
44.0%
8.1%
9.5%
23.2%
23.2%
27.0%
AD (CDS+PSD) 40 49
CDS 17
PSD 45
FRS (PS+) 28
PS 46 33
APU (PCP+MDP/
CDE) 32 78 62
Party
Membership:
Non-party
members: 79 (79%)
Party members:
CDS
PSD
PS
PCP
2 (2%)
8 (8t)
11 (11%)
111(64%) 119(76%)
3 (2%)
7 (4%)
3 (2t)
49 (28%)
4 (3%)
7 (4%)
4 (3t)
23 (14%)
* Differences in the sum of the percentages to lOOt due to
respondents who did not indicate their sex in the
appropriate box
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Number of respondents in each voting group
to the party they had voted for
divided
group)
the 1980
In the 1980 Presidential election respondents were
into voting groups (AD group, FRS group and APU
according in
General election which was held two months prior to the
Presidential election. The number of respondents in each
group is fairly even distributed, although the AD group was
larger than the PS and APU groups of respondents. The
distribution of the questionnaires took place in Braga,
where the right wing alliance enjoyed far greater support
than the other two parties (see Chapter V, section 5.1.2)
In the 1982 Local elections respondents were divided into
voting groups according to their intentions to vote for
each of the three main parties, i.e. AD, PS and APU. The
questionnaires were distributed in three
Coimbra and Barreiro (see Chapter V,
cities,
Section
Lisbon,
5.1.2).
Although the AD and PS sample sizes were very balanced, the
APU sample was considerably larger than the other two. It
is possible that APU respondents were more interested in
answering and returning the questionnaires than the other
respondents, since the same imbalance occurred in the 1983
General election.
In the 1983 General election the distribution of the
questionnaires took place in Lisbon, and respondents were
again divided into voting groups according to their
intentions to vote for each of the four main parties: CDS,
PSD, PS and APU. Apart from the imbalance between the size
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of the APU sample and the other group samples sizes, the
CDS sample size was very reduced. Only 17 out of the 157
who returned completed questionnaires indicated their
intention to vote for the christian-democrats (CDS). This
low figure might have been due to the loss of popularity
suffered by the CDS vis-a-vis the social democrats (PSD)
after the collapse of their alliance.
Party membership
The percentages indicated show the disparity between the
number of affiliated members of the PCP ·(Communist party)
and that of the other parties. In terms of membership,
the PCP is by far the largest party.
No analyses were carried out to determine the effect of the
above variables, which according to the theory of reasoned
action are external to and only have an indirect effect on
voting behaviour.
6.2. Past voting behaviour
Past voting habits were considered by the two earlier
models of voting behaviour, i.e. the Columbia model and the
Michigan model (see Chapter II) to reinforce voters' party
identification, the variable which was found to be the
determinant factor of vote choice. The two measures were
thus considered to be closely related.
However, data published by Butler and Stokes (1959) based
on three electoral surveys carried out in the United States
137
and another three electoral surveys carried out in Britain
shows that 27% of the American voters reported changes
in their party identification while as many as 62% of
British voters reported such changes.
In the Fishbein et al study (1980) of the 1986) American
Presidential elections party identification and voting
history were found to be highly related to vote choice (r-
.69 and r- .50), respectively). However, when their
respective weights were compared with the weights of the
components of the model of reasoned action in vote choice,
they were found to add little predictive power to the
model. As Fishbein et al point out, consideration of party
identification, for example, in addition to differential
voting intentions raised the correlation with behaviour
from R- .80 to R- .84 (Fishbein et aI, 1980, p.187).
On the other hand, in their study of the 1974 British
General election, Fishbein et aI, (1976, p. 62) conclude
that "in contrast to his American counterpart. who appears
to maintain a stable and enduring partisan orientation. the
British voter appears to change his party identification as
easily as he changes his voting behaviour". Party
identification in Great Britain is closely linked to voting
intentions.
It can be concluded, therefore, that even when party
identification is closely related to past voting behaviour,
this variable does not make a significant contribution to
•
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the power of the Reasoned Action model in predicting voting
intentions.
In the Portuguese case, given the lack of
background, it is difficult to speak
identification" in the same terms as in the
a democratic
about "party
American and
British contexts. Also, during the first 9 years of
democratic rule (from 1974 to 1983) no large self reporting
surveys were done on electoral decision. The only data
available to assess vote swings are the electoral results
themselves. Such results, however, do not show individual
lability, only changes in overall party percentages of
vote.
In the three Portuguese elections questionnaires
respondents were only asked to provide information about
their past voting behaviour by means of multiple-choice
questions. No questions were included to assess
respondents' party identification.
Although the contribution of past voting behaviour of
Portuguese respondents to the pred~ction of voting
intention will not be assessed it is of interest to note
their past voting pattern.
According to the information supplied by respondents, the
percentage of voters who switched parties between elections
is not very high.
From the first elections for the Constituent Assembly 1975
(the Assembly charged with the draft of the new
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Constitution) to the General Election in 1980, 22.4% of the
sample said they had changed party. From the 1980 General
Election to the Local Elections of 1982 only 13.2% of the
sample respondents said they had changed party.
The pattern of voting of new voters, i.e. young voters who
voted for the first time, is interesting. In the 1980
sample three were 29 respondents who had not voted in the
1975 Election for the Constituent Assembly. Of these 29
young voters, 13 voted for the AD (right wing alliance) in
1980, 5 voted for the FRS (The Socialist Front) and 11
voted for the APU (the communist alliance). That is to say
44.8% of the new sample voters opted for the AD, 17.2% for
the Socialist Front and 37.91 for the communist alliance.
Of the 15 new voters in the 1982 sample for the Local
Elections, 6 (401) voted for the AD, 4 (26.7%) voted for
the PS (Socialist Party) and 5 (33.51) voted for the APU.
In the questionnaire used for the 1983 General election
study, respondents were asked to indicate how they had
voted in the 1980 General election. It is possible to
assess, therefore, the extent to which respondents' said
they had changed party between two consecutive General
elections.
Table 6.2 shows how the 1983 General election respondents
said they had voted in the 1980 General election. The
division of respondents into voting groups was
according to respondents' voting intentions.
done
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Table 6.2
Vote choice in the 1980 General election of
respondents in the 1983 General election divided
according to voting intentions
Vote choice in the
1980 General election
Vote intention in the
1983 General Election
voters
CDS PSD PS APU
AD (CDS + PSD) 94% 82% 12%
FRS (PS + small 2% 76% 3%
parties)
APU (Communist party 3% 94%
+ MDP)
Other parties 2% 3%
New voters in 1983 14%
94% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire
indicated their intention to vote for the CDS, had voted
for the right wing alliance, AD, in 80; the remaining 6%
were young voters voting for the first time.
82% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire
ind~cated their intention to vote for the PSD, had voted
for the right wing alliance, AD in 1980; of the remaining
18%, 14% were young voters voting for the first time, 2%
had voted for the Socialist alliance (FRS) in 1980 and 2%
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had voted for one of the very small parties not named in
the questionnaire.
76% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire
indicated their intention to vote for the PS had voted for
the Socialist alliance in 1980; of the remaining 24%, 9%
were young voters voting for the first time, 12% had voted
for the AD alliance in 1980 and 3% had voted for small
parties.
94% of the respondents who in the 1983 questionnaire had
indicated their intention to vote for the APU said they had
voted for the APU in 1980; of the remaining 6%, 3% were
young voters voting for the first time and 3% had voted for
the Socialist alliance (FRS) in 1980.
Although there were some changes in vote choices,
particularly among PS and PSD respondents the vast majority
of respondents in the 1983 General election showed no
intention of voting for a party different from the one they
had voted for in the 1980 General election.
Section 6.3 - Sua.ary of Chapter VI
In spite of the sampling method which was adopted, the
characteristics of the samples used in the three Portuguese
studies in terms of their representatives of sex, age and
level of education groups were found to be acceptable.
Some imbalances were noted in the relative size of voting
groups.
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In their short voting history, Portuguese respondents were
found to have tended to vote for the same party. However,
in view of Portugal's political background it would be
premature to accept the significance of any impact which
past voting habits could be found to have on vote choices.
The more fundamental question is to assess whether
respondents, in spite of their initial tendency to vote for
the same party, appear to be aware of important political
issues and of the implications of their vote choices in the
resolution of such issues, since this awareness may have
implications in their future voting behaviour.
The results of the tests of the Reasoned Action model are
described in the following chapter, Chapter VII. These
together with the analyses presented in Chapter VIII and IX
will allow for a better understanding of the factors which
appear to be determinant of the vote choices of Portuguese
respondents.
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CHAPTER VII
RESULTS OF THE TESTS OF THE REASONED ACTION MODEL IN THE
THREE PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS
Introduction
Chapter VII describes the results of the Reasoned Action
model in the three Portuguese elections.
According to the Reasoned Action model intention to perform
a behaviour is a function of the attitude toward performing
the behaviour and normative beliefs, i.e. the opinions of
trusted others about performing the behaviour (1). In the
case of voting behaviour, intention to vote for candidates
or parties is a function of voters' attitudes toward voting
for the candidates or parties and of voters' normative
beliefs about the opinions of trusted referents vis-a-vis
voting for the candidates or parties. Expressed as a
function, the Intention Model, one of the two components of
the Reasoned Action Model, states that:
VI - (A )
vot
+ (NB)
wI w2
where
VI - the persons'intention to vote for the candidates or
for the parties in an election;
(1) motivation to comply measuresincludedin the model
were dropped. These measureswere also excludedfrom the
October 1974 BritishGeneral electionstudy.
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A - the persons' attitudes toward voting for the
vot candidates or the parties;
NB - the persons' normative beliefs about the opinions of
trusted others vis-a-vis voting for the candidates or for
the parties; and
wI and w2 - theoretical parameters which indicate the
relative weight of the two variables as determinants of
voting intentions.
The other component of the Reasoned Action Model, the
Attitude Model, states that the person's attitude toward
performing the behaviour, i.e. the person's attitude toward
voting for the candidates or parties, is in turn a function
of two elements: voters' beliefs on candidates' or parties'
stands on salient issues and of voters' evaluations of the
issues. The relation between voters' beliefs and
evaluations is expressed as follows:
N
A - L b evot i i
i-I
A - the person's attitude toward voting for thevot
candidates or parties;
b - the person's beliefs about candidates' or parties
i
stands on each one of the issues;
e - the person's evaluations of each one of the
i
issues;
N - the number of salient beliefs the person holds
about "vot", i.e voting for the candidates or
parties.
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Chapter VII is divided into four sections. Section 7.1
presents the results of the tests of the Intention and
Attitude models in the 1980 Presidential election. Section
7.2 presents the results of the tests of the Intention and
Attitude models in the 1982 Local elections. Section 7.3
presents the tests of the Intention and Attitude models in
the 1983 General election. Section 7.4 provides a summary
of the results of the tests in the three Portuguese
elections and on overall comparison with the results of the
tests in the 1976 American Presidential election and in the
October 1974 British General election.
Section 7.1 - Predicting voting intentions in the 1980
Presidential election
7.1.1 The test of the Intention Model in the
Presidential election.
1980
Table 7.1.1 shows the coefficients of the multiple
regression carried out to test the dependency of
respondents' intentions to vote for the two presidential
candidates on respondents' attitudes toward voting for the
candidates and on respondents' normative beliefs in the
1980 Presidential election.
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Table 7.1.1
Multiple regression coefficients of respondents'
attitudes toward voting for the two presidential
candidates (A vot ) and of respondents' normative
beliefs (NB), on respondents' intentions to vote
for the two presidential candidates in the 1980
Presidential election.
Intention
vote for
to Zero Order
Correlations
Beta
weights
Multiple
regression
coefficient
R
• • •
A NB A NB
votvot
Soares Carneiro .89
(AD candidate)
.73 .79 .14* .89 (N-86)
Ramalho Eanes .80
(PS candidate)
.63 .68 .• 21** .82 (N-87)
* not significant
** significant at p ( .01
All the other coefficients are significant beyond p ( .01
The zero order correlation coefficients show that attitudes
to voting for the candidates and normative beliefs are
highly related to voting intentions, although the relation
between attitudes toward voting for the candidates and
voting intentions is stronger than the relation between
normative beliefs and voting intentions.
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When the respective weights of attitudes towards voting for
the candidates and of normative beliefs are assessed in
terms of their respective contribution to the prediction of
voting intentions, the weights of attitudes toward
for the candidates (.79 and .68 for the AD
voting
and PS
candidates, respectively) are found to be much more
significant than the weights of normative beliefs (.14 and
.21, respectively) on the prediction of voting intentions.
In the case of the prediction of intentions to vote for the
AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, the weight of normative
beliefs (w - .14) is not significant, and does not
contribute to enhance the power of attitudes toward voting
for Soares Carneiro to predict intentions to vote for him.
In fact R.89 remained unchanged from r.89, the correlation
coefficient between attitudes to voting for Soares Carneiro
and intentions to vote for him.
In the case of the prediction of intentions to vote for the
PS candidate, Ramalho Eanes, the weight of normative
beliefs (.21) although significant, contributes only
slightly to improving the power of attitudes to voting for
Ramalho Eanes to predict intentions to vote for him. In
fact, the correlation coefficient between attitudes to
voting for Ramalho Eanes and intentions to vote for him
(r.80) is only increased to R.82.
These results indicate that in the 1980 Presidential
election attitudes toward voting for the two presidential
148
elections were by far better predictors of respondents'
voting intentions than normative beliefs.
7.1.2 The test of the Attitude Hodel in the 1980
Presidential election
Table 7.1.2 shows the correlation coefficients between
attitudes toward voting for the two presidential candidates
in the 1980 Presidential election and estimates of these
attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the
candidates' stands on the issues (rbe).
i i
Table 7.1.2
Correlation coefficients of attitudes toward
voting for the two presidential candidates
(A ) and estimates of these attitudes based
vot
on beliefs about the candidates' stands
on the issues (t be), in the 1980
i i
Presidential election
r values
Soares Carneiro
(AD candidate)
Ramalho Eanes
(PS candidate)
A -}) e
(vot) i i
.87
(N - 86)
.72
(N - 87)
As predicted by the theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes
toward voting for the candidates (i.e objects) are highly
related to respondents' beliefs about the probability that
the candidates were associated with the issues (i.e. other
objects).
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Although very significant, the relation between attitudes
toward voting for Ramalho Eanes and estimates of these
attitudes based on beliefs about Ramalho Eanes' stands on
the issues (.72) is not as strong as the relation between
attitudes toward voting for Soares Carneiro and estimates
of these attitudes based on beliefs about Soares Carneiro's
stands on the issues (.87).
Section 7.2 - Predicting voting intentions in the 1982
Local elections
7.2.1 The test of the Intention Model in the 1982 Local
elections
regression carried out to test the
the multiple
dependency of
Table 7.2.1 shows the coefficients of
respondents' intentions to vote for the three parties (AD -
right wing alliance, PS - Socialist party and APU
communist alliance) on respondents' attitudes toward voting
for the parties and on respondents' normative beliefs in
the 1982 Local elections.
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Table 7.2.1
Multiple regression coefficients of respondents'
attitudes toward voting for the three parties
(A ) and of respondents' normative beliefs
vot
(NB), on respondents' intentions to vote for the
three parties in the 1982 Local elections
Intention Zero Order Beta Multiple
to vote for ••• Correlations weights regressioncoefficient
A NB A NB R
vot vot
AD (right wing .81 .63 .66 .25 .83 (N-144)
alliance)
PS (socialists) .60 .42 .50 .26 .65 (N-147)
APU (communist .85 .73 .65 .28 .87 (N-146)
alliance)
All coefficients are significant beyond p (.001
The zero order correlation coefficients show that attitudes
toward voting for the thre~ parties and normative beliefs
are all significantly related to voting intentions,
although the relation between attitudes toward voting for
the parties and voting intentions is stronger than the
relation between normative beliefs and voting intentions.
The weights of attitudes toward voting for the three
parties and of normative beliefs on the prediction of
voting intentions are all significant, although the weights
of attitudes to voting for the AD (.66), for the PS (.50)
and for the APU (.65) make a stronger contribution to the
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prediction of voting intentions than the weights of
normative beliefs on intentions to vote for the AD (.25),
on intentions to vote for the PS (.26) and on intentions to
vote for the APU (.28).
Although the contribution of respondents' normative beliefs
on the prediction of their voting intentions was found to
be significant, the power of attitudes toward voting for
the parties to predict voting intentions was only slightly
raised. In the case of the AD, the coefficient of the
correlation between attitudes toward voting for the AD and
intentions to vote for the AD increased from r-.81 to
R-.83. In the case of the PS, the coefficient of the
correlation between attitu~es toward voting for the PS and
intentions to vote for the PS increased from r-.60 to
R-.65. In the case of the APU, the coefficient of the
correlation between attitudes toward voting for the APU and
intentions to vote for the APU increased from r-.85 to
R-.87.
These results indicate that in the 1982 Local elections, as
in the 1980 Presidential elect~ons, attitudes toward voting
for the three parties were by far better predictors of
respondents' voting intentions than normative beliefs.
7.2.2 The test of the Attitude Model in the 1982 Local
elections
Table 7.2.2 shows the correlation coefficients between
attitudes toward voting for the three parties (AD - right
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wing alliance, PS - Socialist party and APU communist
alliance) in the 1982 local elections and estimates of
these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs about the
parties' stands on the issues (~b e ).
i i
Table 7.2.2
Correlation coefficients of attitudes toward
voting for the three parties (A ) and estimates
vot
of these attitudes based on beliefs about the
parties' stands on the issues (Lbe) in the
i i
1982 Local elections
r values
AD PS APU
(right wing (Socialist (communist
alliance) party) alliance)
A - I. b e .81 .61 .80vot i i (N-144) (N-147) (N-146)
As predicted by the theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes
toward voting for the three parties (i.e objects) are
highly related to respondents' beliefs about the
probability that the parties Were associated with the
issues (i.e other objects).
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Although very significant, the relation between attitudes
toward voting for the PS (socialists) and estimates of
these attitudes based on beliefs about the Socialist
party's stands on the issues (.61) is not as strong as the
relation between attitudes toward voting for the AD and the
APU and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs about
the AD and the APU stands' on the issues (.81 and .80,
respectively).
Section 7.3 Predicting voting intentions in the
1983 General election
7.3.1 The test of the Intention Model in the 1983 General
election
Table 7.3.1 shows the coefficients of the multiple
regression carried out to test the depend~ncy of
respondents' intentions to vote for the four parties (CDS -
christian democrats; PSD social democrats; PS
socialists and APU - communist alliance) on resp~ndents'
attitudes toward voting for the parties and on respondents'
normative beliefs in the 1983 General election.
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Table 7.3.1
Multiple regression coefficients of respondents'
attitudes toward voting for the four parties
(A ) and of respondents' normative beliefs
vot
(NB), on respondents' intentions to vote for the
four parties in the 1983 General election
Intention Zero Order Beta Multiple
to vote for correlations weights regression
coefficient
A NB A NB R
(vot) (vot)
CDS (christian .58 .56 .40 .37 .67 (N-149)
democrats)
PSD (-social .82 .65 .72 .14* .82 (N-149)
democrats)
PS (socialists) .65 .40 .59 .11* .65 (N-152)
APU (communist .88 .73 .71 .25 .90 (N-155)
alliance)
* significant at p (.05** not significant
All the other coefficients are significant beyond p (.001
The zero order correlations coefficients show that
attitudes toward voting for the four parties and normative
beliefs are all significantly related to voting intentions,
although the relation between attitudes toward voting for
the parties and voting intentions is stronger than the
relation between normative beliefs and voting intentions.
The weights of attitudes toward voting for the four parties
on the prediction of voting intentions are all significant
(.40 on intentions to vote for the CDS; .72 on intentions
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to vote for the PSD; .59 on intentions to vote for the
PS and .71 on intentions to vote for the APU). The
weights of normative beliefs on the prediction of
intentions to vote for four parties appear to have had a
different contribution vis-a-vis each of the four parties.
In the case of the CDS (christian democrats), the weight of
normative beliefs (.37) on the prediction of intentions to
vote for the CDS was highly significant and did make a
strong contribution to the prediction of intentions to vote
for the CDS. The coefficient of the correlation between
attitudes toward voting for the CDS and intentions to vote
for the CDS (.58) increased to R-.67 with the inclusion of
normative beliefs in the regression.
In the case of the PSD (social democrats), the weight of
normative beliefs (.14) on the prediction of intentions to
vote for the PSD was just found significant (p (.05) but
did not make a significant contribution to the prediction
of intentions to vote for the PSD. The coefficient of the
correlation between attitudes toward voting for the PSD and
intentions to vote for the PSD (.82) did not charige (R-.B2)
with the inclusion of normative beliefs in the regression.
In the case of the PS (socialists), the weight of normative
beliefs (.11) on the prediction of intentions to vote for
the PS was not found to be significant. In the
circumstances, the coefficient of the correlation between
attitudes toward voting for the PS and intentions to vote
for the PS (.65) remained unchanged (R-.65). The inclusion
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of respondents' normative beliefs did not improve the
prediction of intentions to vote for the PS from
respondents' attitudes toward voting for the PS.
In the case of the APU (communist alliance), the weight of
normative beliefs (.25) on the prediction of intentions to
vote for the APU was found to be highly significant
(p < .001) but only made a slight contribution to the
prediction of intentions to vote for the APU. The
coefficient of the correlation between attitudes toward
voting for the APU and intentions to vote for the APU (.88)
increased slightly to R-.90 with the inclusion of normative
beliefs in the regression.
These results indicate that in the 1983 General election,
as in the 1980 Presidential election and in the 1982 Local
elections, attitudes toward voting for the four parties
were far better predictors of respondents' voting
intentions than normative beliefs. However, the fact that
in the case of the CDS party in the 1983 General election,
normative beliefs were found to make a strong contribution
to the prediction of intentions to vote for the CDS,
indicates that the influence of normative beliefs on voting
intentions may be dependent not only upon particular
electoral instances, i.e. electoral, cultural and
historical contexts, as Fishbein et al (1980) suggest, but
also upon differences among the parties within the same
electoral, cultural and historical context.
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7.3.2 The test of the Attitude Model in the 1983 General
election
Table 7.3.2 shows the correlation coefficients between
attitudes toward voting for the four parties (CnS
christian democrats; P'SD social democrats; PS
socialists and APU - communist alliance) in the 1983
General election and estimates of these attitudes based on
respondents' beliefs about the parties' stands on the
issues (1: be).
i i
Table 7.3.2
Correlation coefficients of attitudes toward voting
for the four parties (A ) and estimates of these
vat
attitudes based on beliefs about the parties' stands
on the issues (t be) t in the 1983
i i
General election
r values
CDS
(christian
democrats)
PSD PS APU
(social (socialists) (communist
democrats) alliance)
A -Ib e .80
vot i i (N-I4I)
.84
(N-14I)
.63
(N-14S)
.7S
(N-ISO)
As predicted by the theory of Reasoned Action, attitudes
toward voting for the four parties (i.e. objects) are
highly related to respondents' beliefs about the
probability that the parties were associated with the
issues (i.e. other objects).
IS8
Although very significant, the relation between attitudes
toward voting for the PS (socialists) and estimates of
these attitudes based on beliefs about the Socialist party
stands on the issues (.63) is not as strong as the relation
between attitudes toward voting for the CDS, the PSD and
the APU and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs
about the CDS, PSD and APU stands' on the issues (.80, .84
and .75, respectively). This difference will be analysed
and discussed in Chapter IX.
Section 7.4 - Summary of Chapter VII and overall comparison
of the tests of the Reasoned Action Model in
the American, British and Portuguese studies
The findings of the Reasoned Action Model tests in the
three Portuguese elections give strong support to the
assumptions made by the Model. Attitudes toward voting for
the candidates in the 1980 Presidential election and for
the parties in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983
General election were found to be highly related to
estimates of these attitudes based on respondents' beliefs
about candidates' and parties' stands on electoral issues
( r. b
i
e ).
i
Also, attitudes toward voting for the
candidates and for the parties were found to be very strong
predictors of respondents' voting intentions. However,
with the exception of one instance in the 1983 General
election, the effect of normative beliefs on voting
intentions was found to be very weak.
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However, two points should be highlighted concerning the
results in the 1982 and 1983 elections. In the 1982 Local
elections, the relation between respondents' attitudes
toward voting for the PS (Socialist party) and intentions
to vote for the party, although very significant, was found
to be less strong (.60) than the relation between the two
variables with respect to the other two parties, AD (.81)
and APU (.85) (see Table 7.2.1). In the 1983 General
election, the relation between respondents' attitudes
toward voting for the PS (Socialist party) and for the CDS
(christian democrats) on the one hand and intentions to
vote for the PS (.65) and the CDS (.58), although highly
significant, were also found to be less strong than the
relation between the two variables with
other two parties, PSD (.82) and APU
respect to
(.88) (see
the
table
7.3.1).
The underlying reasons for these relative
correlations found in the case of the Socialist
the 1982 and 1983 elections and in the case of
party in the 1983 election do not appear to be the
weaker
inparty
the CDS
same.
In the Socialist party's case, the weaker relation between
attitudes toward voting for the Socialist Party and
intentions to vote for the party both in the 1982 Local
elections and in the 1983 General election than that found
for the other parties underlaid by a weak although
significant relation between attitudes toward voting
the Socialist party and estimates of these attitudes
on respondents' beliefs about the party's stands on
for
based
the
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issues (.61 and .63, respectively, see tables 7.2.2 and
7.3.2). In the case of the Christian Democratic party,
although the relation between attitudes toward voting for
the CDS and intentions to vote for the party (.58) is
weaker than that found in respect of the PSD and APU
parties, (see table 7.3.1) the relation between attitudes
toward voting for the CDS and estimates of these attitudes
based on respondents' beliefs about CDS stands is quite
strong (.80, see table 7.3.2).
discussed in detail in Chapter IX.
These differences are
On the whole the Portuguese results compare very favourably
with the results obtained in the American and British
studies.
Table 7.4.1 shows the results of the tests of the Intention
Model in the October 1974 British General election study,
in the 1976 American Presidential election study, in the
1980 Portuguese Presidential elections study, in the 1982
Portuguese Local election study and in the 1983 Portuguese
General election study.
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Table 7.4.1
Comparative table showing the results of the tests of the
Intention Model in the October 1974 British General
election, in the 1976 American Presidential election,
in the 1980 Portuguese Presidential election, in the
1982 Portuguese Local elections and in the 1983
Portuguese General election
Jlltential to _
r.,..,
1974IIrlt1111-"1 ~ __
__ ." _lYIIU .. CIIIIIldIIta
1'76 IIopublScon anl-.cratJc
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.... rr~
191J~~
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With the exception of the cases already highlighted
concerning the results of the PS in the 1982 Portuguese
Local elections and in the 1983 Portuguese General
election, and the results of the CDS in the 1983 Portuguese
General election, the other results of the tests of the
Intention model in the Portuguese elections compare very
favourably with the results of the tests of the model in
the British and American studies.
In the five electoral studies, although attitudes toward
voting for the candidates or parties and normative
were found to be significantly correlated with
intentions (or vote choice as in the case of the
study), the weight of attitudes toward voting
beliefs
voting
British
for the
candidates or parties was found to be a much stronger
determinant of voting intentions than the weight of
normative beliefs. In most instances, the inclusion of
normative beliefs in the prediction of voting intentions
either failed to have an effect on or only increased
slightly the power of attitudes toward voting for the
candidates or parties to predict voting intentions.
Table 7.4.2 shows the results of the tests of the Attitude
model in the October 1974 British General election study,
in the 1976 American Presidential election study, in the
1980 Portuguese Presidential election study, in the 1982
Portuguese Local elections study and in the 1983 Portuguese
General election study.
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Table 7.4.2
Comparative table showing the results of the tests
of the Attitude Model in the October 1974 British
General election, in the 1976 American Presidential
election, in the 1980 Portuguese Presidential
election, in the 1982 Portuguese Local elections and
in the 1983 Portuguese General election
Election A - Ib e (1)
vot i i
1974 British Labour candidate .65
General election Conservative candidate .58
1976 American Republican and Democratic .79
Presidential candidates (differential
election * coefficients)
1980 Portuguese AD candidate .87
Presidential PS candidate .72
election
1982 Portuguese AD (right wing alliance) .81
elections PS (socialists) .61
APU (communist alliance) .80
1983 Portuguese CDS (christian democrats) .80
election PSD (social democrats) .84
PS (socialists) .63
APU (communist alliance) .75
(1) correlation coefficients of attitudes toward voting for
the candidates or parties (A ) and estimates of these
vot
attitudes based on beliefs about the candidates' and
parties' stands on issues ( r be).
i i
* Unlike in the other elections, salient issues were used
in the 1976 American Presidential election.
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The results of the tests of the Attitude Model in the three
Portuguese elections compare very favourably with the
results obtained in the British and American studies.
Apart from the case of the Socialist party (PS) in the
Portuguese 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General
election, all the other results show very high correlations
between attitudes toward voting for the candidates or
parties and estimates of these attitudes based on beliefs
about the candidates' and parties' stands on the issues.
These very high correlations were obtained in spite of the
fact that salient issues were not used in the Portuguese
studies.
Although in the Portuguese studies the assumptions of the
Reasoned Action Model were supported by the results of the
tests of the model's two components, i.e. the Attitude
model and the Intention model, it is necessary to ascertain
whether the measures used by the model are better
predictors of voting intentions than other measures such as
direct attitudes to candidates or parties and electoral
outcomes. The aim of Chapter VIII is to make such
comparisons.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE BEST PREDICTOR OF VOTING BEHAVIOUR
Introduction
To be of any practical use a model has to have predictive
power. In this respect the tests of the Reasoned Action
model presented in the preceding chapter and those carried
out in the UK and USA appear to confirm its validity.
However, when assessing its predict~ve power, it is
necessary to demonstrate that the measures used by the
model are indeed better predictors than other alternative
measures and second, that the model, does indeed further
our understanding of the processes which lead to electoral
choice.
As described in Chapter II, earlier models of voting
behaviour postulated determinants of vote choice which
differed from those which are postulated by the Reasoned
Action model. For example, according to the Columbia model
(Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) and Berelson et aI, 1954) and the
Michigan model (Campbell et aI, 1960) vote choice is
determined by party identification, although the models
differ as to the type of social influence which, in turn,
determine party identification. Both models considered,
attitudes toward candidates, parties etc., to be
consequences of party identification
determinants of vote choices.
rather than
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According to Reasoned Action theory, direct attitudes to
candidates and parties are highly related to voting
behaviour. However, instead of being considered as a
consequence of party identification, as suggested by the
Columbia and Michigan models, Reasoned Action theory
(Fishbein and Coombs, 1974) suggests that attitudes toward
candidates and parties (as attitudes toward voting for
candidates and parties) are related to people's beliefs
about candidates and parties' stands on important issues
( r be). Therefore, it is necessary to show whether in
i i
the Portuguese surveys, as in the American and British
surveys attitudes to candidates and parties are related to
respondents' beliefs er be). If, as expected, the two
i i
measures are highly associated with each other it becomes
necessary to assess the relative weight of direct attitudes
to candidates and parties and of attitudes towards voting
for the candidates and parties on voting intention to
establish which of the two attitude measures is a better
predictor of vote choice.
Together with the weights of these two attitude measures
the relative weight of respondents' attitudes toward
electoral outcomes will also be assessed. It is an
important measure to consider when assessing the relative
predictive power of attitude measures in voting intentions.
It might be assumed that voters will wish their preferred
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candidates or parties to win the election. However, when
it comes to the actual electoral outcome there may be cases
in which, in spite of the fact that voters intend to vote
for a preferred candidate or party, they may not be totally
unfavourable to the victory of another candidate or party.
Should this be the case, then one would expect to find
attitudes toward electoral outcomes to be not as good
predictors of voting intention as attitudes toward voting
for the candidates or parties.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 8.1
looks at the relationship between attitudes to candidates
and parties and estimates of these attitudes based on
respondents beliefs about candidates' and parties' stands
on the issues (rbe) in the three Portuguese elections.
i i
Section 8.2 examines the relative weights of direct
attitudes toward candidates or parties and of attitudes
toward voting for the candidates or parties. It will also
show the effect of attitudes toward electoral outcomes on
the prediction of voting intentions. Section 8.3 examines
the indirect effect of beliefs on voting intentions. In its
summing up of the chapter, Section 8~4, refers to the role
of external variables and introduces chapter IX which is
devoted to a detailed analysis of the awareness of
Portuguese respondents.
Appendix 3 is associated with this Chapter. The Appendix
presents detailed descriptions of measures of attitude
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towards the candidates and parties, of attitude towards
voting for the candidates and parties and of attitude
toward electoral outcomes, i.e. the measures used to assess
the best predictor of voting behaviour in Section 8.2.
The description of the measures used in Section 8.3 to
assess the relation between beliefs and voting intentions
is presented in Appendix 4 together with all the other
measures used to assess the political ·and social awareness
of Portuguese voters to which the following Chapter,
Chapter IX is devoted.
Section 8.1 The relationship between attitudes to
candidates and parties and estimates of
these attitudes (r be)
i i
Table 8.1 shows the correlation coefficients between direct
attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the 1980
Presidential election, direct attitudes toward the parties
in the 1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General
election, and estimates of these attitudes based on
respondents' beliefs about the presidential candidates' and
parties' stands on the issues selected for each election
( r be).
i i
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Table 8.1
Correlation coefficients between direct attitudes toward
the presidential candidates (1980 Presidential election),
toward the parties (1982 Local elections), toward the
parties (1983 General election) and estimates of these
attitudes based on beliefs about candidates' or parties'
stands on the issues (b e).
i i
1980 Presidential election Direct attitude
b e
i i
Soares Carneiro, AD candidate .81
Ramalho Eanes, PS candidate .66
1982 Local elections
AD (right wing alliance)
PS (socialists)
.84
.63
.86APU (communist alliance)
1983 General election
CDS (christian democrats)
PSD (social democrats)
.79
.84
.67PS (socialists)
APU (communist alliance) .78
As expected, the correlations between direct attitudes
toward the candidates and parties and estimates of these
attitudes based on beliefs about their stands on the issues
in the three elections are all highly significant.
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In their study of the relationship between attitudes
towards candidates and respondents' beliefs on candidates'
stands about issues, Fishbein and Coombs (1974), obtained
similar results. At the time, the American presidential
candidates were Barry Goldwater and Lyndon Johnson. The
correlation coefficients between direct attitudes towards
the candidates and estimates of these attitudes based on
the candidates' stands on the issues ( r b e ) were .87
i i
and •69 for Goldwater and Johnson,respectively • In the
1974 British electoral study (Fishbein et aI, 1976) the
correlation coefficients obtained between direct attitudes
to parties and estimates of these attitudes based on
respondents' beliefs on the parties' stands (t be) were
i i
.74 and .67 for the Labour and Conservative parties,
respectively.
The correlations obtained in the British and Portuguese
surveys are lower than those obtained in the 1974 American
study, although all are high and significant. As pointed
out by Fishbein et al (1976) in the British study the
lower relationship found may be due to the fact that in the
British studies salient issues were not used (Fishbein et
aL, 1976, p.44).
However in spite of the fact that in the Portuguese study
salient issues were not used, it can be concluded that, as
expected, respondents' attitudes toward the presidential
candidates and the parties appear to be functions of
respondents' beliefs on the stands which candidates and
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parties were likely to adopt, if elected, on the selected
issues.
Section 8.2 - Predicting voting intentions from attitudes
parties,
voting for
electoral
toward candidates and parties,
candidates
outcomes
and and
As shown in the previous section, direct attitudes toward
candidates or parties and estimates of these attitudes
based on respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties'
stands on the issues are highly related. The Reasoned
Action model, however, suggests that behaviour (voting), is
better predicted from direct attitudes toward the behaviour
itself (i.e. voting for the candidates or parties) than
from direct attitudes toward the objects themselves (i.e
candidates and parties). It 1s therefore necessary to test
this hypothesis by assessing the relative weights of direct
attitudes to candidates or the parties, and of attitudes to
voting for the candidates or the parties in the prediction
of voting intentions.
Table 8.2 shows the relative strength of direct attitudes
toward the candidates or the parties and of attitudes
toward voting for the candidates or for the parties in the
1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections and 1983
General election. (For a description of these measures see
Appendix 3, Section 1).
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Table 8.2
Predicting voting intentions from direct attitudes
toward candidates or parties and attitudes toward
voting for candidates and for parties in the
1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections
and 1983 General election
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As expected, attitudes toward voting for the candidates in
the 1980 Presidential election and for the parties in the
1982 Local elections and in the 1983 General election were
found to be better predictors of voting intentions than
direct attitudes toward the candidates or parties. In most
cases direct attitudes toward the candidates or parties
were found to add no significant weight to the prediction
of voting intentions. In the two cases where the weight of
direct attitudes towards parties was found to be
significant, its contribution to the predictive power of
attitudes towards voting for the parties was very small.
In the 1982 Local elections the weight of attitudes toward
the Socialist party was found to make a significant
contribution to the prediction of voting intentions.
However, this contribution only increased the predictive
power of attitudes toward voting for the Socialist party
from r-.62 to R-.64. In the 1983 General election the
contribution of attitudes toward the APU (communist
alliance) had only a marginal effect on the predictive
power of attitudes towards voting for the APU of voting
intentions. The zero order correlation between attitudes
toward voting for the APU and intention to vote or not to
vote for the APU increased from r-.87 to R-.88.
The above results indicate quite clearly that once
attitudes toward the behaviour, i.e. voting for the
candidates or parties, are known prediction of voting
intentions is not enhanced by adding measures of direct
attitudes toward objects i.e. candidates or parties. Will
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prediction of voting intentions be enhanced by adding
attitudes towards electoral outcomes to measures of direct
attitudes toward the candidates or parties and of attitudes
toward voting for them? If voters are aware of the
political implications of their vote choices, they should
also be aware of the implications of the victory of
candidates or parties for whom they do not intend to vote.
It is possible that, at least in some cases, voters may
hold favourable attitudes to certain electoral outcomes, in
spite of the fact that they do not intend to vote for them.
In the case of the Portuguese 1983 General election, it is
possible that respondents who intended to vote for either
of the two right wing parties, i.e. CDS and PSD, did not
hold unfavourable attitudes towards the victory of the
party between the'two, they did not intend to vote for. If
this is the case, then attitudes toward voting for
candidates or parties, should on the whole, be better
predictors of voting intentions than attitudes toward
electoral outcomes. (For a description of measures of
attitude toward electoral outcomes, see Appendix 3, Section
1) •
Table 8.3 shows the effect of direct attitudes toward the
candidates or parties, of attitudes toward voting for the
candidates or parties and of attitudes toward the victory
of the candidates or of the parties when these measures are
considered together on the prediction of voting intentions
in the 1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections and
1983 General election.
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Table 8.3
Predicting voting intentions from direct attitudes
toward candidates or parties, toward voting for the
candidates or parties, and~toward electoral outcomes
in the 1980 Presidential election, the 1982 Local
elections and the 1983 General election
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As it can be seen from Table 8.3 attitudes toward electoral
outcomes appear to be highly related to voting intentions
in the case of the 1980 Presidential election and in the
case of the 1983 General election. In the 1982 Local
elections, however, attitudes toward electoral outcomes
were found to be unrelated to voting intentions.
Of note the fact that in the 1983 General elections, the
correlation between attitudes toward the victory of the
Socialist party and voting intentions, although significant
(.22) is much lower than the correlations found with
respect to the other three parties. This may be indicative
of the general less unfavourable attitudes of respondents
towards the Socialist party which are reflected in their
less unfavourable attitude towards the possible victory of
the socialists.
When the relative weights of direct attitudes toward
candidates or parties, of attitudes toward voting for them
and of attitudes toward electoral outcomes are assessed in
terms of their power to predict voting intentions it is
clear that the best predictor of voting intentions is by
and large attitude toward the behaviour, i.e. towards
voting for the candidates or for the parties. Little is
gained by adding the effect of direct measures of attitude
to objects i.e. candidates or parties or the effect of
attitudes toward electoral outcomes.
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Section 8.3 The relation between beliefs and voting
intentions
Section 8.2 examined the relation between attitudes and
intentions and the relative effect of those attitudes on
the prediction of voting intentions. According to the
theory of Reasoned Action attitudes which guide behaviour
are determined by beliefs acquired about the objects (Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1980). Although the effect of beliefs on
intentions to perform behaviours is considered to be
indirect it is of interest to consider the relative
contribution of respondents' beliefs on candidates and
parties' stands on issues (r. be) and respondents'
i i
normative beliefs concerning the opinion of trusted others
as to whom respondents should be voting for. Since
respondents' beliefs on candidates and parties stands on
issues are the product of respondents' beliefs on
candidates and parties' stands on issues and of
respondents' own evaluations of the issues, they are in
fact belief based attitudes. These beliefs, i.e. t b e
i i
and normative beliefs are indicative of two types of
awareness on the part of voters. Their awareness of
political issues, i.e. their political knowledge, and their
awareness of the opinions of people they trust i.e. their
social knowledge. Table 8.4 shows the relative
contribution of respondents' political and social awareness
on their voting intentions in the three elections.
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Table 8.4
Predicting voting intentions from belief based
attitudes on candidates and parties' stands on the
issues (Lbe) and normative beliefs (NB) in the
i i
1980 Presidential election, 1982 Local elections
and 1983 General election
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As expected, the dependency of voting intentions on beliefs
is not as high as their dependency on attitudes (see tables
8.2 and 8.3). However, it is of interest to note that the
relative weights of beliefs on candidates' and parties'
stands on issues (rb e )and of normative beliefs (NB),
i i
appear to be more balanced than when the weight of
normative beliefs is assessed together with the weight of
attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties. The
weights of I b e and normative beliefs both make a
i i
significant contribution to enhance the prediction of
voting intentions.
Section 8.4 - Su.mary of Chapter VIII
The power of the Reasoned Action model to predict voting
intentions was compared with measures of attitude and of
belief. As expected, direct attitudes toward the
presidential candidates in the 1980 Presidential election
and toward the parties in the 1982 Local elections and in
the 1983 General election, although highly related to
beliefs about the candidates' or parties' stands on the
issues, were found to make no significant contribution to
the prediction of voting intentions when their predictive
weights were assessed together with the predictive weights
of attitudes toward voting for the candidates or parties.
According to the theory of Reasoned Action direct attitudes
toward objects, i.e. candidates or parties in an election
are external to the model. Although direct attitudes
toward candidates or parties are assumed to be related to
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beliefs about the candidates or parties' stands on
important electoral issues they are not assumed to be
related to party identification as the Columbia and
Michiian models proposed. The Portuguese findings showed
the strong relationship between direct attitudes to
candidates or parties and respondents' beliefs on
candidates and parties' stands on the issues. However, no
attempt was made to relate direct attitudes to candidates
or parties with party identification or indeed to relate
other variables which are considered external to the model
such as sex, level of education, age and past voting
behaviour to voting intention. First, these measures,
were found to make no significant contribution to the
predictive power of the Reasoned Action model in the
American and British studies. Second, the main concern of
the Portuguese study was to assess the political awareness
of Portuguese respondents, the effect of this awareness on
their voting intentions and the extent to which voting
intentions were affected by the influence that the opinions
of trusted referents had on respondents.
The balanced effect of the political and social awareness
of respondents (measured by respondents beliefs on
candidates' and parties' stands on the issues -l b e and
i i
by the opinion of trusted others - normative beliefs) on
respondents' voting intentions as described in the
preceding section 8.3 of this chapter, provides a basis for
the detailed discussion of respondents' beliefs to which
the following chapter is devoted.
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CHAPTER II
AWARENESS OF VOTERS: POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND
NORMATIVE INFLUENCE
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the detailed analysis of
results with respect to two types of awareness,i.e.
political awareness of important electoral issues and of
the candidates or parties stands on them, and social
awareness of the opinions of trusted others about electoral
voting choices.
According to the model of reasoned action awareness derived
from political knowledge determines voters' attitudes
towards voting for candidates/parties. On the other hand,
awareness of the opinions of trusted others, together with
attitudes towards voting for candidates/parties, determine
voting intentions.
Detailed analyses of the relevant data in the American and
British studies have shown that voters in these two
countries are aware of electoral issues, have their own
opinions about them and know the stands that
candidates/parties are likely to adopt towards the issues,
if elected. These analyses have also shown that, at least
in some cases, the perceived opinions of trusted others
also have significant weight in determining voting
intentions.
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The results of the tests of the model in the three
Portuguese elections covered by this study are comparable
to the tests carried out in the American Presidential
election of 1976 and in the British General election of
1974 (Chapter VII).
It now remains to be seen through a detailed analysis of
respondents evaluations of the issues and of their beliefs
about the candidates/parties stands on them how aware were
the Portuguese respondents of the political processes at
the time of the elections. A detailed analysis of
respondents' normative beliefs will determine their
awareness of the opinions of trusted others about their
voting choices.
To establish whether respondents were aware of the
political processes which were taking place at the time of
the elections and of the implications of their vote choice
it is necessary to ascertain:
1. voters' degree of uncertainty concerning electoral
issues (in the present study this point is crucial since
salient issues were not used) and the strength of their
evaluations of the issues;
2. voters' degree of uncertainty concerning the stands
which candidates/parties were likely to adopt on the issues
and the strength of their beliefs, on the
candidates/parties stands;
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3. the combined effect of their evaluations of the issues
and beliefs on the candidates/parties' stands on these
issues on their attitudes to voting or not voting for the
candidates/parties.
To establish whether respondents were aware of the opinions
of trusted others it is necessary to ascertain respondents'
degree of uncertainty on the opinions of trusted others and
the strength of their beliefs concerning such opinions.
This chapter is divided in four sections. The first three
sections, sections 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, are devoted· to
examining the political awareness of respondents in each of
the three elections. Each of these three sections assesses
respondents' apathy versus their interest in electoral
issues and in candidates/parties' stands together with the
contribution of their knowledge in these matters to their
attitudes towards voting for the candidates/parties.
Section 9.4 assesses the social awareness of respondents in
the three elections in terms of their beliefs about trusted
others' opinions about whom they should vote for.
Section 9.1 The Presidential Election of 1980 hov
politically aware vere the voters?
9.1.1. Apathy vs interest about issues and candidates'
stands
Respondents' apathy is assessed by the percentage of "don't
know" responses given when they were asked to evaluate the
issues and to indicate the stands the presidential
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candidates were likely to adopt on the issues, if elected.
Evaluation of issues (1980 Presidential election)
Table 9.1. in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0)
responses with respect to each of the ten electoral issues
as a function of party identification, together with the
percent positive (+) and negative (-) responses.
The average percent midscale responses shown by each of the
three groups of voters divided according to party
identification (AD - 12.9%, FRS - 12.21 and APU - 11.81)
indicates that, on the whole, the vast majority of
respondents had feelings about the issues and were able to
evaluate them.
In seven out of the ten issues the direction either
positive or negative of respondents' evaluations is very
similar. The vast majority of AD, FRS and APU respondents
evaluated positively issues 1, 2, 3, and 7 feeling,
therefore, that a President should be impartial, (issue 1)
respect the Constitution, (issue 2) veto Government
proposals which are unconstitutional (issue 3) and support
political stability (issue 7).
Diagram 9.1.1 next page shows the common trend of the
positive evaluations made by the three groups of
respondents in respect of issues 1, 2, 3 and 7.
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other hand, the majority of respondents in all
three groups indicated that a President should not support
a dictatorial form of government, political instability or
a military coup (issues 6, 8 and 10 respectively), although
almost one third of FRS and APU respondents had no feelings
about the latter.
Diagram 9.1.2 next page shows how similar were the negative
evaluations made by the three groups of respondents in
respect of issues 6, 8 and 10.
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In their evaluations of the remaining three issues, i.e.
issues 4,5 and 9 respondents do not.show a common trend,
either
that a President should risk political instab~lity rather
positive or negative. On issues 4 and 5, namely
than give in to a government who acts against the
Constitution and that a President should give unconditional
support to the government, respectively, the FRS and APU
respondents showed similar feelings in the same direction
whereas AD respondents appeared to be very divided among
themselves. In order to highlight the difference between
the FRS and APU respondents' evaluations on the one hand
and those of the AD respondents on the other, Diagrams
9.1.3 and 9.1.4 next page show the positive, midscale and
negative evaluations made by the three groups of
respondents about these two issues.
187
DIAGRAM.9.1.3
~
o 100~--------------------------~t:: 90 n ..
~ 80 ..
.J:5 70 .
UJ
Z...
10 .
e + oISSUE 4
• FRSD ADx APU
DIAGRAM 9.1.4
1001~-------------------- ~99 _ _._ _ "--_
80 _ _.-~ ..-.- __ ..._ ..
D AD
x APU
eISSUE 5
• FRS
Percent positive. midscale and negative
evaluations made by AD, FRS and APU
respondents of issues 4 and 5 in the
in the 1980 Presidential election
AD respondents were clearly divided in their evaluations of
issues on whether a President should risk political
instability rather than give in to a government who acts
President
against the Constitution (issue 4) and on whether a
should give unconditional support to the
government (issue 5).
188
Given that the vast majority of AD respondents, like their
FRS and APU counterparts, had shown clear preference for
an impartial President, respectful of the Constitution who
would not hesitate to use the veto to block government
proposals considered to be unconstitutional, their somewhat
unclear positions on issues concerning breaches of
Constitutional practice may be unexpected. Only 3% of AD
respondents felt that a President should not respect the
Constitution and 85% felt that he should. However, 22%
felt that the President should give in to a government who
act against the Constitution and as many as 32% felt that
the President should give unconditional support to the
government.
This apparent incoherence should be considered in the light
~ of the high percentage of "don't know" responses given by
AD respondents on these two issues. It is possible that AD
respondents were faced with conflicing choices. AD
respondents showed they had a high regard for general
principles connected with the exercise of the President's
off~ce. Simultaneously~ however, they were facing a choice
between two presidential candidates. One of them, the
incumbent, Ramalho Eanes, who had been rejected by the AD
leadership in view of his firm constitutional stands,
offered little guarantee of bringing about, if elected, the
political stability desired by the AD electorate. On the
other hand, Soares Carneiro, the virtually unknown
general backed by the AD, offered every guarantee that,
Army
if
elected, he would keep the institutional harmony desired by
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the AD leadership and would thus open for the first time
prospects of political stability in the country.
If political stability was for the AD respondents the most
important electoral issue, then it is plausible that in
this particular electoral context they were prepared to
accept the implicit contradictions between principle and
practice. Some respondents accepted the contradiction
quite openly; others may have used the "don't know"
response to avoid contradict~ng themselves. If this were
the case it is possible that respondents do not use the
midscale point just for indicating lack of knowledge or
indifference.
Issue 9, namely that a President should support Revolution,
divided the three groups of voters among themselves. Fifty
nine percent of AD respondents indicated negative feelings
towards this issue whereas 80% of APU respondents showed
positive feelings. The FRS respondents showed great
divisions among themselves, and as many as 39% of them
indicated they had no feelings about whether a President
should support Revolution. Diagram 9.1.5 next page shows
the percent positive, midscale and negative evaluations
made by the three groups of respondents on issue 9 to
highlight these differences between the groups.
190
DIAGRAM 9.1.5
1ee~------------------------~90 .
se .
70 .
60 .
zo....
I-~....
§.~ 01L-----~+--------~O~------------~
ISSUE 9
• FRSo AD
x APU
Percent positive, midscale and negative
evaluations made by AD, FRS and APU
respondents of issue 9 in the 1980
Presidential election
The statement that "a President should support Revolution"
left the concept "revolution" unspecified. Respondents
could therefore interpret the concept in terms of the
"April Revolution" or in more general, ideological terms.
APU respondents, given their party affiliation or their
broad political sympathies, do, in principle, support
Revolution as a means to achieve radical political change
from a bourgeois asystem to socialist system.
Furthermore, they had wholeheartedly supported the April
Revolution and continued to do so. It is understandable
that a high percentage evaluated the issue positively.
It is apparent that the FRS respondents experienced
difficulties with the statement. They also had supported
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the April Revolution wholeheartedly. However, unlike their
APU counterparts, they did not accept it as the beginning
of a revolutionary process to Socialism, but as a single
act leading to the restoration of parliamentarian processes
favouring the establishment of universal social rights
under a multi-party democratic system. It is highly
probable, therefore, that the statement
presented them with a conflict between the
the April Revolution and the rejection of
might have
acceptance of
revolution per
se.
To a lesser extent, AD respondents may have faced the same
conflict as their socialist counterparts, although most of
them clearly rejected that a President should support
revolution.
These results on the whole show that respondents had
something to say about the issues~ It should be noted,
however, that ambiguity either in .the way the issues are
presented to respondents or in the political context of the
elections themselves may lead respondents who are
politically aware to use the midscale point.
Beliefs on candidates' stands (1980 Presidential election)
The level of respondents' awareness dropped when they were
asked to state their beliefs concerning the likely stands
of the candidates on each of the ten issues. Table 9.2 in
Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0) responses by the
three groups of voters divided according to party
identification on the likely stands of the candidates on
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each of the ten issues, together with the percentages of
respondents who believed that the candidates were likely to
have a positive or a negative stand towards the issues if
elected. Diagram 9.2.1 illustrates the results.
DIAGRAM 9.2.1
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Percent midscale beliefs of AD, PS and APU
respondents on the stand of the AD candidate
(SC) and of the Socialist party candidate
(RE) on the ten issues in the
1980 Presidential election
As Diagram 9.2.1 based on Table 9.2 shows, overall, almost
one third of AD respondents were unaware of the AD
candidate stands and also of the stands likely to be
adopted by the candidate supported by the Socialist Party
who had just completed four years in office.
On the other hand socialist respondents were on the whole
very certain about the stands likely to be adopted by the
candidate supported by their own party. 87.7% average
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across all items of socialist respondents were able to
attribute stands to their party's candidate, Ramalho Eanes,
and 80.2% were able to attribute stands to the candidate
supported by the AD, Soares Carneiro.
The vast majority of APU respondents were also able to
attribute stands to the candidates. 87.8% of APU
respondents, average across all items, were able to
attribute stands to the candidate supported by the AD. APU
voters were less certain about the stands likely to be
adopted by the candidate supported by the Socialist Party,
Ramalho Eanes, for whom they were advised to vote by the
Communist party. However, as many as 76.3% of APU
respondents, average across all ·items, were able to
attribute stands to Ramalho Eanes.
FRS and APU respondents show great similarities in their
beliefs concerning the stands the two candidates were
likely to take on the ten is&ues as 1llustrated by Diagram
9.2.2.next page.
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The diagram not only highlights the similarities between
the direction of beliefs held by FRS and APU respondents as
regards the stands likely to be adopted by the two
presidential candidates, but also the differences the two
groups of respondents believed to exist between the stands
likely to be adopted by the candidates themselves.
Furthermore, the diagram shows very clearly that with the
exception of issue 9, that a President should support
Revolution, both FRS and APU respondents believed that if
elected, the candidate Rama1ho Eanes supported by the
Socialist party, would adopt stands on the issues very
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similar to those they desired, as indicated by their
evaluations in Diagram 9.2.2. For ease of reference the
Diagram also illustrates the percent positive evaluations
of FRS and APU respondents.
It can be argued that the above results are to be expected
since both FRS and APU respondents clearly intended to vote
for Rama1ho Eanes, and both the Socialist and Communist
parties were highly critical of the AD candidate. However,
it is interesting to note that in spite of the severe
criticisms made by the AD leadership about the incumbent
Rama1ho Eanes, and of their vigorous campaign in support of
their own candidate, Soares Carneiro, AD respondents'
beliefs concerning the likely stands of the two candidates
on the ten issues did not differentiate between the
candidates as well as those expressed by FRS and APU
respondents. This is illustrated in diagram 9.2.3.next
page.
For ease of reference the Diagram also illustrates the
percent positive evaluations of AD respondents.
It is clear that for AD respondents, at least in two of the
issues, the incumbent Ramalho Eanes was expected to adopt
stands more in agreement with the outcomes preferred by the
AD respondents than those expected of the AD candidate.
This is the case in issues 2 and 3, where the majority of
AD respondents expected Ramalho Eanes to respect the
Constitution and use the veto to block unconstitutional
government proposals. As it is illustrated in the diagram,
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the majority of AD respondents did not expect the AD
candidate to the Constitution or vetorespect
unconstitutional government proposals (issues 2 and 3
respectively).
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On the other hand, the vast majority of AD respondents
expected the AD candidate to support political stability, a
most preferred outcome on the part of AD respondents and to
reject political instability. In contrast, only about one
third of AD respondents expected the Socialist party
candidate, to actually support political stability.
The belief that the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, would
bring about political stability if elected appears to have
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been the overriding factor which, as electoral results
showed, led most AD voters to vote for him. Only issue 7
concerning political stability offered little uncertainty
and no divisions among AD respondents. It was also the
only issue which did not cause uncertainty or divisions
among AD respondents when they were asked to state their
beliefs concerning the likely stand of the AD candidate.
However only the analysis of the products of the issue
evaluations made by the respondents and their beliefs
concerning the candidates' stands ( be) allow conclusions
i i
to be drawn about the effect of an issue in voting. It is
necessary now to examine the strength of respondents'
evaluations and beliefs and assess the contribution of
their combined effect on respondents attitudes towards
voting or not voting for the candidates.
9.1.2. The contribution of political knowledge to
attitude towards voting for the candidates (b e ) in the
i i1980 Presidential election.
Strength of feelings about the issues (1980 Presidential
election)
As expected. the strength of feelings about the issues did
not produce marked differences between the three groups of
respondents. Table 9.3, in Appendix 4, shows the average
strength of evaluations of each of the three groups of
respondents on each issue.
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Diagram 9.3.1 illustrates the mean differences in strength
of the evaluations made by the AD, FRS and APU respondents
on each issue.
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FRS and APU respondents showed no difference in the
strength of their evaluations, except, as expected, on
issue 9 that a President should support Revolution. While
APU respondents clearly believed that a President should
support revolution, the division among the FRS respondents
concerning this issue is clearly illustrated by the zero
mean. The differences between the AD group means and the
means of the other two groups of respondents are
differences in strength rather than in direction, with the
exception of issue 9, since AD respondents did not believe
that a President should support revolution.
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Issues 4 and 5 that a President should risk political
instability rather than give in to a government who acts
against the Constitution, and that a President should give
unconditional support to the government, had caused
divisions among the AD respondents as discussed in the
previous subsection. The low mean values of +.4 and -.1
reflect those divisions rather than general apathy.
Strength of beliefs about candidates'
Presidential election)
stands (1980
The mean belief strength shown by AD, FRS and APU
respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the two
presidential candidates on each issue is shown in table
9.4, in Appendix 4.
Diagrams 9.4.1 and 9.4.2 next page illustrate the
differences in mean belief strength between the AD, FRS and
APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by each
presidential candidate on each of the ten issues.
It is evident that FRS and APU respondents were in total
agreement as to the stands they believed Soares Carneiro,
the candidate supported by the AD, would be likely to
adopt, if elected, on each issue. It is also evident that
both groups of respondents were also in total agreement as
to the stands they believed Ramalho Eanes, the candidate
supported by the Socialist party, would be likely to adopt,
if elected, on each issue.
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On the stands attributed to Ramalho Eanes, the AD
respondents agreed with the FRS and APU on all but three
stands. On two of these, i.e. the stands on issues 7 and 8
that a President should support political stability and
that a President should support political instability, the
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differences are in the strength of beliefs rather than in
their direction. On issue 1, that a President should be
impartial, the AD respondents believed that Ramalho Eanes
would not be impartial whereas both FRS and APU respondents
believed he would be.
On the candidate Soares Carneiro supported by the party
they identified with, AD respondents showed some measure of
agreement with the beliefs expressed by FRS and APU
candidates on five issues, i.e. issues 1, 4, 5, 8, 9. The
strength of AD respondents' beliefs was, however,
significantly lower than that shown by the other two
groups. Like their FRS and APU counterparts AD respondents
believed that Soares Carneiro would not be impartial (issue
1); that he would not risk instability rather than give in
to a government who acted against the Constitution (issue
4); that he would support the government unconditionally
(issue 5); that he would neither support political
instability (issue 8) nor Revolution (issue 9). Unl~ke.the
FRS and APU respondents, AD respondents believed that
Soares Carneiro would respect the Constitution (issue 2),
would use the veto to oppose unconstitutional government
proposals (issue 3) and would not support a military coup
(issue 10). On issue 7, whereas FRS and APU respondents
appeared to be undecided as to whether Soares Carneiro
would be likely to support political stability, AD
respondents strongly believed that he would.
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In fact when the sets of beliefs expressed by AD
respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the two
candidates are analysed it is clear that AD respondents
strongly believed that Ramalho Eanes, the candidate
supported by the Socialist party, would use the veto to
block unconstitutional government proposals, that he would
not support the government unconditionally and that he
would be opposed to a dictatorial type of government, the
three issues which involved the Presidency directly with
the government. The AD respondents appeared to be,
therefore, quite aware that Ramalho Eanes would be likely
to adopt these stands as he had shown himself capable of
during the previous 11 months of AD government, and in so
doing continue the instability which had characterised
political life in the country for so long.
On the other hand, in relation to the candidate supported
by the AD, Soares Carneiro, the AD respondents strongly
believed that, if elected, he would give his unconditional
support to the government. As shown by the way they
evaluated the issue AD respondents were deeply div~ded
about it. However they appeared to accept the AD
candidate's lack of impartiality in order that political
stability could be achieved.
The contribution of evaluations and beliefs to attitudes
(1980 Presidential election)
Table 9.5 in Appendix 4 shows the contribution of each
belief held by respondents regarding the stands likely to
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be adopted by the candidates on each issue to overall
attitude to voting for the candidates. This contribution
is assessed by the product of respondents evaluations of
the issues and their corresponding beliefs concerning
candidates' stands.
Diagrams 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 next page illustrate the
contribution of respondents' evaluations of issues and
beliefs on the candidates' stands on each issue to
respondents' attitudes towards voting for each candidate.
As Diagrams 9.5.1 and 9.5.2 next page show the products of
FRS and APU respondents' evaluations and beliefs about the
presidential candidates' stands on the issues are all
positive in relation to Ramalho Eanes, the candidate
supported by the Socialist party, and all very negative in
relation to Soares Carneiro, the candidate supported by the
AD alliance, showing very clearly the effect of the
political awareness of FRS and APU respondents' on their
attitudes towards voting for each of the two presidential
candidates.
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The effect of AD respondents' political awareness on their
attitudes towards voting for each of the two presidential
candidates is not so explicit. The fact is that the
products of AD respondents' evaluations and beliefs about
the stands likely to be adopted by each of the two
presidential candidates make a positive contribution to
their attitudes toward voting for both of them.
It is necessary to examine the effect of the type of issue
on the contribution that evaluations of outcomes and
beliefs made to attitudes towards voting for the candidates
to understand why most of the AD respondents intended to
vote for the AD candidate.
The ten issues can be divided into four main types
according to whether they prescribe presidential duties,
presidential rights, specific relations between the
Presidency and the Government or reflect the anxieties and
fears of radical interventions in the political scene.
Issues 1 and 2 that a President should be impartial and
should respect the Constitution refer to presidential
duties; issues 3 and 4, that a President should use the
veto to block unconstitutional proposals and risk
instability
against the
rather than give in to a government who acts
constitution refer to rights that can be
exercised by the President; issues 5 and 6, that a
President should give unconditional support to the
Government and to a dictatorial type of government, refer
to the nature of the relations between Presidency and
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Government viewing the former as controlled by the latter.
The last four issues that a President should support
political stability or political instability per se,
revolution and a military coup are of a more general kind
but closely related to anxieties resulting from the lack of
stability in the country and fears felt at the time about
the possibility of radical interventions, i.e revolution
and military coup.
Table 9.A below shows the mean contribution to overall
attitude to voting for the presidential candidates as a
function of type of issue and party identification.
Table 9.A
Mean contribution to overall attitude to voting for the
presidential candidates as a function of type of issue and
party identification in the 1980 Presidential election.
Candidates
Type Soares Carneiro (AD) Ramalho Eanes (PS)
of AD FRS APU AD FRS APU
issue voters voters voters voters voters voters
I.Pres. .8 -4.5 -5.7 1.3 4.9 4.5
duties
2.Pres. .8 -3.6 -5.4 1.4 4.4 4.3
rights
3.Relat. 1.9 -3.7 -5.3 2.6 4.6 4.3
between
Presdcy
and Gov.
4.Stabi- 3.2 -.6 -1.7 .8 2.7 1.9
lity
Averages 1.7 -3.1 -4.5 1.5 4.2 3.8
It is clear that AD respondents' attitude towards voting
for the candidate supported by the Socialist party, Ramalho
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Eanes would be more favourable than their attitude towards
voting for the candidate supported by their own party if
only specific issues concerned with presidential duties and
rights and relations between the Presidency and Government
were taken into account. It is clear that at the time of
the election, AD respondents were more concerned with
general questions related to political stability than with
questions concerned with the way the future President
should exercise his power.
Section 9.1.3 Summary of Section 9.1 (1980 Presidential
election)
Summary: Political awareness in the 1980 Presidential
election
On the whole respondents showed that they were aware of the
issues which had been selected for their evaluation and of
the stands the presidential candidates were likely to adopt
on them.
Judging by expressed beliefs of AD respondents the
vociferous electoral campaign made by the AD leadership
against the incumbent did not to have the desired effect on
the AD electorate. Their efforts to promote their own
candidate were not uncritically accepted either. The AD
respondents showed remarkably little trace of being
affected by the AD campaigns. The majority did not feel
compelled to believe that the incumbent had been a bad
President in order to decide to vote for the AD candidate;
nor did they feel compelled to believe that the latter
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would make necessarily a good President in order to vote
for him. On the contrary, they showed independence of
judgement and awareness as to the reasons which made them
decide to vote or not to vote for either of the candidates.
The effect of the death of the two AD leaders on electoral
results
As stated in Chapter 1, three days prior to the
Presidential election the main leader of the AD coalition,
the social democrat Prime Minister, Sa Carneiro and the
number two of the christian democrats, Adelino Amaro da
Costa, were killed in a plane crash after taking off from
Lisbon to go to Oporto for the closing rally in support of
their presidential candidate.
At the time, many observers expressed the opinion that the
deaths of the two charismatic AD leaders, had been
responsible for the defeat of the AD candidate. They
argued that some AD supporters might have felt that the
country needed time to adjust to the loss of a strong
leader. It was argued that since the AD candidate, Soares
Carneiro, was an unknown figure who during the electoral
campaign had failed to impress public opinion, some AD
supporters might have thought that, in the circumstances,
political stability would be better served if the incumbent
were returned to the Presidency.
On the other hand, other observers expressed the view that
the deaths of the two leaders would benefit the chances of
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the AD candidate of winning the election at the first
ballot, on the grounds that the AD electorate, especially
those who intended to vote for the incumbent, would want
to respect the last wish of the dead leaders.
The funerals took place on the eve of the election amidst
general consternation. Wide TV coverage, the grief and
shock expressed in the statements and eulogies of friends
and political foes alike, were thought to have a likely
emotional effect on voting decision.
The two opposing arguments as to the possible effect of the
deaths on the election results cannot be entirely dismissed
and it is conceivable that some voters were affected either
way. However, the questionnaires used in the Braga
district were all completed and returned by the morning of
the day of the accident, a few hours before it happened.
AD respondents feelings showed that on the whole they had
not blindly followed the AD leadership arguments in favour
of the AD candidate or against the incumbent. It is
therefore plausible to assume that the deaths of the two AD
leaders did not have a significant effect on electoral
results.
Section 9.2 The Local Elections of 1982 how
politically aware were the voters?
9.2.1. Apathy vs interest about issues and parties' stands
Respondents' apathy is assessed by the percentage of "don't
know" responses given when they were asked to evaluate the
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issues and to indicate the stands the three main parties
were likely to adopt on the issues if elected.
Evaluation of issues (1982 Local elections)
Table 9.6 in Appendix 4, shows the percent midscale (0)
responses with respect to each of the ten electoral issues
as a function of intention to vote for each party, together
with the percent positive (+) and negative (-) responses.
The average miscale responses shown by each of the three
groups of respondents,(AD - 9.6%, PS - 2.6% and APU -
1.4%), indicates that the large majority of respondents had
feelings about the issues. Respondents also show a very
high degree of concordance in the direction of their
feelings. This is to be expected i.n view of the nature of
the issues themselves. Di?gram 9.6.1 next page shows the
percentage of respondents which within each group evaluated
the issues positively.
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Beliefs on parties' stands (1982 Local elections)
As in the Presidential elections of 1980, the level of
respondents' awareness dropped considerably when they were
asked to state their beliefs concerning the likely stands
of the candidates on each of the ten issues.
Table 9.7 in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0)
responses by the three groups of voters divided according
to intention to vote on the likely stands of the parties on
each of the ten issues.
The average level of uncertainty expressed by AD and PS
respondents concerning the stands the parties they intended
to vote for would be likely to adopt on the issues, is
quite high 22% and 30% respectively. APU respondents
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showed very low levels of uncertainty with respect to the
APU stands. Only 8 percent of APU respondents, overall,
stated that they did not know which stands the APU were
likely to adopt.
In relation to the parties they did not intend to vote for
AD and PS respondents showed very high levels of
uncertainty whereas APU respondents showed much less.
Diagrams 9.7.1 and 9.7.2 illustrate the apathy shown by AD
and PS respondents.
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AD and PS respondents showed very high levels of
uncertainty in relation to the stands likely to be adopted
by the three parties, i.e. AD, PS and APU. 39 and 36
percent of AD respondents were uncertain of the stands
likely to be adopted by the PS and APU respectively
(Diagram 9.7.1).
PS respondents showed even higher degrees of uncertainty.
As many as 44 and 41 percent were uncertain of the stands
likely to be adopted by the AD and APU, respectively
(Diagram 9.7.2).
APU respondents, on the other hand, showed much less
uncertainty about the stands likely to be adopted by the AD
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and the PS on the issues. Diagram 9.7.3 illustrates the
point.
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Only 9 percent of APU respondents, overall, were uncertain
of the AD stands on the ten issues and 21 percent, overall
were uncertain of the PS stands on the ten issues.
9.2.2. The contribution of political knowledge to attitude
towards
elections.
voting for the parties ( b
i
e ) in the
i
1982 Local
Strength of feelings about the issues (1982 Local elections)
Table 9.8 in Appendix 4 shows the average strength of
evaluations of each of the three groups of respondents on
each issue. As expected, the strength of feelings about
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the issues did not show marked differences between the
three groups of respondents. The significant differences
found between the mean evaluations of the three groups of
respondents are differences in the strength of the
evaluations rather than in their direction. Diagram 9.8.1
illustrates the similarities in the strength of feelings
expressed by the three groups of respondents on each of the
ten issues.
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Strength of beliefs about parties' stands (1982 Local
elections)
The mean belief strength shown by AD, PS and APU
respondents on the stands likely to be adopte~ by the three
parties on each issue is shown in table 9.9 in Appendix 4.
The strength of respondents' beliefs on the three parties'
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stands on each issue is illustrated in the following three
diagrams. Diagram 9.9.1 shows the average belief strength
of AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be
adopted by the AD on each issue.
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It is clear that whereas AD respondents believed that the
AD would support all the ten issues if elected, PS and APU
respondents, especially the latter, did not believe that
the AD would support the desired policies on any of the
issues. Diagram 9.9.2 shows the mean belief strength of
AD, PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to be
adopted by the PS on each issue.
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PS respondents believed that the PS would support all the
ten issues if elected. AD respondents believed that the
PS would be able to support some of the issues, and APU
respondents did not believe that the PS would support any
of them.
Two points should be noted about AD and APU respondents'
beliefs about the PS stands. The negative beliefs
expressed are quite mild and, although PS respondents did
not believe that the AD were capable of implementing the
right policies to solve the needs and problems expressed in
the issues, AD respondents showed a moderate degree of
confidence in the Socialist party to tackle them.
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Diagram 9.9.3 shows the mean belief strength of AD, PS and
APU respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the
APU on each issue.
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APU respondents who showed that they did not believe that
either the AD or the PS would be capable of tackling the
issues appeared to be extremely confident that the APU
would be capable of satisfying the needs and solving the
problems expressed in the selected issues.
PS respondents showed some degree of confidence in the
APU's ability to solve some of the problems. On the other
hand, AD respondents' beliefs about the APU's stands on the
issues were unexpectedly mild in view of the deep
ideological differences between the two alliances.
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The contribution of evaluations and beliefs to attitudes
(1982 Local elections)
Table 9.10 in Appendix 4 shows the contribution of each
evaluation combined with each belief held by respondents on
the stands likely to be adopted by the AD, the PS and the
APU on each issue to their attitudes towards voting for the
three parties. The following three diagrams illustrate
these results.
Diagram 9.10.1 shows the mean contributions to attitudes
which result from the combination of respondents
evaluations of the issues with their beliefs on the AD
stands.
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Diagram 9.10.2 shows the mean contributions to attitudes
towards voting for the PS which result from the combination
of respondents' evaluations of the issues with their
beliefs on the PS stands.
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Diagram 9.10.3 next page shows ·the mean contributions to
attitudes towards voting for the APU which result from the
combination of respondents' evaluation of the issues with
their beliefs on the APU stands.
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In view of the fact that there were no significant
differences in the direction of the evaluations made by the
three groups of respondents, the contribution of their
political knowledge to their attitudes towards voting for
the parties followed very closely the beliefs expressed by
respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the three
parties on the issues.
Diagram 9.10.4 next page shows the overall average
contribution made by the political knowledge of AD, PS and
APU respondents to their attitudes towards voting for the
three parties (overall averages shown in Table 9.10 in
Appendix 4).
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The results expressed in diagram 9.10.4 reflect the apathy
of AD and PS respondents and their lack of strong feelings
against the APU at local government level. In contrast,
APU respondents showed not only a keener interest in local
affairs but also little uncertainty as to the party they
wished to see in charge of them.
Section 9.2.3.
elections)
Su..ary of Section 9.2 (1982 Local
Summary: Political awareness in the 1982 Local elections
As explained in the Method (Chapter V), the sample used for
the 1982 Local elections was drawn from three
Municipalities. It is not possible to assess whether
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respondents' beliefs and attitudes differed significantly
according to the Municipality where they lived in view of
the fact that the returned questionnaires were not properly
identified.
However, results indicate quite clearly the apathy and
uninterest of AD and PS respondents and the interest and
involvement of APU respondents in local political
processes.
At local level, the APU has gained the reputation of being
efficient,. hard working and concerned with the welfare of
local populations. The alliance has been able to increase
the number of municipalities under its control in spite of
the anti-communist campaigns waged by the right wing and
the Socialist party in an effort to reverse the tendency of
the electorate to abstain (the level of abstentions in
local elections is much higher than in general elections)
or to actually vote for the APU. The right wing parties
and the PS have supported each other in some instances
where their combined weight could have a chance of making
the APU lose control of municipalities. The mild negative
attitude of AD respondents towards voting for the APU,
together with the mild positive attitude of PS respondents
towards voting for the APU may be explained by the
awareness of these two groups of respondents of APU
efficiency in local administration.
interest about what party is
In not showing
in charge of
great
local
administration, AD and PS respondents do not appear very
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concerned with the fact that the Communist party, by far
the largest party of the APU alliance, may hold the power
of deciding policy at the local level. APU respondents, in
contrast, show very clearly that they want the APU to be in
charge and reject quite strongly the other two parties,
especially the AD.
Section 9.3 The General Election of 1983 how
politically aware were the voters?
9.3.1. Apathy vs interest about issues and parties'
stands
As explained in the previous sections, the apathy of voters
was assessed by the percentage of "don't know" responses
given when respondents were asked to evaluate electoral
issues and to indicate the stands the four main parties
were likely to adopt on them if elected.
Evaluation of issues (1983 General election)
Table 9.11 in Appendix 4 shows the percent midscale (0)
responses with respect to each of the eight electoral
issues as a function of voting intention for each party,
together with the percent positive (+) and negative (-)
responses. After each issue, in brackets, is shown the
party who proposed it.
The average midscale responses shown by each of the four
groups of respondents,(CDS- 3%, PSD- 5%; PS- 19% and APU-
10%), indicates that, by and large, the majority of
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respondents had feelings about the issues.
Christian-democrat (CDS) and social-democrat (PSD)
respondents showed, overall, very little uncertainty about
the issues; equally, the vast majority of APU respondents
also appeared to have something to say about them. On the
other hand almost one fifth of Socialist respondents showed
uncertainty.
Diagram 9.11.1 illustrates the percent positive
evaluations made by the four groups of respondents, CDS,
PSD, PS and APU on each of the eight issues.
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Diagram 9.11.1 shows quite clearly that CDS and PSD
respondents were little uncertain about the eight issues.
PS and APU respondents' evaluations were not as clear cut.
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This, in part, could have been due to the nature of the
issues selected.
For example, issues 2 and 5, on the need to promote
patriotism and order (issue 2) and on the need for a future
government to rule with firmness, authority and
(issue 5), are value-laden issues affirming
morality
general
principles of conduct. The association of these principles
with the electoral campaigns of the CDS and PSD,
respectively, presented no problems for the CDS and PSD
respondents. However, the association of the two issues
with the right wing parties could have affected PS and APU
respondents in different ways, especially issue 2 on
patriotism and order reminiscent of the slogans of the
Dictatorship.
Some PS and APU respondents may have evaluated the issues
independently of the electoral context as general
principles of conduct; others may have evaluated them as
right wing stands and opposed them on those grounds; others
may have abstained from stating an opinion to avoid the
conflict between the two interpretations. On reflection,
therefore, the inclusion of value-laden issues should have
been avoided.
Other divisions among PS and APU respondents are of much
greater interest. APU voters show a marked division in
their evaluations of issue 1, on the need to introduce the
Social Contract as a means to pacify industrial relations.
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The APU leadership was highly critical of this proposal
presented by the Socialist party. Nevertheless only 35% of
APU respondents evaluated the issue negatively. It remains
to be seen whether APU respondents correctly identified the
APU stand on the issue.
The evaluations made by socialist respondents on two of
the issues need to be examined in the light of the gradual
shift of the Socialist party to the centre of the political
spectrum. These were issues 4 and 7, concerned with the
need to reduce the public sector (issue 4)and to change
labour laws thus permitting a more flexible approach to the
hiring and firing of workers (issue 7). As explained in
Chapter I, the dimension of the public sector and the
existing labour laws highly protective of workers' rights
were included in the 1975 Constitution approved by three of
the main parties (PSD, PS and PCP). The CDS abstained.
Soon after the General election of 1976, the social
democrats (PSD) began their campaign against the spirit and
text of the 75 Constitution, with special emphasis on the
public sector and labour laws. Quite rightly from their
pOint of view the notions of a free market and minimal
state intervention in the economy were incompatible with
the agreed constitutional prescriptions on these two
questions.
The AD, the coalition between the christian-democrats and
the social-democrats, won Parliamentary majority in the
1980 general elections. When the Constitution was revised
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in 1982 with the AD in power, in spite of enjoying an
absolute majority in Parliament, the AD lacked the two-
thirds majority needed to approve major changes in the
Constitution. With the support of the Socialist party to
make-up a two third majority in Parliament, the AD was able
to introduce a number of moderate constitutional changes.
However,in spite of their demarcation from the communists
and the general shift to the centre, the socialists did not
agree with the radical changes proposed by the AD on the
public sector and labour laws. The result was that these
two points remained largely unaltered amidst strong
criticsms on the part of the AD who blamed the economic
ills of the country on constitutional impediments to their
economic strategy.
It is against this background that the evaluations made by
socialist respondents on issues 4 and 7 should be
considered and analysed. Although most of them (62%)
agreed that labour laws should be changed, only 47% of
socialist respondents did so with respect to the need to
reduce the public sector, and as many as 34% showed
indifference. It is difficult to believe that as many as
34% of socialist respondents were not aware of the issue,
or did not have an opinion about it. It is possible that
by abstaining from giving an opinion either way they were
reflecting the lack of definition on the part of the
socialist leadership, on these two issues. The socialist
leadership supported some privatizations and some changes
229
in Labour laws but was unclear as to the extent of such
measures.
It is highly likely therefore that in their evaluations of
the issues respondents are influenced by factors related to
the particular political context at the time of the
election, i.e. ambiguous party stands, conflict between
party stands and respondents' opinions etc.
It is also of interest to consider how respondents
evaluated the issues which were more emphatically supported
by each party. Table 9B shows the average percent
positive, midscale and negative evaluations of each pair of
issues supported by the four parties by respondents
divided into groups as a function of respondents' voting
intention.
Table 9.B
Average percent positive, midscale and
negative evaluations of each pair of issues
supported by the four parties by respondents
divided into groups as a function of voting
intention in the 1983 General election
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As expected the vast majority of CDS and PSD respondents
evaluated the four pairs of issues positively. PS and APU
respondents showed much less indecision as a to the pairs
of issues supported by their respective parties, and more
were in favour of the pair of issues proposed by each
other's parties of those proposed by the CDS or PSD.
Of the eight issues used only four can be considered as
having discriminative power between the parties' positions.
As already pointed out, the two value-laden issues may have
confounding effects on respondents' assessments.
In addition issue 3, concerning the need to extend health
services, housing and education to all is generally
accepted by all the parties. As it is phrased, the issue
refers to a general principle and does not involve a choice
between specific policies directed at its implementation.
It is to be expected that in these circumstances all
respondents would evaluate the issue highly.
Issue 6, concerning the need to develop the country's
natural resources in order to diversify production,
introduced first by the APU alliance, was quickly adopted
by the other parties. Again it is a general proposal
against which it is difficult, to argue. Differences of
opinion were likely to emerge, however, on the
advocated by each party to implement the general
Such methods were not explicitly explained
electorate. More importantly, the issue as
methods
policy.
to the
it was
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presented to respondents did not differentiate between the
methods each party would employ to implement it.
The four remaining issues were more concerned with specific
policies and should have produced better differentiated
evaluations between the four groups of respondents.
Issue 1,
celebrate
accepted
introduced by the PS, concerning the
a "social contract". This proposal,
by the CDS and PSD remained very much
need to
although
linked to
its proponent, the Socialist party until the end of the
electoral campaign. The APU remained the only critic.
Issues 4 and 7 supported by the CDS and the PSD concerning
the need to reduce the public sector and change existing
labour laws, were strongly attacked by the APU and
criticised by the PS on the grounds that the proposed
changes were too radical and extensive.
Issue 8, concerning APU's position on the need to increase
the purchasing power of the people, was contested by the
Socialist leadership who advocated the need for strict
austerity measures to curb inflation and prepare the ground
for a slow but sure economic recovery. CDS and PSD leaders
argued that such measures would not be needed if their
proposed changes in public ownership and labour laws were
introduced.
Table 9.C shows the percent positive, midscale and negative
evaluation of issues 1,4, 7 and 8 as a function of
respondents' voting intention.
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Table 9.C
Percent positive, midscale and negative evaluation
of issues 1,4,7 and 8 as a function of respondents'
voting intention in the 1983 General Election
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CDS and PSD respondents were overwhelmingly in favour of
the reduction of the public sector and of the
liberalization of labours laws. Also as expected most of
them favoured the increase in the purchasing power of the
population, and the introduction of the social contract.
By and large, PS respondents favoured the introduction of
the social contract proposed by the party they intended to
vote for but 751 of them favoured the increase in the
purchasing power of the people, showing that they did not
agree with the Socialist party's warning about the need for
strict austerity measures. The divisions within socialist
respondents as to the reduction of the public sector and
the liberalization of labour laws are evident, especially
in relation to the former.
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The large majority of APU respondents favoured the
adoption of measures to increase purchasing power of the
people supported by the party they intended to vote for,
opposed the liberalisation of labour laws and the reduction
of the public sector and were divided as to the
introduction of the social contract.
In their evaluations of policy issues, only CDS
respondents were following closely the positions
parties they intended to vote for. However, the
point is to see whether PS and APU respondents, who
and PSD
of the
crucial
showed
some deviations from their respective parties' lines on
some of the issues, were indeed aware of their parties'
stands.
Beliefs on parties' stands (1983 General election)
Table 9.12 in Appendix 4 shows the average percent
positive, midscale and negative beliefs respondents divided
according to voting intention held in respect of the stands
the parties were likely to adopt, if elected, on the eight
electoral issues.
Overall, respondents appeared to be aware of the stands
likely to be adopted on the issues by the parties they
intended to vote for. The midscale point was only used by
3% of CDS voters, 12% of PSD votes, 18% of PS voters and 7%
of APU voters. More socialist respondents appeared to be
uncertain of their own party stands than the other groups
of respondents in relation to the stands likely to be
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adopted by the parties they intended to vote for.
The level of uncertainty expressed by respondents in
relation to the stands of the parties they did not intend
to vote for is illustrated by Diagrams 9.12.1, 9.12.2,
9.12.3 and 9.12.4 which show the percent midscale reponses
of each group of voters divided according to voting
intention with respect to the stands likely to be adopted
by each party on each issue.
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CDS, PSD and APU respondents (Diagrams 9.12.1, 9.12.2 and
4) were less uncertain about the stands of the parties they
intended to vote for than about the stands of the parties
they did not intend to vote for. PS respondents (Diagram
9.12.3), on the other hand showed themselves to be equally
uncertain about the stands likely to be adopted by the four
parties.
When the overall levels of uncertainty of all respondents
as a single group are averaged across the eight stands and
across the four policy stands, it appears that
approximately one third of respondents were uncertain about
the socialist party stands, as Table 9.D shows.
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Table 9.D
Average levels of uncertainty expressed as percent
midscale beliefs by all respondents across the
eight stands and the four policy stands of the
four parties in the 1983 General election
% Midscale beliefs, by all
respondents on the four
parties' stands
PARTIES EIGHT ISSUES FOUR POLICY ISSUES
CDS
PSD
PS
APU
14%
17%
31%
15%
15%
17%
32%
11%
The ambiguous positions of the Socialist party seemed to
have had an effect on all respondents' beliefs about the
party's stands on the issues. The level of uncertainty
remained high in relation to the Socialist party stands on
the four policy issues.
The large majority of CDS and PSD respondents believed that
their respective parties would support and implement the
policies needed to fulfill the targets ex~ressed in the
eight issues Diagram 9.12.5 next page shows the percent
positive beliefs of CDS and PSD respondents on the stands
likely to be adopted by the CDS and PSD on each issue.
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The vast majority of CDS respondents not only believed that
the CDS would implement all the eight issues but also that
the PSD, if elected, would also do so. The majority of PSD
respondents believed that the PSD would implement the
measures needed to fulfill the eight issues. On six of the
issues, PSD respondents also believed that the CDS would
implement the correct policies. However, on two of the
issues, namely the introduction of the Social Contract
(issue 1) and on the increase in the purchasing power of
the people (issue 8), PSD respondents appeared to be
divided as to the CDS ability to implement the correct
policies.
This shows that whereas CDS respondents believed that the
victory of the PSD would ensure the fulfilment of the eight
240
issues, in the same way that the victory of the CDS would,
PSD respondents believed that if the CDS were to win the
election the CDS would not carry out the desired policies
on two of the issues. In other words CDS respondents did
not differentiate between the positions of the CDS and the
PSD, whereas PSD respondents showed important divergences
on two policy issues.
Diagrams 9.12.6 and 7 next page illustrate percent positive
beliefs of CDS and PSD respondents, respectively, on the
stands likely to be adopted by the PS and the APU on the
issues.
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CDS and PSD respondents did not believe that either the PS
or the APU, if elected, would fulfill the eight issues. On
the two issues supported by the PS, CDS and PSD
respondents, especially the latter, gave an indication that
the PS would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) and
policies which would extend health, education and housing
programmes to all (issue 3). In fact, in relation to these
two issues, over 50% of PSD voters believed that the PS
would implement the correct policies.
It is clear that the vast majority of CDS and PSD
respondents believed that their parties held very similar
stands on the issues and that the PS and the APU,
especially the latter, if elected, would not adopt the
desired stands on the issues.
The direction of beliefs held by PS and APU respondents on
the stands likely to be adopted by the PS and the APU is
illustrated in Diagrams 9.12.8 and 9.
Diagrams
beliefs
9.12.8 and 9 next page show the percent positive
of PS and APU respondents on the stands likely to
be adopted by the PS and the APU, respectively, in respect
of each issue and of each other's party.
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The large majority of PS respondents believed that the PS
would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) and extend
health, education and housing programmes to all (issue 3),
the two issues proposed by the PS. They also believed that
the PS would implement policies directed at the development
of the country's natural resources (issue 6). On the
reduction of the public sector (issue 4) and on the changes
in labour laws (issue 7), the two most controversial policy
issues, just over one third of PS respondents believed that
the Socialist party would reduce the public sector and
nearly half believed that the PS would introduce changes in
the labour laws. Clearly, PS respondents, who were divided
in their evaluations were also divided in their beliefs
about the PS stands on the two issues.
Contrary to expectations, however, over half of PS
respondents believed that the PS would increase the
purchasing power of the people (issue 8), in spite of the
repeated warnings made by the socialist leadership that
strict austerity measures would have to be introduced, at
least during the first two years after the election.
In relation to the APU stands and in line with CDS and PSD
respondents' beliefs, most PS respondents did not believe
that the APU would develop the natural resources of the
country (issue 6) or that the APU would increase the
purchasing power of the people (issue 8), the two issues
proposed by the APU.
Also in line with CDS and PSD respondents, most PS
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respondents did not believe that the APU would reduce the
public sector (issue 4), change labour laws (issue 7) or
introduce the Social contract (issue 1), identifying quite
correctly the stands of the APU on these three issues.
As it can be seen in Diagram 9.12.9, the vast majority of
APU respondents believed that the APU would develop the
natural resources of the country (issue 6) and would
increase the purchasing power of the people (issue 8), the
two issues on which the APU based their strategy for the
economic recovery of the country. APU respondents also
believed that the APU would not reduce the public sector
(issue 4) and would not introduce changes in labour laws
(issue 7). Although nearly 50% of APU respondents had
evaluated positively the introduction of the Social
Contract (issue 1) the vast majority quite correctly did
not believe the APU would introduce it.
The vast majority of APU respondents appeared to know very
well the positions of the APU on the four policy issues
(issue 1, 4, 7 and 8) and on the two general issues
concerning the extension of health, education and housing
programmes to all (issue 3) and the development of natural
resources (issue 6). Indecision was felt when respondents
were asked to express their beliefs on the APU stands on
the two value laden issues.
In relation to the Socialist party stands, nearly half of
the APU respondents believed that the PS would introduce
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the Social Contract (issue 1) and over half of the APU
respondents believed that the PS would reduce the public
sector (issue 4) and introduce changes in labour laws
(issue 7). In relation to the PS stand on the introduction
of the Social Contract (issue 1) the beliefs of APU
respondents are in line with those expressed by PSD and CDS
respondents. However, in relation with the PS stands on
the reduction of the public sector (issue 4) and on the
labour laws (issue 7) the beliefs held by APU respondents
differ from those held by CDS and PSD respondents, who
believed that the PS would not reduce the public sector and
would not introduce changes in the labour laws.
The two left wing groups of respondents (PS and APU) were
clearly much more apart in the beliefs they held about each
other's parties' stands than the two right wing groups of
respondents (CDS and PSD) in relation to the beliefs they
held about each other's parties' stands.
The direction of beliefs held by PS and APU respondents in
relation to CDS and PSD stands is illustrated in the two
following diagrams.
Diagrams 9.12.10 and 9.12.11 next page show the percent
positive beliefs of PS and APU respondents, respectively,
on the CDS and PSD stands on the eight issues.
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PS and APU respondents who showed very distinct beliefs
about each other's party stands on the issues held very
similar beliefs concerning the stands they believed the CDS
and PSD would be likely to adopt, if elected.
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The majority of PS and APU respondents believed that the
CDS and the PSD would reduce the public sector (issue 4)
and would introduce changes in the labour laws (issue 7),
identifying very clearly the positions of the parties on
these two policy issues. By and large, PS and APU
respondents did not believe that the CDS and PSD would
introduce the Social Contract (issue 1) would promote
policies to extend health, education and housing to all
(issue 3), would develop the country's natural resources
(issue 6) or that they would increase the purchasing power
of the people (issue 8).
Summing up, respondents, on the whole, were able to
identify the stands of the parties, especially those on the
four policy issues. The CDS and PSD respondents held very
similar beliefs not only on the stands likely to be adopted
by each other's parties, but also on the stands they
believed the PS and the APU would adopt on the issues, if
elected. On the other hand, the PS and APU respondents did
not hold similar beliefs on the stands likely to be adopted
by each other's parties but held very similar beliefs on
the stands they believed the CDS and PSD would adopt on the
issues, if elected.
The direction of respondents evaluations of issues and
beliefs about parties' stands on them highlight three
important points in the Portuguese political scene at the
time: the traditional division between Right and Left on
public ownership and workers rights; the lack of strong
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divisions between the two right wing parties; and, the
split within the Left with the socialists trying to move to
a more middle-of-the-road position.
This move by the socialists to the centre of the political
spectrum is illustrated by their evaluations and beliefs on
the PS stands on public ownership and the liberalisation of
labour laws. The Socialist party supported some reductions
in the public sector and some changes in labour laws but
was vague as to their extent. Judging from socialist
respondents evaluations 47% of them supported reductions in
the public sector but only 34% believed the party wanted to
introduce them. Likewise 62% of socialist respondents
wanted changes in labour laws but only 47% believed the
Party wanted to introduce them. CDS and PSD respondents
did not believe the Socialist party wanted to reduce the
public sector or liberalise labour laws. On the other
hand, APU respondents believed the Socialist party would.
It is clear that by adopting an undefined position on
ideological issues, the Socialist party was creating
confusion not only among the broad socialist camp but also
in the electorate as a whole. On the other hand, the right
wing parties, as perceived by CDS and PSD respondents, had
become too undifferentiated, especially in the opinion of
CDS respondents. The instability within the Socialist
electorate and the lack of differentiation on the part of
the CDS electorate vis-a-vis the PSD which were detected by
this study at the time of the 1983 General election were to
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have important consequences. These will be described in
the Epilogue where political developments after the 1983
General election are briefly presented.
It now remains to be seen how the product of respondents'
evaluations of issues and beliefs about parties' stands
contributed to their attitudes towards voting for each of
the four main parties.
9.3.2. The contribution of political knowledge to attitude
towards voting for the parties { b
i
e }in the 1983
i
General
election
Strength of feelings about the issues {1983
election}
General
Mean evaluations of the eight issues made by respondents
divided according to voting intention are shown in Table
9.13, in Appendix 4. Diagram 9.13.1 next page illustrates
the similarities and differences between the CDS, PSD, PS
and APU respondents.
251
DIAGRAM 9.13.1
3r-------------------------~~ 2.40 .
1.80 .......J
ILl
~ 1.20· li···· ~ ,..
LL 0.60· .. ..
o 0~4M~~~~~~~~~.u~~~~
~ -0.60 ~ .
z -1.20 _ .
ILl
01: -1 •90 __ . _ -._..
~
00 -2. 40 - _-_ _ _ _.__ _ _..__._._.._._
-3 1 2
• CDSo PS
3 4 5 679ISSUES
mI PSD
~ APU
Mean strength of the evaluations made by
CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents on each
of the eight issues in the
1983 General election
In the strength and direction of their evaluations, and as
expected, CDS and PSD respondents show no significant
differences between themselves.
PS respondents evaluated the eight issues positively
although, in relation to some of the issues, their mean
strength of feeling is significantly different from the
mean strength of feeling of CDS and PSD respondents.
APU respondents evaluated six of the issues positively. On
these, the significant differences noted in comparison with
the mean strength of feeling shown by the other three
groups of respondents are differences in strength and not
in the direction of the evaluation. However, as expected,
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APU respondents evaluated negatively issues 4 and 7 related
to the reduction of the public sector and to changes in the
labour laws (issue 7) respectively. APU respondents also
evaluated negatively the value-laden issue on patriotism
and order (issue 2).
Strength of beliefs about parties' stands (1983 General
election)
Mean strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU
respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the four
parties on the issues is shown in Table 9.14 in Appendix 4.
Diagrams 9.14.1 to 9.14.4 illustrate respondents' belief
strengths.
Diagram 9.14.1 next page shows the belief strengths of the
four groups of respondents divided according to voting
intention on the stands likely to be adopted by the CDS on
the eight issues.
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CDS respondents believed very strongly that the party they
intended to vote for would implement policies to fulfil the
needs expressed in the eight issues. PSD respondents, on
the whole, also believed that the CDS would implement such
policies. However they were not very confident in the
CDS's ability to increase the purchasing power of the
people (issue 2). PS and APU respondents strongly believed
that the CDS would reduce the public sector (issue 4) and
change labour laws (issue 7). But they did not believe
that the CDS would introduce the Social Contract (issue 1),
would extend health, education and housing programmes to
all (issue 3), would develop the natural resources of the
country (issue 6) or would increase the purchasing power of
the people (issue 8).
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Diagram 9.14.2 illustrates the belief strengths of the four
groups of respondents divided according to voting intention
on the stands likely to be adopted by the PSD on the eight
issues.
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PSD respondents believed strongly that the party they
intended to vote for would implement policies to fulfil the
needs expressed in the eight issues. CDS respondents also
held very strong beliefs that the PSD would implement such
policies. In fact CDS respondents' mean strengths are not
significantly different from those of PSD respondents' on
six of the eight issues showing that they hardly
differentiated between the two parties.
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PS and APU respondents strongly believed that the PSD would
reduce the public sector (issue 4) and would change labour
laws (issue 7). PS and APU respondents were rather neutral
in relation to the PSD's ability to introduce the Social
Contract (issue 1) and did not believe that the PSD would
extend health, education and housing programmes to all
(issue 3), would develop the natural resources of the
country (issue 6) or would increase the purchasing power of
the people (issue 8).
Diagram 9.14.3 illustrates the belief strengths of the four
groups of respondents divided according to voting intention
on the stands likely to be adopted by the PS on the eight
issues.
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PS respondents believed that the PS would
policies to fulfil the needs expressed in all
implement
the eight
issues with one exception, namely, they did not believe
that the PS would reduce the public sector (issue 4),
although PS respondents' strength of feeling on the issue
was positive.
The strengths of beliefs expressed by PS respondents on the
PS stands, however, is generally mild. The other three
groups of respondents also held mild beliefs, either
positive or negative, on PS stands. This mildness felt
all respondents in relation to the stands likely to
adopted by the PS could have been due to a general
disposition towards the Socialist party. However, as
by
be
mild
the
percent analysis as shown, the mildness in belief
in relation to the PS stands resulted rather
strength
from the
uncertainty and divisions among all respondents on the
stands likely to be adopted by the PS.
Diagram 9.14.4 next page illustrates the belief strengths
of the four groups of respondents divided according to
voting intention on the stands likely to be adopted by the
APU on the eight issues.
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The APU respondents strongly believed that the APU would
develop the natural resources of the country (issue 6) and
would increase the purchasing power of the people (issue
8), the two issues strongly supported by the APU during the
electoral campaign. APU respondents also strongly believed
that the APU would implement policies to extend health,
education and housing programmes to all (issue 3). In
spite of having evaluated the introduction of the Social
contract (issue 1) positively APU respondents quite
correctly showed that they did not believe the APU would
support it. APU respondents showed very. clearly that they
did not believe that the APU would reduce the public sector
(issue 4) or that the APU would introduce changes in the
labour laws (issue 7).
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CDS, PSD and PS respondents strongly believed that the APU
would not reduce the public sector (issue 4) and would not
introduce changes in labour laws (issue 7). On all the
other issues, by and large, it is clear that CDS, PSD and
PS respondents believed that theAPU would not adopt the
right policies to solve the economic crisis and restore
social justice.
The contribution of evaluations and beliefs to attitudes
(1983 General election)
Respondents evaluations of .the issues combined with their
beliefs about the stands of the parties on the same issues
give a measure of the contribution of their political
awareness to their attitudes towards voting for each party.
Table 9.15 in Appendix 4 shows the contribution of the
product of each evaluation and each belief held by
respondents on the stands likely to be adopted by the CDS,
PSD, PS and APU on each issue to their attitudes towards
voting for the four parties.
The average contributions of evaluations and beliefs to
attitude to voting for each of the parties across all items
give an indication of the overall attitude towards voting
for each party by each group of respondents. Diagram
9.15.1 next page shows the average overall contribution of
respondents awareness of issues and parties' stands to
their attitudes towards voting for each of the four
parties.
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It is clear that the CDS and PSD respondents held very
positive attitudes towards voting for each other's parties
and that they held quite negative attitudes towards voting
for the APU. PSD respondents' attitude is less negative
than the CDS respondents' attitude towards voting for the
PS.
It is equally clear that APU respondents held very positive
attitudes towards voting for the APU and very negative
attitudes towards voting for either the CDS or PSD.
Although their attitude towards voting for the PS is
negative, it is not as extreme as their attitude towards
voting for the CDS and PSD.
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PS respondents appear to hold milder positive attitudes
towards voting for the party they intended to vote for than
the other groups of respondents towards the parties they
intended to vote for. Also, unlike the other groups of
respondents, their attitudes towards voting for the CDS
PSD and APU hardly differentiate between the parties.
These results indicate the existence of strong divisions
between the left and right within the socialist electorate.
9.3.3 Summary of political awareness findings
General ~lection
1983
Summary: Political awareness in the 1983 General election
By and large, respondents showed that they were aware of
issues and parties stands on them in spite of the fact that
the issues selected were not salient and the value laden
issues could have presented problems to two groups of
respondents.
The two most significant points highlighted by respondents
in their assessment of their desired outcomes vis-a-vis the
positions
within the
assumed by the parties are the instability
socialist electorate on the one hand and the
fact that in spite of the failure of the AD alliance which
precipitated the 83 general election, the respondents who
intended to vote for its two main parties, CDS and PSD,
remained confident in them.
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Post-electoral coalitions (1983 General election)
As a post-scriptum to this section it is of interest to
refer to respondents' attitudes toward four possible post-
electoral coalitions. It will be remembered from the
Method (chapter 5) that because most observers prior to the
election had commented upon the inevitability of a post
electoral coalition between the Socialist party (PS) and
Social Democratic party (PSD) as the only means to ensure
the formation of a stable government,the questionnaire
included a section in which respondents were asked to
indicate on a seven point scale their feelings about each
of four possible coalitions. Table 9.E sho~s ~ttitude
means of respondents divided as a function of voting
intention.
Table 9.E
Attitude means toward four possible post electoral
coalitions as a function of respondents' voting intentions
in the 1983 General election (Range + - 3; N - 157).
Possible coalitions Respondents
CDS PSD PS APU
PS + APU -2.7 -2.2 -1 1.8
PS + PSD - .3 .6 .4 -1.6
PS + PSD + CDS 1.1 1 -.6 -2.5
PSD + CDS 2.1 1.1 -1.7 -2.8
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CDS and PSD respondents appeared to prefer a post-electoral
coalition between their two parties although both groups
accepted that their coalition could be enlarged to
accommodate the Socialist party.
CDS respondents' attitude towards a coalition between the
PSD and PS is very mildly negative, whereas both PSD and PS
respondents are marginally in favour of it. All but the
APU respondents are against a coalition between the PS and
APU.
The percentage of respondents who expressed positive,
midscale or negative feelings about the four possible
coalitions is shown in table 9.F.
Table 9.F
Percent positive, midscale and negative attitudes towards
the four possible coalitions as a function of respondents'
voting intentions in the 1983 General election (N-157)
Possible Respondents
coalitions
CDS PSD PS APU
+ 0 + 0 + 0 + 0
PS + APU 0 0 100 2 4 94 12 21 67 92 5 3
PS + PSD 24 35 41 51 33 16 33 55 12 3 10 87
PS+PSD+CDS 82 12 6 67 20 13 15 24 61 0 3 97
PSD+CDS 88 6 6 71 9 20 3 12 85 0 0 100
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In clear opposition to the opinion of the PSD leadership
and agreeing with the position of the CDS leaders the vast
majority of CDS and PSD respondents favoured a coalition of
their two parties on their own or with the Socialist party
included.
PSD respondents were fifty fifty on a coalition between
their party and the Socialist party but only 16% opposed
it.
PS respondents did not show much enthusiasm for post
electoral coalitions. However, one third supported a
coalition with thePSD but over 50% of socialist
respondents were undecided or indifferent. Only 12% of
socialist respondents supported a coalition of the APU with
the APU unlike the overwhelming majority of APU respondents
who supported a post electoral coalition with the Socialist
party.
As it had been predicted by the majority of political
observers, after the election, the Socialist party (PS) who
received 36% of the votes and the Social Democratic party
(PSD) who received 27% of the votes formed a coalition
headed by the socialist prime minister, Mario Soares. This
coalition became known as the "Bloco Central " (Central
Block), but only lasted for 2 years.
The feelings among PSD and PS respondents on the possible
post electoral coalition between their two parties are
quite understandable if their beliefs about the two
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parties' stands on the issues are taken into account.
Diagrams 9.12.12 and 9.12.13 (based on Table 9.12 in
Appendix 4) illustrate the point.
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The two parties' positions, in the opinion of PSD and PS
respondents, were indeed very far apart.
Section 9.4 - How aware were respondents of the opinion of
trusted others? The extent of social awareness and
influence in the three elections.
The social influence component used three categories of
trusted others in order to assess the social awareness of
respondents and its influence on voting intentions. The
three categories were: trusted relatives, best friends and
the Roman Catholic Church.
It should be noted that the way the questions were phrased
can only give an indirect indication of possible social
influence effects on respondents' decisions. The questions
assess the degree of awareness on the part of respondents
as to what trusted others think they should do. In the
first two election questionnaires respondents were asked to
state whether they would wish to conform to the opinion of
trusted others, but the vast majority of respondents either
did not answer or simply used the midscale point to avoid
answering. In fact many respondents were upset with this
part of the questionnaire since according to their reports
it implied that they were not capable of deciding for
themselves.
Therefore, the effect of respondents' awareness of trusted
others' opinions on behaviour can only be inferred from a
belief that if there is awareness as to what people we
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trust want us to do this awareness will have weight in the
decision making process. In other words, if we value the
opinion of relatives for whom we have great consideration
and if we value the opinion of our best friends, it is
plausible to infer that their opinions do matter to us.
Given the important status of the Roman Catholic Church and
its long and widespread influence in Portugal it was
necessary to assess its impact on respondents' vote
decision. By 1980 the Church had regained much of the
strength lost during the immediate aftermath of the
Revolution.
The Church took strong stands against both the Communist
and Socialist parties and had been openly advising
catholics to vote for the parties of the AD right wing
alliance, CDS and PSD, and for the Alliance itself after it
was formed. However, during the 1980 Presidential Election
campaign, the Church, abstained from advising the catholic
electorate. This restraint, according to the explanation
supplied by the head of Information Services at the Lisbon
See, was due to the fact that the two presidential
candidates with more chances of winning the election, were
both good and respected catholics.
In broad terms, the electorate had been giving a clear
indication that the Church's influence on vote decision was
not as strong as it might have been assumed. In a
predominantly Catholic country where, according to
estimates, about 90% of the population is baptised and a
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majority defines itself as Catholic (a considerable
proportion is not regular church goers but still identifies
itself with the catholic religion), more than half of the
population had not been following the Church's strong
appeals and advice.
This, however, does not invalidate the possibility that in
some cases, especially in the rural areas, strong pressure
was exercised on local people. Such cases usually occur in
villages where people have been traditionally dependent
upon local dignitaries, sometimes m~mbers of the Church,
for work, favours etc. Total dependence upon Church's
advice on religious grounds alone may therefore be a rare
occurrence.
The question that is interesting to this study, is to
assess the awareness of respondents as to the Church's
positions and by implication in comparison with their
awareness of positions of relatives and friends vis-a-vis
their vote decision infer, the extent to which the Church
may be considered as having influence in vote decision.
The section is divided into three subsections each
concerned with social awareness results in each of the
three elections.
Section 9.4.1 - 1980 Presidential election - how socially
aware were the voters?
Table 9.16. in Appendix 4 shows the percent positive,
midscale and negative beliefs indicated by respondents as
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to how each social influence factor, i.e. trusted
relatives, best friends and the Church, wanted them to vote
for each presidential candidate. Respondents are divided
into groups according to party identification.
Diagrams 9.16.1, 9.16.2 and 9.16.3 show the percent
positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents
divided according to party identification on the opinions
of trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and
the Church on voting for the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro.
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Soares Carneiro, in the 1980 Presidential election
AD respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty in
all the categories of trusted others, whereas FRS and PS
respondents only showed light levels of uncertainty with
respect to the opinions of the Church about voting for the
AD candidate.
The majority of AD respondents believed that their more
trusted others wished them to vote for the AD candidate but
AD respondents were much more unsure about the opinions of
their best friends, reflecting perhaps the existence of
conflicting opinions among themselves.
On the other hand FRS and APU respondents show very little
uncertainty about the opinions of trusted relatives and
best friends on voting for the AD candidate. Most of them
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believed that their trusted relatives and best friends did
not think that they should vote for the AD candidate.
The vast majority of AD, FRS and APU respondents who
expressed beliefs about the Church's opinion believed that
the Church thought that they should vote for the AD
candidate.
Diagrams 9.16.4, 9.16.5 and 9.16.6 next page show the
percent positive, midscale and negative ofbeliefs
respondents divided according to party identification on
the opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends
(friends) and the Church on voting for the Socialist party
candidate, Ramalho Eanes.
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AD respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty about
the opinions of best friends on voting for the PS
candidate; this was to be expected in view of the high
levels of indecision shown, in the same category, about
voting for the AD candidate.
FRS and APU respondents believed, on the whole, that their
trusted relatives and friends wanted them to vote for the
PS candidate, Ramalho Eanes.
Extremely high levels of uncertainty were expressed by all
respondents on the opinions of the Church about voting for
the PS candidate. Those who expressed an opinion, however,
believed that the Church did not want them to vote for the
PS candidate.
The high levels of uncertainty expressed by all respondents
on the opinion of the Church on voting for either of the
two candidates might have been due to the fact that the
Church, during the election campaign, abstained from giving
advice.
Table 9.17 in Appendix 4 shows the average strength of
beliefs expressed by respondents divided according to party
identification in respect of the opinions of trusted
relatives, best friends and the Church as to how they
should vote for each presidential candidate.
FRS and APU respondents strongly believed that their
trusted relatives and best friends wished them to vote for
Ramalho Eanes, the candidate supported by the Socialist
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party, and not to vote for Soares Carneiro, the candidate
supported by the right wing alliance, AD. AD respondents
who had shown more uncertainty as to the opinions of their
trusted relatives and of their best friends, believed,
overall, that these wished them to vote for Soares
Carneiro, the AD candidate. The difference between the
average strength belief means of the three groups of
respondents with respect to family and friends are, as
expected, highly significant (p < .001).
On the other hand, the difference between average belief
means of the three groups of respondents with respect to
the opinion of the Church as to how they should vote is not
significant. The three groups of respondents believe that
the Church would wish them to vote for the right wing
candidate, Soares Carneiro and not for the Socialist
candidate, "Ramalho Eanes.
Section 9.4.2 - The 1982 Local Elections - how socially
aware were the voters?
Table 9.18 in Appendix 4 shows the percent positive,
midscale and negative beliefs indicated by respondents as
to how each social influence factor i.e. trusted relatives,
best friends and the Church, wanted them to vote for each
party in the 1982 Local Elections. Respondents are divided
into groups according to voting intention.
Diagrams 9.18.1, 9.18.2 and 9.18.3 next page show the
percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of
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respondents divided according to voting intention on the
opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends
(friends) and the Church on voting for the AD party.
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The vast majority of AD respondents believed that their
Theytrusted relatives wanted them to vote for the AD.
were much less sure about the opinions of their best
friends. PS respondents showed high levels of uncertainty,
especially in relation to the opinions of their best
friends on voting for the AD. APU respondents were very
certain that their trusted relatives and best friends did
not want them to vote for the AD.
As far as the Church opinion was concerned, all respondents
showed very high levels of uncertainty, especially AD
Of those respondents who expressedrespondents. an
opinion, the majority believed the Church wanted them to
vote for the AD.
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Diagrams 9.18.4, 9.18.5 and 9.18.6 show the percent
positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents
divided according to voting intention on the opinions of
trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the
Church on voting for the PS party.
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PS respondents showed themselves divided as to the opinions
of their trusted relatives, and great uncertainty as to the
opinions of their best friends about voting for the PS.
AD respondents believed that their trusted relatives did
not want them to vote for the PS but showed great
uncertainty as to the opinions of their best friends.
APU respondents believed that both their trusted relatives
and best friends did not want them to vote for the PS.
As far as the opinions of the Church are concerned, AD, PS
and APU respondents showed high levels of uncertainty,
although of those who expressed an opinion the overwhelming
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majority believed that the Church did not want them to vote
for the PS.
Diagrams 9.18.7, 9.18.8 and 9.18.9 show the percent
positive, midscale and negative beliefs by respondents
divided according to voting intention on the opinions of
trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the
Church on voting for the APU alliance.
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APU respondents believed that their trusted relatives and
best friends wanted them to vote for the APU. AD and PS
respondents believed that their trusted relatives did not
want them to vote for the APU. As far as the opinions of
their best friends were concerned, AD and PS respondents
showed very high levels of uncertainty, although of those
who expressed an opinion the majority believed that their
best friends did not want to vote for the APU.
AD, PS and APU respondents all showed high levels of
uncertainty about the Church's opinion on voting for the
APU. Those who expressed an opinion all believed that the
Church did not want them to vote for the APU.
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Table 9.19 in Appendix 4 shows the mean strength of beliefs
expressed by respondents divided according to voting
intention on the opinions of trusted relatives, best
friends and the Church on voting for the AD, the PS and the
APU.
AD and the APU respondents indicated strong beliefs that
the relatives they trusted most and their best friends
wanted them to vote for the parties they intend to vote
for. PS respondents appeared to believe more strongly that
their relatives and best friends did not wish them to vote
for the AD and APU than that they wished them to vote for
the PS.
The three groups of respondents indicated again that they
believed that the Church wished them to vote for the right
wing alliance and not for the Socialist party, PS or the
Communist-led alliance APU. The significant difference
found between the belief strength means of the three groups
of respondents concerning the opinion of the Church that
they should vote for the right wing alliance, AD, is a
difference in strength rather in the direction of the
beliefs.
Section 9.4.3 - The 1983 General Election - how socially
aware were the voters?
Table 9.20 in Appendix 4 shows the percent positive,
midscale and negative beliefs indicated by respondents as
to how each social influence factor i.e trusted relatives,
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best friends and the Church, wanted them to vote for each
party in the 1983 General Election. Respondents are
divided into groups according to voting intention.
Diagrams 9.20.1, 9.20.2 and 9.20.3 next page show the
percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs by
respondents divided according to voting intention on the
opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends
(friends) and the Church on voting for the CDS party.
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The majority of CDS respondents believed that both their
trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for
the CDS, although they were more uncertain about the
opinions of their friends.
PSD respondents showed very high levels of uncertainty
about their trusted relatives and best friends opinions on
voting for the CDS. Of those who expressed an opinion, the
majority (nearly half of the respondents) were certain that
their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them
to vote for the CDS.
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PS and APU respondents were very certain that their trusted
relatives and best friends did not want them to vote for
the CDS party.
On the whole, respondents were very uncertain about the
opinion of the Church, especially PSD respondents. Over
80% of PSD respondents showed they had nothing to say about
the Church's opinion. Those who expressed an opinion
believed the Church wanted them to vote for the CDS.
Diagrams 9.20.4, 9.20.5 and 9.20.6 show the percent
positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents
divided according to voting intention on the opinions of
trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the
Church on voting for the PSD party.
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PSD respondents believed that their trusted relatives and
best friends wanted them to vote for the PSD although
approximately one third were uncertain.
CDS respondents were very uncertain, especially in relation
to the opinions of their best friends on voting for the
PSD.
Approximately one third of PS respondents believed that
their trusted relatives and best friends wished them to
vote for the PSD and APU respondents were very certain that
their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them
to vote for the PSD.
As far as the Church's opinion was concerned well over
fifty percent of all respondents showed uncertainty. The
majority of those who expressed an opinion believed the
Church wanted them to vote for the PSD.
Diagrams 9.20.7, 9.20.8 and 9.20.9 next page show the
percent positive, midscale and negative beliefs of
respondents divided according to voting intention on the
opinions of trusted relatives (family), best friends
(friends) and the Church on voting for the PS party.
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About two thirds of PS respondents believed that their
trusted relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for
the PS party. As many as 20 percent, however, were sure
that their trusted relatives and best friends did not want
them to vote for the PS.
By and large, CDS, PSD and APU respondents believed that
their trusted relatives and best friends did not want them
to vote for the PS, although about one quarter were
uncertain.
CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents showed again very high
levels of uncertainty concerning the Church's opinion. Of
those who expressed beliefs about it, all believed that the
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Church did not want them to vote for the PS party.
Diagrams 9.20.10, 9.20.11 and 9.20.12 show the percent
positive, midscale and negative beliefs of respondents
divided according to voting intention on the opinions of
trusted relatives (family), best friends (friends) and the
Church on voting for the APU alliance.
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All respondents were quite certain about the opinions of
their trusted relatives and best friends about voting for
the APU.
relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the APU.
APU respondents believed that their trusted
CDS, PSD and PS respondents were equally certain that their
trusted relatives, and best friends did not want them to
vote for the APU.
Again, the levels of uncertainty about the Church's opinion
are very high. Of those who expressed beliefs about it,
all indicated that they believed the Church did not want
them to vote for the APU.
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Table 9.21 in Appendix 4 shows the mean strength of beliefs
expressed by respondents divided according to voting
intention in respect of the opinions of trusted relatives,
best friends and the Church as to how they should vote for
each party, i.e. the CDS (Christian Democratic party), the
PSD (Social Democratic party), the PS (Socialist party) and
the APU (Communist-led Alliance).
Each group of respondents believed that their trusted
relatives and best friends wanted them to vote for the
party they intended to vote for and not for any other
party. CDS respondents are the only exception, since their
mean strength of beliefs on the opinions of their trusted
relatives and best friends on voting for the PSD is also
positive although marginally so.
As far as the opinion of the Church on voting for each of
the four parties, COS, PSD, PS and APU respondents believed
that the Church wanted them to vote for the CDS or to a
lesser extent for the PSD. They also believed that the
Church did not want them to vote for the two left wing
parties, especially the APU.
Section 9.4.4 - Summary of Section 9.4
Summary: Social awareness in the three elections
The main finding is that, as expected, the majority of
respondents do not appear aware or interested in the
opinion of the Church as to how they should vote. Some
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respondents in all the three elections have shown that they
were aware of the Church's advice. Of these, the majority
showed that they believed the Church wished them to vote
for the two right wing parties, especially for the CDS.
However, the level of uncertainty among respondents was so
high that it should be concluded that, on the whole,
respondents did not appear interested in the position of
the Church.
Respondents were aware of the opinions of trusted relatives
and best friends which, on the whole, were in line with
respondents' vote intention.
PS respondents showed strong beliefs that trusted relatives
and friends did not wish them to vote for either the CDS or
the APU; the strength of their corresponding beliefs
concerning the PSD, were less negative, though.
CDS respondents showed very strong beliefs that trusted
relatives and best friends did not wish them to vote for
either the PS or the APU but the strength of their
corresponding beliefs concerning the PSD is slightly
positive. The very close positions of CDS respondents to
the PSD party detected in the analysis of the political
awareness of CDS respondents prior to the 1983 General
election are also noted here. It is plausible to assume
that CDS respondents were feeling pressure from their PSD
relatives and friends to vote for the PSD.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS AND EPILOGUE
Introduction
The
the
detailed analyses contained in Chapter IX concerning
Portuguesepolitical and social awareness of
respondents who took part in the three voting behaviour
studies showed, as expected, that respondents appeared to
be aware of important electoral issues and of candidates or
parties' stands on them. Although some respondents were
aware of the Church's position vis-a-vis the main parties
the influence of the Catholic Church was not acknowledged
by the majority of them. Respondents' showed awareness
of the positions of trusted relatives and best friends vis-
a-vis their vote choices. However, as the results of the
tests of the Reasoned Action model indicated (Chapter VII),
the political awareness of respondents was found to be a
much more significant determinant of voting intentions than
their social awareness. These results, as shown in Chapter
VII, Section 7.4, are comparable to the results obtained in
the American and British voting behaviour studies based on
the Reasoned Action Model, and therefore support the main
argument of the thesis that Portuguese voters, like their
American and British counterparts, do make reasoned vote
choices based on knowledge of current electoral issues and
of the stands candidates and parties have on them.
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Although the results of the three voting behaviour studies
carried out in Portugal just prior to the 1980 Presidential
elections, the 1982 Local elections and the 1983 General
elections, were obtained using the Reasoned Action model
and had as main referents the applications of the model
in the 1974 British General election and the 1976 American
Presidential election studies, they should also be
considered in relation to the other social psychology
models of voting behaviour described in Chapter II; i.e.the
Columbia, the Michigan and the Cognitive Models.
Irrespective of the assumptions on which the four models of
voting behaviour are based, the Columbia, the Michigan, the
Reasoned Action and the Cognitive models have aimed at
explaining the psychological processes which determine vote
choice. The development of the models took place at
different times and in different contexts. As suggested in
Chapter II, time and context influenced the way the models
themselves were constructed. However, in their common aim
of defining
acknowledged
the determinants of vote choice they
thatthe same one fundamental pOint, i.e.
implicit in the act of voting there is a choice among two
or more alternatives. If such choice among alternatives
exists then the probabilities are that not the same
candidates or parties will always win the elections. If
vote shifts exist, and they do, what causes them to occur?
Whims on the part of voters? The influence of young
voters? A felt need on the part of voters to be governed by
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new faces? A sense of fairness on the part of voters to
give all alternatives a chance?
The four models cope with vote shifts in different ways.
Their suggestions will be used as a framework to the
general discussion and conclusions of the three Portuguese
voting behaviour studies, bearing in mind the value of each
explanatory approach to further our understanding and
improve prediction of voting behaviour in any given context
at any given time.
The chapter is divided into four sections. Section 10.1
examines the explanations for vote shifts offered by the
Columbia, Michigan, Reasoned Action and Cognitive models.
Section 10.2 assesses how well the Portuguese results fit
the vote shift explanations offered by the four models
Section 10.3 will examine the set of criteria established
by the authors of the Cognitive model to assess its
validity in relation to the Portuguese findings. Section
10.4, Epilogue, examines the Portuguese results within the
context of political and electoral developments from 1983
to the present day.
Section 10.1 Vote shifts - the explanations offered by the
Columbia, Michigan, Reasoned Action and Cognitive models.
The four voting behaviour models described in Chapter II
offer explanations to account for vote shifts from election
to election.
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For the Columbia researchers vote choice was directly
determined by party identification which in turn was
determined by the various social, ethnic, religious etc.
groups a person belonged to. Vote shifts were attributed to
the effect of cross pressures resulting from the
conflicting opinions between these various groups.
The Michigan researchers, who like their Columbia
predecessors, had found party identification to be the main
determinant of vote choice (Chapter II) introduced an
interesting electoral
shifts. According to
classification to explain vote
their classification, there are
"maintaining"
"realigning
described as
elections,
elections".
"deviating elections" and
isA "maintaining election"
one in which the "events surrounding the
campaign ••• seem signally devoid of circumstances that can
generate forces running counter to existing partisan
loyalties" (Campbell et aI, 1960, p.531).
"A deviating election" is one in which the basic division
of partisan loyalties is not seriously disturbed, "but the
attitude forces on the vote are such as to bring about the
defeat of the majority party" (p.533). However, as
Campbell et al point out" a deviating election should not
be taken as evidence of a secular decline in the importance
of party identification".
"A realigning election" (a classification first introduced
by Key, 1959, and adopted by the Michigan researchers) is
characterised by the appearance of a "more or less durable
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realignment" of party loyalties. Such shifts in basic
partisan commitments are infrequent although as Key
observes and Campbell et a1 quote "every election has the
effect of creating lasting party loyalties in some
individual voters, but it is "not often that the number so
affected is so great as to create a sharp realignment".
(p.534).
The Reasoned Action model and the Cognitive model, by
virtue of the assumptions they make about the voters
themselves, consider vote shifts to be due to the voters'
assessment of each electoral campaign in terms of what the
voters believe to be the most important problems that need
to be solved and of whom, among the candidates or parties,
is more likely to adopt the right policies to solve them.
Unlike the Columbia and Michigan models which view people
as passive voters, only jolted into change either by a
conflict of opinions between third parties or by undefined
contextual forces, the Reasoned Action and the Cognitive
models consider people as active decision makers, who in
spite of the influence of their past voting history, social
pressure factors, values and beliefs are aware of political
processes and through their vote, seek to obtain solutions
to important problems.
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Section 10.2 How well do Portuguese results fit the vote
shift explanations offered by the Columbia, the Michigan,
the Reasoned Action and the Cognitive models
As we have seen, in the short history of the Portuguese
democracy, from the first legislative general elections of
1976 to the General election of 1983, two major vote shifts
occurred. The left wing majority in Parliament in 1976
gave place to a right wing majority in 1980. The right
wing majority in 1980 reverted to a left wing majority in
1983. As shown in Chapter VI, Section 6.2 the shifts among
the electorate appeared to have mainly occurred among
social democrat and socialist voters.
It is difficult to assess the impact of cross group
pressures assumed by the Columbia researchers to cause vote
changes, on the shifts which occurred in Portugal between
1976 and 1983. The questionnaires used for the three
Portuguese studies did not probe directly into the effect
of cross group pressures on respondents vote choices.
However the measures used to assess the effect of social
influence on voting intentions included three important
social groups, i.e. trusted relatives, best friends and the
Church. Since the global influence of these groups on
respondents' voting intentions was found to be marginally
significant in only some cases, it is highly improbable
that the explanation suggested by the Columbia researchers
for vote shifts can be applied to Portugal.
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The vote shift explanation offered by the Michigan
researchers, can be applied to the Portuguese shifts. The
1980 General election can be considered as "deviating"
election, since in 1983 voters maintained their original
partisan lines of 1976. The very fact that just prior to
the 1983 General election christian democrat and social
democrat respondents wished their parties to continue their
alliance (AD alliance) may be considered as evidence of
strong partisan loyalties among voters. Equally, the
strong and clear indication on the part of the communist
alliance voters (APU alliance) that the APU would be the
only party likely to adopt the necessary policies, both at
local and national level, lends further support to the
Michigan finding concerning the overriding effect of party
identification on vote choice.
The Michigan explanation of vote shifts could be applied to
shifts at the Local elections level. However, how would the
1980 Portuguese Presidential results fit in with the
Michigan classification? In two months, an important
percentage of the electorate who had returned the AD
alliance to power with a reinforced majority in Parliament,
did not vote for the Presidential candidate supported by
the AD. It could be argued that since the AD had been
helped in the 1980 General election by socialist
"deviators" the defeat of the AD presidential candidate
could have been due to the return of the "deviators"to
their old party.
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In other words, the Michigan classification can explain
every shift that occurs. That is to say, the classification
includes every possible electoral outcome i.e. the
maintenance of the status quo from election to election,
fluke results and major electoral upheavels which in
subsequent elections establish a new status quo.
The Michigan classification although it explains different
types of vote shifts does not further our understanding of
their causes.
In contrast, the explanations offered by the Reasoned
Action Model and the Cognitive model not only explain the
vote shifts registered in the Portuguese elections but also
help to further our understanding of how Portuguese voters
come to their voting decisions. Within the context of the
tests of the Reasoned Action model in the three Portuguese
elections using the 1980 Presidential election example,
irrespective of whether the respondents who had "deviated"
in the 1980 General election to the AD were the ones who
in the 1980 Presidential election returned to their old
party (or parties) causing the AD presidential candidate
to lose the election, the analyses of belief based attitude
measures (b e) towards the two presidential candidates
i i
allow us to understand why a percentage of AD voters did
not back the candidate supported by the party they had
voted for in the 1980 General election. Table 9.A in
chapter IX, Section 9.1.2, showing the mean contribution to
overall attitude towards voting for the two candidates as a
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function of type of issue and party identification
illustrates this point very clearly.
Overall, AD respondents' mean contribution to attitude
towards voting for the AD candidate and for the PS
candidate, based on respondents' evaluations of issues and
their beliefs about the candidates' stands on them, was 1.7
and 1.5, respectively. When the type of issues is taken
into account it is clear that insofar issues related to the
actual performance of
President discharges
relates himself to
the President i.e. the way
his duties, uses his rights
the Government are concerned
the
and
AD
respondents held stronger positive attitudes toward the
candidate supported by the AD (1.3, 1.4, 2.6 as opposed to
.8, and 1.9 respectively). It is only when general issues
related to political stability are examined that we
understand why the majority of AD respondents opted for
voting for the AD candidate. On stability issues the mean
contribution to attitude towards voting for the AD
candidate of 3.2 was much stronger than the mean
contribution to attitude towards voting for the PS
candidate of .8. We not only understand why the majority
of AD respondents voted for the AD candidate but also
understand why some AD respondents did not. In other
words, by assuming the active participation of voters in
the political electoral process, the Reasoned Action model
affords the possibility for vote shifts to be predicted and
explained on more precise and rational grounds than those
offered by the Michigan classification.
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In calmer electoral contexts the assumptions of the
Reasoned Action model also allow us to understand voters'
choices in a more coherent fashion. If we take as example
the Portuguese 1982 Local elections under the Michigan
classification, the elections would be classified as
"maintaining elections" since when the research took place
no vote shifts were high enough to change the composition
of the previous mandates. The fact that the elections
"maintained" the status quo does not help us understand why
it was maintained nor whether voters perceive Local
elections in the same way as Presidential or General
elections are perceived. Belief based attitude measures (b
i
e) on the other hand help us further understanding of
i
these questions.
For example, as indicated in Chapter I, Section 1.3.4., the
percentage of abstentions in Local elections is greater
than in General elections. The more generalised apathy
among AD and PS respondents found in the 1982 Local
elections (Chapter I, Section 9.2.1) helps explain the drop
in turnout percentages. Also, the milder negative feelings
expressed by AD and PS respondents towards each other and
toward the communist alliance appear to indicate that
voters' perceptions of local politics are not as strongly
ideologically based as, for example, in General elections.
The apathy of the AD and PS electorates not only in
relation to Local elections per se but also in relation to
the role of the communists at local level is perhaps
responsible for the combined efforts of the Christian
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Democrat, Social Democrat and Socialist parties to force
the Communist party, wherever possible, to lose control of
Municipalities.
The advantages of the assumptions made by the Reasoned
Action model concerning the active involvement of voters in
important electoral issues to explain vote shifts over the
Michigan classification are clearly demonstrated by the
Portuguese 1983 General election results, especially when
these are assessed within the context of the voting
behaviour of the electorate in subsequent elections.
As already pointed out, in accordance with the Michigan
classification, the Portuguese 1980 General election was a
"deviating" election since in 1983 the percentages of the
popular vote obtained by the four main parties reverted to
the 1976 General election levels. In other words, the
Michigan model would simply have found that voters had
"deviated" in 1980 had gone back to the parties they
identified with in 1983. Since respondents' attitudes
toward parties were highly related to voting intentions
(Chapter VIII, Section 8.2) the assumption made by the
Michigan model that vote choice is determined by party
identification would have been upheld.
However, the belief based attitude measures (b e) which
i i
underlie the assumptions of the Reasoned Action model allow
us to understand the 1983 electoral results within the
political context of the time.
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A percentage of the electorate had in fact deviated in 1980
in order to attain political stability. The AD alliance
failed to provide it and plunged the country into a grave
economic and social crisis. There are indeed strong signs
that the main 1980 "deviators" were socialist voters
(Chapter VI, Section 6.2) and it is highly probable that
these "deviators" returned to the socialist camp in 1983.
The important
identified with
point here is to establish
the Socialist party.
how well they
As indicated in Chapter IX, Section 9.3.1, the
who indicated their intention to vote for the
respondents
Socialist
party showed high levels of indecision and divisions among
themselves regarding the Socialist party stands on issues
such as the reduction of the public sector, the changes in
labour laws and the increase in the purchasing power of the
people. These findings which can only be obtained through
a detailed analysis of respondents' evaluations of
important electoral issues and of their beliefs on the
stands likely to be adopted by the parties on the issues
reveal that respondents not only were unsure of the
Socialist party's positions but also that they held
different perceptions of those positions. As it will be
seen in the next section, these findings are of crucial
importance to understand the subsequent electoral behaviour
of voters who in 1983 voted for the Socialist party.
The explanation offered by the Michigan model based on the
assumption that party identification is the sole
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determinant of vote choice and on the rationale suggested
to explain vote shifts will be shown to be too simple to
account for the electoral shifts which voters caused after
1983.
At this stage it should also be pointed out that the
analyses carried out on belief based attitude measures (b
i
e ) provided by christian democrat respondents also assist
i
us in understanding the subsequent behaviour of the
christian democrat electorate, and in so doing further our
understanding of electoral processes placed in an
historical perspective. As shown in chapter IX, Section
9.3.2, although christian democrat respondents showed no
divisions among themselves or uncertainty regarding the
stands of the Christian Democrat party on the issues, they
were found to hardly differentiate between the party they
intended to vote for (CDS) and the Social Democrat party
(PSD).
The following section, Section 10.3, is devoted to
examining the results of the three Portuguese studies
within the framework of the Cognitive model. As shown in
Chapter II, Section 2.3.3, although the Reasoned Action
model and the Cognitive model have important methodological
differences they share common assumptions, i.e. that voters
not only identify important political issues but also are
aware of the candidates' or parties' positions on them.
In view of these similarities between the Reasoned Action
and the Cognitive models it is important to see how well
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the Portuguese results fit the Cognitive model criteria for
evidence of the determinant effect of political knowledge,
and not party identification, on vote choice.
Section 10.3 How well do the results of the Portuguese
studies fit the Cognitive model criteria for evidence of
the determinant effect of political knowledge on vote
choice
As explained in Chapter II, the Cognitive model built on
evidence gathered in a longitudinal study lasting 23 years
is a complex model requiring a great deal of information
about respondents early socialization processes, past
voting habits, value systems as well as their knowledge of
issues and parties' stands on them.
The analyses which resulted from the longitudinal
enabled Himmelweit et al to establish the validity of
study
the
cognitive model's assumption that voters' cognitions are
the most important determinant of their vote choices on
four major findings (Chapter II, Section 2.3.2) which are
discussed here in the light of the results obtained in the
Portuguese studies.
First, the longitudinal sample showed a high degree of
volatility from election to election. Himmelweit et al
concluded that high volatility in vote choice would not be
expected to occur if early socialization were to have a
determinant effect on vote choice. In the Portuguese
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studies, respondents' reports' on past voting behaviour
habits did not show high volatility in vote choice.
However, it should be pointed out that whereas the
longitudinal
Portuguese
only voted
study covered five British general elections
voters, before the 1983 General election had
in three General elections in a political
context very different from the British one.
The second major finding of the longitudinal study that
supports the Cognitive model assumption that voters' based
their vote choices on reasoning processes, showed that
voters were able to perceive correctly the differences
between the parties' stands on non-consensus issues.
As pointed out in Chapter IX, Portuguese respondents were
able to perceive the differences in candidates or parties'
stands on non-consensus issues. In the 1980 Presidential
election there were three non-consensus issues ie that a
President should risk political instability rather than
give in to a government who acts against the Constitution;
that a President should give unconditional support to the
government and that a President should support Revolution.
(Chapter IX, Section 9.1.1) and respondents were able to
attribute the correct stands to the two presidential
candidates (Chapter IX, section 9.1.1).
In the 1982 Local elections there were no non-consensus
issues. As expected with consensus issues, respondents
believed that their respective parties were more likely to
adopt the required stands than the other parties.
307
In the 1983 General election there were two major non-
consensus issues i.e. that to solve the crisis and promote
social welfare and justice the public sector should be
reduced and changes in Labour Laws including the strike law
should be introduced. Respondents were able to attribute
correctly the stands of three of the four parties on these
two issues (see Chapter IX, Section 9.3). The uncertainty
shown by all respondents on the Socialist party stands' on
the two issues reflects the ambiguous position of the party
vis-a-vis the two issues during the election campaign
rather than respondents' lack of awareness.
The third major finding which attests to the validity of
the cognitive model can not be applied to the Portuguese
studies since it is based on information gathered about the
past voting history of respondents and their attitudes on
vote choice in each election (see Chapter II, section
2.3.2).
The fourth and last finding which attests to the validity
of the Cognitive model is in the words of Himmelweit et al
the finding that establishes "unequivocally a causal link
from attitudes to behaviour". As explained in Chapter II,
Himmelweit et al showed that when voters express attitudes
which are at variance with those expressed by the majority
of those voting for the same party, the likelihood of them
defecting to another party in a subsequent election is
increased.
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Given the characteristics of the Portuguese surveys no
analyses can be made directly to test this fourth
criterion. However, there is quite strong evidence from the
Portuguese 1983 general election results that respondents
who intended to vote for the Socialist party were deeply
divided on some of the stands likely to be adopted by the
party (Chapter IX, sections 9.3.2 and 9.3.3). Table 9.12
in Appendix 4 illustrates these divisions. In at least
three important issues (issue 4 on the reduction of the
public sector, issue 7 on the changes in labour laws, and
issue 8 on the increase in purchasing power of the people)
there were substantial divisions within the socialist
respondents
party would
as to the likely stands which the
adopt. It will also be remembered
Socialist
that the
majority of socialist respondents showed uncertainty
were opposed to a post electoral coalition between
Socialist party and the Social Democrat party (Chapter
or
section 9.3.3). It is possible, however, to
relevance of these findings together with
developments after the 1983 election.
examine
the
IX,
the
political
If, as Himmelweit et al suggest voters who are at
with the party they vote for, are more likely to
their vote choice, then it is highly probable
variance
change
that a
considerable percentage of socialist voters who
voted for the Socialist party would be likely
party in the next election. This because, it
in 1983
to change
would be
highly unlikely that the Socialist party, if elected, would
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have the ability to satisfy the different expectations of
the divided socialist electorate.
After the 1983 General election, the Socialist party (who
received 36% of the popular vote) entered into a coalition
with the Social Democrat party (who received 27%) of the
popular vote) known as the Bloco Central, and introduced
severe austerity measures, thus reducing the purchasing
power of the population. Socialist respondents were
divided on these two measures.
The Bloco Central government soon became very unpopular and
the socialists, the larger party in the coalition took most
of the blame for the consequences of the economic
stagnation in which the country was plunged. By 1984, a
new party was created under the auspices of the President
Ramalho Eanes, the winner of the 1980 Presidential election
covered by this study. ( In 1984, General Ramalho Eanes was
in his last year of his second mandate and would therefore
be prevented by the Constitution to run for a third term).
The new party, Partido Renovador Democratico, (PRD) sought
to fill in the vacuum, which according to its leaders, was
being created within the centre-left in view of the right
wing policies being pursued by the Socialist party within
the Bloco Central coalition. The PRD also aspired at
restoring honest political practice in Portuguese politics.
According to PRD leaders there was a need to put a stop to
widespread corruption and political favouritism.
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Opposed by the Socialist party and the right wing parties,
the new PRO party did not attract much criticism from the
Communist party. In fact the communists were in broad
agreement with the aims of the PRO. The Bloco Central fell
in 1985 and its failure was followed by a General election
which was held on October 6 of that year. The Socialist
party was severely punished. Its 1983 36% share of the
vote was drastically reduced to 21%. The new PRO party
obtained 18% of the popular vote, undoubtedly at the
expense of the Socialist party.
It is therefore plausible to assume that a considerable
percentage of the voters who in 1983 had decided to vote
for the Socialist party but were already at variance with
Socialist party's policies changed their vote to the PRO
party.
If this
important
establish
was the case, then it follows that
criterion defined by Himmelweit
a causal link between attitudes
the most
et al
based
to
on
political knowledge and vote shift can be applied to
results obtained from tests of the Reasoned Action model.
Although applied discreetly and on different samples, the
measures used by the Reasoned Action model can reveal the
extent to which respondents are at variance with the stands
the parties they intend to vote for are likely to adopt.
It is plausible to assume that major vote shifts can be
predicted from a detailed analyses of respondents
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evaluations of important issues and their beliefs
concerning the parties' stands on them.
Section 10.4 Epilogue
The main argument contained in this thesis that Portuguese
voters make reasoned vote choices based on political
knowledge has been supported. It was argued (Chapter II,
Section 2.1.3) that a distinction should be made between
two basic types of political knowledge, i.e. deep,
ideologically based, political knowledge and surface, more
practically based, political knowledge. In theory, all
voters may possess the two types of political knowledge.
In practice, it is more realistic to assume, and there is
plenty of evidence to support the assumption as shown in
Chapter II, that only an elite minority possesses the two
types. The vast majority of voters may lack the theory but
the important question is whether they are able to identify
important political issues which divide the parties or
candidates and choose among the latter the one party or the
one candidate whose positions on the issues are more
similar to the voters'. The Portuguese respondents like
their American and British counterparts showed that they do
possess this type of political awareness, and that this
awareness appears to be the most determinant factor in
their vote choices.
The three elections covered by this study were held at a
crucial time in the development of democratic rule in
Portugal. Amidst the political confusion of the first
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post-revolutionary years Portuguese voters, through their
votes, were trying to achieve much needed and desired
political stability. For the first time in their lives,
real alternatives were being presented to them, at national
government level, at local government level and at
Presidential level.
Politicians, institutions and the electorate were all
learning to adapt to new modes of coexistence based on free
expression and equal rights. While the political parties
made their bids for power, entered into seemingly stable
coalitions which resulted in failure, the electorate calmly
went to the polls and gradually took the initiative.
In the General election of 1980 it consolidated the right
wing alliance (AD) in power. But denied the AD complete
control of the main political institutions by electing a
socialist-backed President, two months after the AD
victory. After the collapse of the AD alliance in 1982,
the General election of 1983 brought about an undesired
coalition, the Bloco Central. After its collapse, in 1985,
the socialist electorate split almost in half. The social
democrats who with 30% of the vote formed a minority
government after the 1985 elections lost a vote of
confidence in Parliament in April 1987 moved by the new PRD
party and supported by the socialists and communists. The
electorate, who was enjoying the fruits of the economic
recovery which had started after the 1985 election
due to the strict austerity measure imposed
(partly
by the
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socialists and partly by very favourable external
conditions, i.e the drop of the dollar and of oil prices),
showed in a drastic way their displeasure at the concerted
action on the part of the PRD, the Socialist party and the
Communist party to bring down the Government. By means of
a major vote shift in the 19 July 1987 the Portuguese
electorate gave an absolute majority of votes and of seats
in Parliament to the Social-democrats. Table 10.4 shows
the percentage of the popular vote each party received in
the 1983, 1985 and 1987 general elections.
Table 10.4
CDS
PSD
PRD
PS
APU*
CDU*
* the APU, the alliance between the Communist party, the
1983
12.6
27.2
18.1
1985 1987
9.9 4.4
29.9 50.4
17.9 4.9
20.8 22.2
15.5
12.1
36.1
left wing socialistsMDP/CDE and independentswas replaced
by a new alliance between the Communist party, the
Ecologist party and independents. Since, the MDP/CDE, the
left wing socialists who split from the APU alliance,
running in the 1987 election on their own, only received
.6% of the popular vote, the considerable drop suffered by
the Communist party and its new allies cannot be attributed
to the defectionof MDP/CDE votes.
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In four years and three elections the Portuguese electorate
caused a major upheaval in the relative strength of the
main political parties. The majority of christian
democrats, who showed themselves so close to the social
democrats in the 1983 election (see chapter IX, Section
9.3.2) went over to the social democrat camp. The PRD lost
13 percent points from almost 18% of the popular vote in
1985 to just under 5% in 1987. The communists lost in four
years 6 percent points from just over 18.1% to just over
12.1% in 1987. The socialists, after their collapse in
1985 when they lost almost 16 percent points of the popular
vote, in 1987 recovered only 1.4% to obtain 22.2% of the
popular vote.
In their rapid democratic apprenticeship the Portuguese
electorate finally managed ~n 1987 to elect a single
majority government. It is plausible to assume that the
PSD government elected in 1987 will be able to stay in
power for the full four year mandate. If this happens it
will be the first time since Democracy was restored in 1974
that a government survived its full mandate. Will the
Portuguese accept their newly acquired political stability
without question or will they be looking for alternatives
in 1991? Judging by the results of the three Portuguese
surveys, it is quite possible that if they are not
satisfied with their stable majority government the
electorate will not hesitate in picking a different
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alternative provided a credible one presents itself. The
Portuguese sank their majestic ship on 25 April 1974. Since
then they have undoubtedly learnt to live with their feet
wet.
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APPENDIX 1
THE DICTATORSHIP: A BRIEF ACCOUNT
1. The Dictatorship. from 1926 to 1974 - Salazar and
Caetano
1.1. Corporativism
The first steps towards the dictatorship were taken after
the military coup of 1926 which put an end to 16 years of
successive Republican governments following the overthrow
of the Monarchy in October 1910.
The Generals responsible for the Coup invited in 1928,
Antonio Salazar, a Professor of Law at the University of
Coimbra to head the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Two years
later he became head of government. By 1933, a new
Constitution prepared by a young lawyer, Marcelo Caetano,
laid down the principles of the Portuguese Corporate State.
The Corporate State was based on seven major State
institutions, i.e. the Corporations: Police, Governmental
Bureaucracy, the Military, the Church (Roman Catholic), the
Unions (representing the big economic interests), Industry
and Commerce, and Agriculture. Of these seven
Corporations, the most prominent and important pillars of
the corporate edifice were the Military, the Church and the
"Unions". The Dictator exercised control over all of them.
The seven Corporations collaborated in harmony. Between
themselves, through the influence and power they exercised,
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they were able to control all "national activities". In a
speech delivered to the Secretariat of National Propaganda
in 1938, Salazar clearly indicated the supremacy of the
State and emphasised the economic procedural aspects of the
new regime:
"The State has the right to foster, harmonise and control
all national activities ••• We wish to advance toward a new
political economy, working in harmony with human nature,
under the authority of a strong State which will protect
the higher interests of the nation, its wealth and its
labour, both from capitalist excesses and from destructive
Bolshevism".
(In Delzell, 1970 p.333)
In practice, th~s meant a continuous and ruthless
elimination of all kinds of opposition to the regime while
capitalist procedures remained archaic and retained, in
some respects, almost feudal types of exchange (Perlmutter,
1981).
1.2. Political life and opposition during the regime
In any authoritarian state, all political parties are
banned with the exception of the regime's party. The
party, however, is no more than an adornment, a docile
mouthpiece
implement.
of the policies the Dictator wishes to
318
During Salazar's time the regime's party was called, Uniao
Nacional (National Union). Its name was changed by Salazar
successor in 1969 to Accao Nacional, i.e. National Action.
The Dictator, as President of the Council of Ministers,
exercised supreme control. The Dictator's policies were
discussed in the Assembleia Nacional (Parliament) and
endorsed. The President of the Republic had no power.
Elections took place both for the National Assembly and for
the Presidency. However, electoral suffrage was restricted
on account of level of education, property ownership etc.
Registered voters only accounted for 19.51 of the
population in 1969 (Figueiredo, 1975).
Although political parties were banned, prior to elections
the opposition had limited freedom to campaign.Electoral
rolls were not kept up to date and the opposition was not
allowed to supervise ballots. The forces of the opposition
which contested the elections ~ere not organised as
parties, but as movements such as the Movimento de Unidade
Democratica (Movement of Democrat~c Unity) in the forties
and the democratic movements CDE and CEUD in the sixties.
Well known figures ran from time to time for the Presidency
as opposition candidates. However the performance of the
opposition at the polls was always weak, amidst accusations
of rigged results.Changes in government were produced, not
by elections, but by the intervention of the dictator.
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Apart from the opposition forces which came to the fore at
the time of elections there were other types of continuous
resistance and opposition. The most significant since the
start of the dictatorship was the Communist Party, which
had been founded in 1921. Operating in secret, the
Communists became an influential form of permanent and
untiring resistance. More fragmented but also very
important, was the open challenge on the part of some
democrats,descendants of the political parties of the first
Republic. Within the military there were a considerable
number of coup attempts to overthrow Salazar. They all
failed. Workers protested and went on strike, although
forbidden by Law. In the sixties the students protested.
All forms of resistance, protest and opposition were
crushed, often brutally by the military, paramilitary and
various police forces of the State. Of the latter the most
feared was undoubtedly the PIDE, the state's secret police,
the new Inquisition (Figueiredo, 1975). Many communists
and non-communists suspected of being communists died in
the prisons where the use of torture was widespread. Well-
known opponents were silenced behind bars and many went
into exile.
Towards the end of the sixties, reflecting the growing
discontent felt among prominent industrial and business
sectors, a handful of members of the National Assembly,
known as the "Liberal Wing" started to question the
regime's archaic economic policies and sought to push for
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much needed reforms. Mild as their protests were, they
nevertheless represented the first open breach within the
ranks of the regime (as members of the National Assembly
they all had to belong to the regime's party). They were
not put in prison, but had to resign.
1.3. Conditions in general
It was Salazar's stated belief that learning would destroy
the peaceful and uncomplicated existence of peasants. Four
year primary education, compulsory by law, was never really
enforced, especially in the rural areas. Illiteracy rates
at the time of Revolution were estimated at well over one
third of the population and only a very small minority had
access to higher education. This was specially true of the
rural interior regions of the country isolated from the
more developed coastal centres by a deficient and, in some
cases, non-existent transport network system.
In the sixties, throughout rural Portugal over one third of
the population still lived at subsistence level. Land
distribution still reflected the system which had evolved
with the Christian reconquest in the 12 and 13th centuries.
Fragmentation of holdings in the northern half of the
country and extensive farmlands, the latifundia in the
South. (Figueiredo, 1975). In 1954, according to
Estatistica Agricola, 50% of Portuguese holdings were of
less than 1 acres; 38% between 1 and 5 acres; 7% between 5
to 10 acres; 4% more than 20 acres but less than 50; 1%
more than 50 acres. Only 0.3% of the holdings were larger
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than 200 acres. Included in this minute 0.3% "were the
properties of the four greater landlords in the country
who between them owned 235,000 acres, the same amount of
land held by 50,400 farmers" (Figueiredo, 1975).
Due to their geographical position the coastal areas
between Lisbon and Oporto had always enjoyed far more
development than the interior and the South. By the late
fifties early sixties, the main industrial belts of Lisbon,
Oporto and Setubal (a city 50 km south of Lisbon) had
developed in sharp contrast with the rural areas of the
interior. The exodus from the rural regions to the big
industrial centres went on relentlessly, and with it grew
the shanty towns, especially in the periphery and in some
of the old quarters of Lisbon and Oporto.
Industrial development as well as land was concentrated in
the hands of a few powerful families, who enjoyed the
protection of the regime and were simultaneously part of
it.
During the sixties, emigration, a permanent feature in
Portuguese history by tradition to Brasil and the colonies,
also took place in large scale to the more affluent
European countries. By 1972 an estimated 1.2 million
Portuguese had settled in Europe. By 1974 there were over
1 million Portuguese working in France alone. (Figueiredo,
1975).
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A small but important proportion of emigrants was made of
young men who fled the country to avoid conscription
the Army, who since 1961 were fighting against
into
the
liberation movements in Angola, Guine-Bissau and
Mozambique.
Change and modernization took place to tradition and order,
and were only allowed to take place as long as they did not
represent a challenge to the regime and its main pillars:
the Church, the Unions and the Army.
The Roman Catholic Church enjoyed a much privileged
position and regained the power lost during the first
Republic until the 1926 coup. Salazar, a staunch catholic
himself, before the 1926 coup had been a member of the CADC
(Centro Academico de Democracia Crista - Academic Centre of
Christian Democracy) founded in 1901. Another member of
CADC was Manuel Cerejeira, a young man who later became
the Cardinal Patriarch of Lisbon for the duration of
Salazar's rule. The CADC was the intellectual centre of
Catholic opposition to the Republic. Salazar and
Cerejeira's friendship lasted a lifetime.
Extremely conservative, the Church exercised their power
mainly in the rural areas of the northern half of the
country. Peasants in the South, anti-clerical by
tradition, were never brought to the fold in significant
numbers. The Church distributed their own papers and
periodicals to over 2 million subscribers and operated
their own Radio Station - the Radio Renascenca. Opposition
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within the Church against the regime was practically non-
existent. By and large the Church endorsed the regime's
policies, supporting them in their teachings extolling the
virtues of poverty, resignation and acquiescence.
The "Unions" represented big economic interests which were
practically concentrated in the hands of a few families.
The non-existence of independent unions, the illegality of
strike action and the patron/client nature of labour
relations reinforced the exploitation of labour.
Figueiredo in his book quoting OEDC figures for 1970/1971
writes: "through institutionalised trade unionism,
collective bargaining and pressures inherent in the
consumer society, (in the industrialised advanced countries
of the OEDC) labour had achieved a share of some 70% of the
national income, while capital earnings took 30%; in
Portugal, the proportion was almost reversed with capital
earnings taking 55% and labour including the managerial
classes, less and 45%".
The Army, apart from restricted opposition, remained on the
whole stable and loyal to the regime. The colonial wars,
however, were to subject the Army and the regime to
pressures which they could not withstand.
Conscription increased from 2 to 4 years; young men of all
social strata were being killed and maimed. Many deserted.
Much needed resources for economic development were
channeled to the war effort.
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In 1969, due to ill health, Salazar was replaced by Marcelo
Caetano. Some of his early actions tried to correct some
of Salazar's most glaring injustices. He promised some
reforms but these did not satisfy his opponents. In fact,
open opposition to the regime grew and revolutionary groups
started bombing campaigns in Lisbon and other cities.
Dissatisfied with the intransigence of the regime in
starting negotiations with the liberation movements in the
colonies in face of the military impasse in the wars, and
with the loss of prestige over the granting of higher pay
to non-commissioned officers, the army middle ranks finally
and successfully revolted in April 1974.
2. Post scriptum
Many details and important events were omitted from this
brief description. Its main aim was to convey
impression about the type of di~tatorship
a general
which had
controlled Portuguese economic, social and political life
until April 1974 so that developments after the Revolution
could more easily be put into perspective.
The Dictatorship had forged its hold on the country with
the help of the Army, the Church and the "Unions". After
1974, the Army reaffirmed its prestige and power in the new
democratic scenario imposed by their own action. The
Church hierarchy, pushed to the background in the immediate
post-revolution months, continued to exert a powerful
influence in the more conservative rural areas of the
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Centre and the North. The main economic and political
structures of the old regime were brought down.
Democratic Unions were created and great changes in labour
relations took place. The various unions affiliated
themselves in either of the two Trades Unions
confederations: the CGTP-Intersindical (Confederacao Geral
dos Trabalhadores Portugueses), of communist and leftwing
socialist tendencies, which operated in a semi-underground
manner during the last two years of dictatorship: and the
UGT (Uniao Geral dos Trabalhadores) of centre left and
right wing tendencies.
It is not surprising that a mass explosion of political
activity took place immediately after the Revolution. By
July 1974 there were around 75 political parties. But the
main political forces to emerge, with the exception of the
Christian Democrats, reflected the opposition factions
which had opposed the regime:
PCP The Portuguese Communist Party,influential in the
interior flat lands of the South (Alentejo) and in
the industrial belts of Lisbon, Oporto and Setubal.
Its Secretary General, Alvaro Cunhal, a lawyer, had
suffered long prison sentences and torture during
the Dictatorship, but lived in exile, in
Chechoslovakia, at the time of the Revolution. The PCP is
a member of the International Communist Movement.
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PS - The Socialist Party, influential in the middle-classes
and sectors of the working class up and down the country.
Founded in 1973 abroad by Mario Soares and other democrats.
Mario Soares,its Secretary General until 1985,(when was
elected President of Portugal), a lawyer was one of the
most outspoken opponents of the regime and suffered various
terms of imprisonment. The PS is a member of the Socialist
International.
PPD/PSD - The Social Democratic Party was formed after the
Revolution by some members of the so called "Liberal Wing"
in the former dictatorship's parliament. It is an uneasy
coalition of the more dynamic business interests of the
coastal zone and the more traditionally conservative
trades, small businessmen and peasants of the central and
northern regions. Its leader was Francisco Sa Carneiro, a
lawyer, who died in 1980 in a plane crash. The PPD/PSD is
affiliated in the Liberal International.
CDS The Christian Democratic Party was also formed
after the Revolution by members of the younger generation
of the old regime. They represent Catholic traditionalism,
and big economic interests with influence in the rural
areas of
bourgeoisie.
the Northeast
Its founder
and in parts of the urban
Diogoand leader in 1982 was
Freitas do Amaral, a young professor of law, a disciple of
Marcelo Caetano. The CDS is affiliated in the Union of the
Christian Democratic Parties.
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APPENDIX 2
The Post-Revolutionary years - Calendar of main events
adapted from
"Portugal, the Revolution in the Labyrinth", edited by
Jean Pierre Faye from the papers of The Russell Committee
for Portugal, 1976.
1974
April 25
The National Salvation Junta is invested with powers of
government and General Antonio Spinola, a conservative, is
appointed President of the Junta.
May 15
General Spinola is appointed President of Republica.
May 16
First Provisional Government, presided over by Prof.
Palma Carlos (a well known lawyer, founder of the
Independent Social Democratic Party - PSDI - a right, wing
conservative party, with very little following).
July 10-17
Show of strength by Spinola with the Ministers: resignation
of Palma Carlos and the PPD ministers with a view to forming
a strengthened "Spinolist" government headed by Col. Firmino
Miguel, Spinola's right hand man.
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July 12
The MFA (Armed Forces Movement who overthrew the
dictatorship) forms the COPCON: The Operational Command of
the Continent (the MFA's military defence force) under the
direction of Major Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, a sympathiser
of extreme left-wing positions.
July 18
Second Provisional Government, presided over by Col. Vasco
Goncalves (communist sympathiser) appointed by the MFA
Assembly who had refused Spinola's suggestion to appoint his
right hand man. The MFA Assembly offered Spinola a choice
between Major Melo Antunes (a moderate socialist) and Col.
Vasco Goncalves. Spinola chose Goncalves, judging Antunes
to be too "Marxist".
Septeaber 10
Speech by Spinola appealing to the "silent majority".
Septe.ber 28
Presidential show of strength by Spinola, who arrogates full
powers to himself with the support of the GNR (the
Republican National Guard) and the Tancos paratroopers,
summons the head of the COPCON (Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho)
and the Prime Minister (Vasco Goncalves) to the Belem Palace
(the Presidential Palace) and has them put under arrest by
his right hand man, Col. Firmino Miguel.
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At the Sao Bento Palace, seat of the MFA Assembly and of the
government, Melo Antunes organises the rescue of Otelo
Saraiva de Carvalho.
The people put up barricades against the forces of the coup
d'etat. Spinola resigns. General Costa Gomes, the General
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, becomes President of the
Republic and holds the two functions.
Third Provisional Government, presided over by Col. Vasco
Goncalves.
1975
January 14-20
The quarrel over having one single trade union body: The
PCP (communist party), the MDP (left wing socialist
movement) and the MES (another left wing socialist
movement) demonstrate in favour of an united trade union
congress. The PS (Socialist Party) and the PPD (the Social
Democratic Party) take up opposing positions.
The MFA pronounces itself to be in favour of one Union
Congress, the lntersindical. The Provisional Government
ratifies this position by introducing a bill.
March 11
Military show of strength by Spinola: The Air Force,
leaving the Parachute Troops' College base at Tancos, bomb
and attack the Lisbon Artillery Regiment, the RALlS. The
people are mobilised around its barracks. Failure of the
Spinolist putsch. Lt Col Firmino Miguel and Major Sanchez
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Osorio, chief organisers of the plot, take to flight. Gen.
Spinola is driven to the airport by Otelo Saraiva de
Carvalho, and asks Brazil for asylum, passing through Spain
on the way.
The MFA's coordinating commission becomes the Council of
the Revolution, an advisory Council to the President.
Harch
Ordinances on the nationalisation of the banks are started.
April
Ordinances on the Agrarian Reform.
April 25
First free elections held in Portugal since the 1926 coup
d'etat
Chamber
to elect, through proportional
with the sole object of
representation, a
drafting a new
Constitution.
Fourth Provisional Government, presided over by Col. Vasco
Goncalves.
Hay 19
Beginning of the conflict between the
(socialist) and the Workers' Commission
editorial staff
(mainly UDP
extreme left wing) of the newspaper Republica.
June
Radio Renascenca (a Catholic Broadcasting Lisbon Station)
is occupied by a Workers' commission incited by the UDP.
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July 8
The MFA publishes a handbook on popular power and the
Workers' Commission.
July 9
The newspaper Republica is published once again, directed
by the Workers' Commission (with UDP tendencies) and an
editor appointed by the MFA.
July 11
Resignation of the socialist Ministers from the fourth
provisional government. Governmental crisis.
July 12
Formation of a National Secretariat of Workers Commissions.
July 18
Speech by Mario Soares the influential leader of the
Socialist Party at Oporto.
July 19
First arson fire in a PCP centre at Rio Maior.
JUly 21
A triumvirate with full powers, is set up by the MFA: the
President, Costa Gomes, the Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves,
and the head of Copcon, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.
August 1
Demonstration by Workers' Commission and by districts.
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August 7
Document of the Nine (the nine being a group of moderate
socialist officers of the Council of the Revolution), or
Melo Antunes' document is published in Jornal Novo.
August 8
Fifth Provisional Government, presided
Goncalves
over by Vasco
August 11
The Nine are suspended from the Council of the Revolution.
August 13
The COPCON document, written by Major Tome (UDP) and made
public by Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho.
August 15
Elaboration of the Synthesis-Document, by Melo Antunes and
Otelo Sara iva de Carvalho.
August 18
Speech by the Prime Minister, Vasco Goncalves at Almada.
August 23
Programmatical Lines of Action, drawn up by the Fifth
Government.
August 25
Formation of the FUR: United Revolutionary Front. The PCP,
who join it on August 25, leave it on the following day,
but the MDP (allies of the PCP) the MES (socialist
movement, the PRP (leftist), the FSP (socialist splinter
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group), the LCI (4th International) and LUAR (revolutionary
leftist grouping) remained on it.
Augu.st 28
Letter from Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, head of the COPCON,
to the Prime Minister, Vasco Goncalves. Disagreement in the
triumvirate.
September 4-6
The MFA's general assembly is cut short at Tancos. Vasco
Goncalves resigns. The Group of Nine has the majority in
the Council of the Revolution. The "Goncalvists" are
excluded.
September 19
Sixth Provisional Government, presided over by Admiral
Pinheiro de Azevedo (socialist).
September 27-28
Congress of Workers' Commissions.
September 30
On the orders of the Sixth Government, the armed forces
occupy the radio and television stations in Lisbon.
Septemberl
October
Appearance of the SUV (Soldiers United will win) in Porto,
primarily to oppose the replacing of General Corvacho
(Goncalvist) with General Pires Veloso (Conservative) at
the head of the Northern Military Region.
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October 22
The Workers' Commission with UDP leanings recaptures the
Radio Renascenca (the Catholic station) held by the Army.
The SUV demonstrate in Lisbon in favour of Popular Power.
November 8
On Government orders, the Tancos paratroopers blow up the
Radio Renascenca transmitters, held by the Workers'
Commission.
November 9
The Tancos paratroopers and their sergeants rebel against
the military hierarchy which imposed on them the order to
blow up the transmitters.
November 10
The 123 para officers from the Training Base leave Tancos
to regroup at Sintra, in the suburbs to the west of Lisbon.
They begin to make contact with Pires Veloso (Northern
Military Region), Morais e Silva (Chief of Staff of the Air
Force) and Jaime Neves (Amadora Commando Regiment) in
preparation of the "25 November".
Nove.ber 12-13
Demonstration by construction workers at the Palace of Sao
Bento (Parliament): confinement of Ministers and of the
Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo. The Azevedo Government
"strikes" as a protest, for an unlimited period, demanding
"the powers of government from the President".
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November 16
Demonstration called for by Workers' Commissions from
Lisbon's industrial belt, supported by the FUR, the SUV and
the PCP.
THE EVENTS OF NOVEMBER 25
November 21
A surprise vote by the Council of the Revolution, triggered
by the military right wing and the Group of Nine, dismisses
Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho from the Command of the Lisbon
Military Region but he remains head of the COPCON.
November 22
The Amadora Comandos, with Ja~me Neves at their head,
announces their refusal to obey the commandant of the
COPCON in future. In Oporto, the socialist leader,
Soares accuses the PCP of being the "chief saboteur of
Revolution" and demands action by the President of
Mario
the
the
Republic. The Secretary General of the Communist Party
leaves Lisbon that day for a visit to Warsaw.
November 24
"The team of professionals" (Le Monde) built up around
Lieutenant-Colonel Ramalho Eanes, settle in the Amadora
Comandos' barracks, in charge of which is Colonel Jaime
Neves. This "operational command in the shadows"(Le Monde
17 Dec. 1975) comprises Colonel Garcia dos Santos
(transmissions) Lieutenant-Colonel Ferreira da Cunha
(information) Major Loureiro dos Santos (liaison with the
President) and the Command of the Lisbon Military
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Region), Firmino Miguel (Spinola's right hand man during
the aborted coup d'etat of September 28, 1974) and Aventino
Teixeira, a member of the MRPP (a Maoist party). Fighters
take off from Lisbon air bases and the Central Military
Region, to concentrate at the Cortegaca Base near
at the disposal of the commandant of the Northern
Region General Pires Veloso.
November 24-25
During the night, at Rio Maior, 80 km to the north of
Oporto,
Military
Lisbon, the association of agricultural land-owners (a
right wing association) blocks roads, railways, the main
road to the North, and threatens to cut off the capital's
water and electricity supply.
November 25
During the night, units of the Paratroopers' Training Base
at Tancos, to the north-east of Lisbon, receive by radio
messages (of unknown origin) the order to occupy the air
bases of the Lisbon and Central Military Regions. The
military right wing (headed by the Air Force Chief of
Staff, General Morais e Silva) and the Group of Nine,
finally confirm the dismissal of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho
as Commandant of the Lisbon Military Region. The President
summons Otelo to the Presidential Palace. The Amadora
Commandos leave their barracks and in radio messages
announcing that their action is in the name of the
President of the Republic take over a few military
installations.
the state of
The President, during the night
emergency and the occupation of
proclaims
military
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installations proceeds during the morning of November 26.
November 27
The unions call for a general strike. Troops from the
Northern Military Region, under General Pires Veloso's
command, come to reinforce those in the Lisbon Military
Region.
November 26-28
At Setubal, a large working class city to the south of
Lisbon, a committee of struggle stirs up popular resistance
and controls the town for three days.
November 26
All newspapers cease to be published except the Luta
Popular the MRPP's mouthpiece (Maoist).
November 27
COPCON is disbanded.
December 6
Lieutenant-Colonel Ramalho Eanes, an officer
since the Spinolist coup d'etat on 11 March, is
Army Chief of Staff, with the rank of General.
unassigned
appointed
APRIL 76
The new Constitution is approved and the first free
elections to elect Parliament are held on April 25, two
years after the overthrow of the old regime. On June 27,
General Ramalho Eanes wins the first free Presidential
Elections.
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APPENDIX 3
Descriptive measures
Appendix 3, related to chapter VIII presents detailed
descriptions of the following mesures:
1. Attitudes toward candidates and parties and attitudes
toward voting for candidates and parties
1.1 Presidential Election of 1980
1.1.1 Attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the
1980 Presidential election
1.1.2 Attitudes toward voting for the presidential
candidates in the 1980 Presidential election
1.2 Local Elections of 1982
1.2.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1982 Local
elections
1.2.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1982
Local election
1.3 General Election of 1983
1.3.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1983 General
election
1.3.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1983
General election
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2. Attitudes toward electoral outcomes
2.1 Presidential Election of 1980
2.2 Local Elections of 1982
2.3 The General Election of 1983
1. Attitudes toward candidates and parties and attitudes
toward voting for candidates and parties
1.1. Presidential Election of 1980
1.1.1 Attitudes toward the presidential candidates in the
1980 Presidential election
In the Presidential Election of 1980 the Presidential
candidates were evaluated on six scales: good-bad; wise-
foolish; harmful-beneficial; honest~dishonest; weak-strong
and competent-incompetent. The five first scales were used
by Fishbein et aI, for the voting behaviour study in the
British General Election (1974). The competent-incompetent
scale was added since it was thought -to complete the
characteristics assumed to be essential for an evaluation
~
of the candidates and parties in terms of their qualities
to do the job well.
Very high correlations between the six semantic
differential scales were obtained. The two factor analyses
carried out on each set of six semantic differential scales
used to measure respondents' feelings toward the two
presidential candidates only extracted one factor in each
case. In the case of the Socialist Party candidate,
340
Ramalho Eanes, 75% of total variance was explained by the
first factor, with N-96. In the case of the AD candidate,
Soares Carneiro, 81% of total variance was explained by the
first factor, with N- 96.
Table 1.1 shows the means of attitudes toward the two
presidential candidates of respondents divided into groups
according to their vote choice in the 1980 General
election.
Table 1.1
Means of attitudes toward the two 1980 Presidential
candidates expressed by respondents divided into groups
according to their vote choice in the 1980 Presidential
election.
CANDIDATES
Soares Carneiro
(supported by
the AD)
Mean
St.D
VOTERS
AD FRS APU
N-38 N-27 N-29
.47 -.72 -1.6*
.57 .90 1.1
+2 0 0
2(0) 3(-3) 3 (-3)
-.16 .69 .46**
.44 .54 .86
+1 +2 +3
2(-1) 2(0) 3(0)
Range
Ramalho Eanes
(supported by
FRS and APU)
Mean
St.D
Range
* the differences between the means of attitudes of the
three groups of respondents toward Soares Carneiro are
significant, p < .001.
** the difference between the means of attitudes of FRS and
APU respondents is not significant. The mean attitudes of
the AD respondents is significantly different from the
attitude means of the other two groups, p < .001.
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1.1.2 Attitude toward voting for the presidential
candidates in the 1980 Presidential election.
In the Presidential Election of 1980, attitudes toward
voting for the two main candidates were measured by three
seven point semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-
foolish; and beneficia1- harmful.
Very high correlations between the scales were obtained and
the factor analyses carried out on each set of three
semantic differential scales used to measure respondents'
feelings towards voting for the two presidential candidates
only extracted one factor in each case. In the case of
the Socialist Party candidate, Rama1ho Eanes, 93% of total
variance was explained by the first factor with N-96. In
the case of the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, 96% of total
variance was explained by the first factor with N-96.
Table 1.2 shows the means of attitudes toward voting for
the two presidential candidates of respondents divided into
voting groups according to intention to vote.
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Table 1.2
Means of attitudes toward voting for each of the two
presidential candidates by respondents divided into groups
according to their vote choice in the 1980 General Election
(scale +3 to -3)
CANDIDATES VOTERS
AD FRS APU
N-38 N-27 N-30
Soares Carneiro Mean 0.82 -1.5 -2.5*
(AD Candidate) St.D 0.82 0.84 0.82
+3 0 -1
Range 3 (0) 3 (-3) 2 (-3)
N-38 N-27 N-30
Ramalho Eanes Mean -0.53 1.3 1.2**
(PS Candidate) St.D 0.92 0.77 1.1
+1 +3 +3
Range 3 (-3) 3 (0) 4 (-1)
* the differences between the means with respect to the FRS
and APU groups of voters is significant at p ( .001.
** the difference between the means with respect to the FRS
and APU groups of voters is not significant.
1.2 Local Elections of 1982
1.2.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1982 Local
elections.
In the 1982 Local Election questionnaires attitudes toward
the three main parties (AD-right wing alliance; PS-
socialist party, and the APU-communist alliance) were
measured by three seven point semantic differential scales
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i.e. harmful-beneficial; honest-dishonest; and competent-
-incompetent.
Table 1.3 shows the means of attitudes toward each party in
the 1982 Local Elections expressed by voters divided
according to voting intention.
Table 1.3
PARTIES VOTERS
AD PS APU
N-45 N-43 N-70
AD (right wing Mean 1.15 -.17 -1.14*
alliance) St.D 1.10 .63 1.22
0 +1 0
Range 3 (+3) 4 (-3) 4 (-3)
N-40 N-45 N-66
PS (socialist Hean -.27 .84 .04**
party) St.D .79 .85 .85
+1 0 +1
Range 4 (-3) 3 (+3) 6 (-2)
N-43 N-45 N-72
APU (communist Mean -1.87 -.12 1.88
alliance) St.D 1.12 .56 .98
+1 +3 0
Range 3 (-3) 6 (-3) 3 (+3)
* the differences between the means of the three groups of
voters are all significant beyond p < .001.
** the differences between the means of AD and APU
respondents is not significant. The difference between the
mean of PS respondents and the means of the AD and APU
respondents is significant beyond p < .001.
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1.2.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1982
Local election.
Since the three semantic differential scales used in the
Presidential Election questionnaires were found to be
highly correlated between each other, the questionnaires
used for the Local Elections of 1982 to measure attitudes
toward voting for the parties only used one scale
The use of this scale rather than the"positive-negative".
"good-bad" scale is explained in Chapter 5. Method, section
5.
Table 1.4 shows the means of attitudes divided according to
voting intentions toward voting for the three parties, AD
(right-wing alliance), PS (Socialist party) and APU
(Communist alliance) of respondents divided according to
voting intention in the 1982 Local elections.
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Table 1.4
Means of attitudes toward voting for each party in the 1982
Local election expressed by voters divided according
to voting intention (scale +3 to -3).
ALLIANCES VOTERS
AD PS APU
N-48 N-45 N-76
AD
(right wing Mean 1.87 -0.93 -2.40*
alliance St.D 1.00 0.86 1.04
+3 +1 +3
Range 3 (0) 4 (-3) 6 (-3)
N-44 N-45 N-74
PS
(socialists) Mean -0.63 1.26 -0.40**
St.D 1.16 0.88 1.05
+2 +3 +1
Range 5 (-3) 4 (-1) 4 (-3)
N-47 N-45 N-78
APU
(communist Mean -2.06 -0.68 2.30
alliance) St.D 1.03 1.32 0.93
+1 +3 +3
Range 4 (-3) 6 (-3) 3 (0)
* the differencei between the means of the three groups of
respondents are significant beyond p < .001.
** the difference between the means of the AD and
APU respondents is not significant. The difference between
the mean of PS respondents and the means of the AD and APU
respondents is significant beyond p < .001.
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1.3 General Election of 1983
1.3.1 Attitudes toward the parties in the 1983 General
election
In the General Election questionnaires, attitudes toward
the four main parties (CDS - christian democrats; PSD
social democrats; PS - socialists and APU communist
alliance) were measured by three seven point semantic
differential scales: harmful-beneficial, honest-dishonest
and competent-incompetent.
Table 1.5 shows the means of attitudes toward each party
in the 1983 General Election expressed by voters divided
according to voting intention.
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Table 1.5
Means of attitudes toward each party in the 1983 General
Election expressed by voters divided according to voting
intention (scale +3 to -3)
PARTIES VOTERS
CDS Mean
(Christian St.D.
Democrats)
Range
PSD Mean
(Social St.D.
Democrats)
Range
CDS
N-17
1.76
0.90
+1
2 (+3)
N-17
0.48
0.55
o
2 (+2)
PSD
N-41
PS
N-32
APU
N-58
0.64
0.70
+1
2 (-1)
N-42
0.64
0.86
-2.12
0.88
+1
4 (-3)
o
3 (+3)
N-30 N-57
-1.23
-1.21
+1
4 (-3)
1.57
0.99
o
3 (+3)
-0.31
0.95
o
3 (-3)
PS Mean -0.46 -0.50 0.78 -0.71
(socialists)St.D. 0.71 0.73 0.92 1.50
+1 +2 0 +1
Range 4(-3) 3(-3) 3(+3) 4(-3)
APU Mean -2.03 -1.78 -0.55 1.81
(communists St.D. 1.05 1.19 0.93 0.91
alliance) -1 +1 +1 0
Range 2(-3) 4(-3) 3(-3) 3(+3)
All differences between the means of the four groups of
voters are significant beyond p (.001 with the exception of
the differences between the means of CDS, PSD and APU
respondents' attitudes toward the Socialist Party (PS).
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1.3.2 Attitudes toward voting for the parties in the 1983
General election.
The questionnaires for the General Election of 1983 used
one "positive-negative" seven point semantic differential
scale to measure respondents' attitudes toward voting for
each party.
Table 1.6 shows the means of attitudes toward voting for
the four parties, CDS (christian-democrats), PSD (social-
democrats), PS (socialists) and APU (communist alliance),
of respondents divided according to voting intention in the
1983 General election.
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Table 1.6
Means of attitudes toward voting for each party in the
General Election of 1983 expressed by voters divided
according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3).
PARTIES VOTERS
CDS (christian
democrats)
PSD (Social
democrats)
PS
(Socialists)
APU
(Communist MDP
CDS
N-17
Mean
ST.D.
2.23
0.83
+3
2(+1)
0.23
0.97
+2
3(-1)
PSD
N-44
0.25
0.86
+3
4(-1)
1.95
1.0
+3
3(0)
-0.40
1.04
+2
5(-3)
-2.15
1.38
+3
6(-3)
PS
N-32
-1.62
0.94
o
3(-3)
-0.90
0.99
+2
5(-3)
1.37
0.87
+3
3(0)
-1.61
1.17
+1
4(-3)
APU
N-60
-2.75
0.54
-1
2(-3)
-2.50
0.70
-1
2(-3)
-0.96
1.11
+1
4(-3)
2.22
0.89
+3
3(0)
Range
Mean
St.D.
Range
Mean -1.29
St.D. 1.04
+1
Range 4(-3)
Mean -2.94
St.D. 0.24
-2
Range 1(-3)
Differences between the means attitudes of all the four
groups of voters towards voting for the four parties are
significant beyond p < .001 with the exception of the
following mean differences:
Attitudes means of CDS and PSD voters towards voting for
the PS - p (.01
Attitudes means of PSD and APU voters towards voting for
the PS - p < .01
Attitudes means of CDS and PSD voters towards voting for
the APU - p (.05
350
2. Attitudes toward electoral outcomes
2.1 Presidential Election of 1980
In the 1980 Presidential Election attitudes to each
possible electoral outcome were mesured by three seven
point semantic differential scales: good-bad; wise-foolish
and beneficial-harmful.
Very high correlations between the three semantic
scales were obtained. The factor analyses
on each set of three semantic differential
differential
carried out
scales used to measure respondents' feelings towards the
victory of each of the two presidential candidates only
extracted one factor in each case. In the case of the
Socialist party candidate, Ramalho Eanes, 92% of total
variance was explained by the first factor, with N- 96. In
the case of the AD candidate, Soares Carneiro, 97% of total
variance was explained by the first factor, with N- 95.
Table 2.1 shows the means of attitudes towards each of the
two possible electoral outcomes of respondents divided
according to their vote choice in the 1980 Presidential
Election.
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Table 2.1
Means of attitudes toward the victory of the two 1980
presidential candidates expressed by respondents divided
according to their vote choice in the 1980 General election
(scale +3 to -3)
CANDIDATES VOTERS
AD FRS APU
N-38 N-26 N-30
Soares Carneiro Mean .7 -2.1 -2.7*
(AD candidate) St.D. .8 .9 .6
+3 0 -1
Range 3 ( o ) 3(-3) 2(-3)
N-38 N-26 N-31
Ramalho Eanes Mean -.6 1.2 .9**
(PS candidate) St.D .8 .7 1.1
+1 +3 +3
Range 4 (-3) 3 (0) 4 (-1)
* with respect to the AD candidate the differences between
the attitude means of the three groups of voters are
significant beyond p ( .01
** with respect to the PS candidate the difference between
the mean of AD respondents and each of the means of the
other two groups of respondents is significant beyond
p < .001. The difference between the means of FRS and APU
respondents is not significant
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2.2. Local Elections of 1982
In the 1982 Local Elections questionnaire, attitudes toward
the three possible electoral victories were measured by one
"good-bad", seven point semantic differential scale.
Table 2.2 shows the means of attitudes towards each of the
three possible outcomes of respondents divided according
to their voting intention.
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Table 2.2
Means of attitudes toward the victory of the three parties
in the 1982 Local Elections expressed by voters divided
according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3).
PARTIES VOTERS
AD PS APU
N-49 N-46 N-74
AD (right wing
alliance) Mean 1.5 -.8 -2.6*
St.D 1.3 .9 .8
+3 +1 0
Range 6 (-3) 4 (-3) 3 (-3)
N-45 N-46 N-73
PS (socialist
party) Mean -.5 1.3 -.9**
St.D 1.1 .9 1.2
+2 +3 +1
Range 5 (-3) 3 (0 ) 4 (-3)
N-48 N-45 N-77
APU (communist
party) Mean -2.6 -.8 2.3*
St.D .7 1.3 1.0
0 +2 +3
Range 3 (-3) 5 (-3) 3 (0)
* the differences between the means of the three groups of
voters are all significant beyond p (.001
** the differences between the means of the AD and
APU respondents is not significant. The difference between
the mean of PS respondents and the means of the AD and APU
respondents is significant beyond p < 001.
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2.3 The General Election of 1983
In the 1983 General Election questionnaire, attitudes
toward the four possible electoral victories were measured
by one "positive-negative", seven point semantic
differential scale.
Table 2.3 shows the means of attitudes towards each of the'
four possible electoral outcomes, of respondents divided
according to their voting intention.
355
Table 2.3
Means of attitudes toward the victory of the four parties
in the 1983 General Election expressed by voters divided
according to voting intention (scale +3 to -3)
PARTIES VOTERS
CDS PSD PS APU
N-17 N-44 N-32 N-61
CDS (christian
democrats) Mean 2.2 .4 -1.7 .-2.8
St.D .8 .8 .9 .5
+1 -1 0 -1
Range 2 (+3) 4 (+3) 3 (-3) 2 (-3)
N-17 N-45 N-32 N-61
PSD (social
democrats) Mean .4 2.1 -1.0 -2.6
St.D .8 .9 1.0 .6
-1 0 +1 -1
Range 3 (+2) 3 (+3) 4 (-3) 2 (-3)
N-17 N-43 N-31 N-61
PS
(socialists) Mean -1.2 -.4 1.6 -.5
St.D .8 1.1 1.0 1.2
0 +2 0 +1
Range 3 (-3) 5 (-3) 3 (+3) 4 (-3)
N-17 N-45 N-33 N-62
APU (communist
alliance) Mean -2.9 -2.3 -1.7 2.1
St.D .2 1.2 1.0 1.0
-2 +3 0 -1
Range 1 (-1) 6 (-3) 3 (-3) 4 (+3)
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CDS and PSD voters on CDS - P <.001
" " " " " PSD - P <.001
" " " " " PS - P < .01
" " " " " APU - P <.05
PS and PSD voters on APU - P < .05
APU and CDS voters on PS - p (.05
APU and PS voters on CDS - p < .05
APU and PS voters on PSD - p ( .05
APU and PSD voters on CDS - n.s.
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Table 9.1
Table
Table 9.3
Table 9.4
Table 9.5
Appendix 4
This Appendix is related to Chapter IX
and it contains the following tables:
Percent positive, midscale and negative
evaluations of the ten electoral issues as
a function of party identification in the
1980 Presidential election
9.2 Percent positive, midscale and
beliefs on candidates' stands on
electoral issues as a function
negative
the ten
of party
identification
election'
in the 1980 Presidential
Mean strength of the evaluations of the ten
issues as a function of party identification
in the 1980 Presidential election
Mean belief strength of the stands of the
two presidential candidates on the ten
issues as a function of party identification
in the 1980 Presidential election
Mean contribution to overall attitude
towards voting for the candidates resulting
from the mean products of respondents'
evaluations of issues and beliefs on the
candidates' stands on the issues in the 1980
Presidential election
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Table 9.6
Table 9.7
Table 9.8
Table 9.9
Table 9.10
Table 9.11
Percent positive, midscale and negative
evaluations of the ten electoral issues as a
function of voting intention in the 1982
Local elections
Percent positive, midscale and negative
beliefs on the parties' stands on the ten
electoral issues as a function of voting
intention in the 1982 Local elections
Mean strength of evaluations of the ten
issues as a function of voting intention in
the 1982 Local elections
Mean belief strength of the stands of the
three parties on each of the ten issues as a
function of voting intention in thei982
Local elections
Mean contribution to overall attitude
the AD, PS and APUtowards voting
resulting from
for
the mean products of
andrespondents' evaluations of issues
beliefs on the parties' stands on the issues
in the 1982 Local elections
Percent positive, midscale and negative
evaluations of the eight electoral issues as
a function of voting intention in the 1983
General election
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Table 9.12
Table 9.13
Table 9.14
Table 9.15
Table 9.16
Table 9.17
Percent positive, midscale and negative
beliefs on the parties' stands on the eight
electoral issues as a function of voting
intention in the 1983 General election
Mean strength of the evaluations of the
eight issues as a function of voting
intention in the 1983 General election
Mean strength of the beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS
and APU respondents on the stands of the
four parties on each of the eight issues in
the 1983 General election
Mean contribution to overall attitude
towards voting for the CDS, PSD, PS and APU
resulting products of
and
from the mean
respondents' evaluations of issues
beliefs on the pa~ties' stands on the issues
in the 1983 General election
Percent positive, midscale and negative
beliefs of AD, FRS and APU respondents on
the opinion of family, friends and Church as
to how they should vote for each candidate
in the 1980 Presidential election
Mean strength of beliefs of AD, FRS and APU
respondents on the opinion of family,
friends and the Church on voting for each
candidate in the 1980 Presidential election
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Table 9.18
Table 9.19
Table 9.20
Table 9.21
Percent positive, midscale and negative
beliefs of AD, PS and APU respondents on the
opinion of family, friends and Church as to
how they should vote for each party in the
1982 Local elections
Mean strength of beliefs of AD, PS and APU
respondents on the opinion of family,
friends and the Church on voting for each
party in the 1982 Local elections
Percent positive, midscale and negative
beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and APU respondents
on the opinion of family, friends and Church
as to how they should vote for each party in
the 1983 General election
Men strength of beliefs of CDS, PSD, PS and
APU respondents on the opinion of family,
friends and the Church on voting for each
party in the 1983 General election
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Appendix 5
Text of the questionnaires
This appendix contains detailed information about the texts
of the three questionnaires used in each of the three
elections. The questionnaires were very similar and
contained the same questions. A master questionnaire is
used; differences introduced in each questionnaire are
indicated whenever appropriate.
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QUESTIONNAIRES
Introductory Note
This questionnaire has been prepared by Maria Manuela
Portugal Lopes d'Oliveira who is researching into the
voting behaviour of the electorate and the factors which
may influence voters in their electoral decisions.
The researcher has a degree in Psychology and works in the
British Open University. This research is part of her
current work towards a PhD.
This questionnaire is NOT used for public
purposes. Respondents are not required
opinion survey
to identify
themselves and their answers are strictly confidential. In
fact, as you may verify answers are all given by means of
crosses inserted in the small squares presented throughout.
In this way your handwriting cannot be identified.
The researcher takes the opportunity to thank you for your
help and cooperation in completing the questionnaire.
{Party aembership}
"Section 1 In this section I would like to know whether
you are a member of a political party.
Yes No
If you
following
answered "Yes" which of the
parties are you a member of?"
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PSD/PPD CDS PPM PS UEDS
(1980 election)
ASDI MDP/CDE PCP OTHER
(1982 elections) PPM CDS PSD PS PCP UDP OTHER
(1983 election) CDS PSD PS PCP UDP OTHER
(Past voting behaviour - 1980 Presidential Election)
"Section 2 In this section I would like to know for
whom you voted in previous elections. In
order to simplify, insofar as the elections
held prior to December 1979 are concerned,
the questions ask whether you voted in any
of the parties who are now members of the
three main alliances: AD, FRS, APU
1975 - Elections for the Constituent Assembly
Have you voted for any of the parties of
the:
AD FRS APU ANOTHER Didn't
vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
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1976 - General election
Have you voted for any of the parties of
the:
AD FRS APU ANOTHER Didn't
vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
1979 - General election
Have you voted for any of the parties of
the:
AD FRS APU ANOTHER Didn't
vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
1980 - General election
Have you voted for any of the parties of
the:
AD FRS APU ANOTHER Didn't
vote
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
1976 - Presidential election
For whom did you vote in 1976?
Ramalho Eanes ANOTHER Didn't"
vote
Yes No Yes No
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(Past voting behaviour - 1982 Local elections)
"Section 2 a) - For whom did you vote in the previous
Local elections?
For any of
the AD parties
For any of
the FRS parties
1976 -
1979 -
For any of
the APU parties
Other Didn't
vote
1976 -
1979 -
b) For whom did you vote in the previous
General elections?
For any of
the AD parties
1976 -
1979 -
1980 -
For any of
the APU parties
1976 -
1979 -
1980 -
For any of
the FRS parties
Other Didn't
vote
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c) For whom did you vote in the Presidential elections?
Ramalho Eanes Another Didn't vote
1976 -
Soares Carneiro Another Didn't vote
1980 -
(Past voting behaviour - 1983 General election)
"Section 2 For whom did you vote in the previous
General election of 1980?
AD PS APU ANOTHER Didn'tvote
(Intention to vote in the forthcoming election)
"Section 3 In this section I would like to know
whether you intend voting in the
forthcoming (Presidential; Local; General)
election.
In order to answer, please read the
statements and cross the square under the
alternative which corresponds to what you
intend to do.
"I INTEND VOTING IN THE (Presidential; Local; General)
ELECTION".
YES NO DON'T KNOW
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If you answered 'don't know' please move to next section.
If you answered either 'yes' or 'no' please indicate by
ticking one of the following squares the probabilities of
the statement being true or untrue."
(Likely/unlikely scale)
High Fifty/fifty Low
Intention to vote for candidate/party
(Intention to vote for a particular Presidential candidate
1980 Presidential election or party 1982 Local
elections and 1983 General election).
"Section 4 - In this section I would like to know if you
intend voting for any particular candidate
(party).
In order
statements
alternative
to answer, please read
and cross the square under
which corresponds to what
the
the
you
intend to do."
1980 Presidential election
Statements "I intend to vote for •••••• "
(Aires Rodrigues, Ramalho Eanes, Carlos
Brito, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, Galvao de
Melo, Soares Carneiro and Pires Veloso)
each followed by a likely-unlikely scale
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1982 Local election
Statements "I intend to vote for ••••••"
(AD, PS, APU)
each followed by a likely-unlikely scale
1983 General election
Statements "I intend to vote for ••••••"
(CDS, PSD, PS, APU, ANOTHER)
each followed by a likely-unlikely scale
(Attitude towards electoral outcome)
1980 Presidential election
"Section 5 In this section I would like you to give me
an idea of what you feel about the most
probable results of the election either in
the first or second ballot. According to
the forecasts the two candidates more
likely to win the election are Ramalho
Eanes and Soares Carneiro. Therefore this
section only mentions them."
1982 Local election and 1983 General election
"Section 5 In this section I would like you to give me
an idea of what you feel about the most
probable results of the election."
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Text which follows was common to the three questionnaires:
"In order to answer please read the
following statements. Under each statement
you find three scales. Please cross the
square in each of the scales which
corresponds to what you feel about the
possible victory of each (presidential
candidate; party).
"A victory for •••••• would be••••••"
Semantic
Differential
Scales
Extremely good
" wise to
beneficial to
to extremely
"II
bad
unwise
harmfulII
1980 Presidential election
Separate statements for Soares Carneiro and
Rama1ho Eanes followed by the three
semantic differential scales
1982 Local elections
Separate statements for AD, PS and APU
followed by the three semantic differential
scales
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1983 General elections
Separate statements for CDS, PSD, PS and
APU followed by the three semantic
differential scales
(Evaluation of electoral issues 1980 Presidential
election)
"Section 6 In this section I would like to know what
you feel about some questions related to
the way a President should act and to the
type of relations which should exist
between the President and the Government.
In order to answer, please read the
following statements and cross the square
underneath each alternative in each scale
which corresponds with what you feel."
"An impartial President is ••••••"
"
wise
beneficial
to
to
to
extremely bad
" unwise
harmful"
Semantic
differential
scales
extremely good
"
(In the questionnaire proper each of the following
statements was followed by the same three seven point
scales:
"A President who respects the Constitution is" ••••••
"A President who vetoes Government proposals which are
unconstitutional is" ••••••
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"A President who risks political instability rather then
give in to a Government who acts against the Constitution
. "1 S ••••••
"A President who always supports the Government . "1 S ••••••
"A President who supports a dictatorial form of Government
. "18 ••••••
"A President who supports political stability . "1.S ••••••
"A President who supports political instability . "1.S ••••••
"A President who supports Revolution . "1.S ••••••
"A President who supports military coup . "a 18 ••••••
(Evaluation of electoral issues - 1982 Local elections and
1983 General election)
"Section 6 - In this section I would like to know what
you feel about each of the following
statements. In order to answer please read
them and cross the square underneath each
alternative in each scale which corresponds
to what you feel".
1982 Local elections
Statements: "In the municipality where Ilive ••••••
••• housing should all be provided with piped
water, electricity and sewage
••• priority should be given to solving housing
shortages
••• more sport and socio-cultural facilities
should be provided
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more playgrounds and creches should be
built
·.. more schools should be built
·.. the important thing is to elect honest and
hard working councillors who are interested
in improving living conditions
• • • local authorities should be accountable as
to the manner public funds are administered
• • • transport problems should be solved
• •• priority should be given to pollution
control
• • • councillors should maintain very frequent
contacts with local populations so that the
most pressing problems are identified and
solved".
1983 General election
Statements: "To solve the crisis and promote social
welfare and justice ••••••
••• the social contract between the government,
employers and unions should be celebrated
••• patriotism and order should be strengthened
••• social welfare policies on the right of all
to health, education and housing should be
promoted
... the public sector should be reduced
••• the government should rule with purpose,
authority and morality
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• • • a new government should embark on a program
of development of the country's natural
resources in order to diversify production
and create new jobs
changes in labour laws including the strike
law should be introduced
••• a new government should increase the
purchasing power of the people
In the 1982 and 1983 elections each statement was followed
by one semantic differential scale only:
Semanttc
differential
scale
extremely good to extremely bad
(Beliefs about the candidates' or parties' stands on the
issues listed in section 6)
"Section 7 In this section I would like to know what
you feel about the stands which the
candidates (parties) would be likely to
adopt if elected on the issues raised in
the previous section. In order to answer
please read the following statements and
cross the square underneath the
alternatives which correspond closer to
what you feel".
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"If elected (1) will (2)....... .......
(1) name of presidential candidate in the 1980
Presidential election questionnaire and of
party in the 1982 and 1983 elections
(2) statement of the issues listed in Section 6
Separate statements were included for each
presidential candidate and each party
showing each issue. Every statement was
followed by a likely-unlikely scale.
(Attitude towards the candidates or parties)
"Section 8 - In this section I would like to know your
opinion about (the two candidates most
likely to win the election; the three main
parties; the four main parties). In order
to answer please cross the appropriate
square of each scale".
1980 Presidential election
Ra.alho Eanes
Semantic Extremely good to extremely bad
differential " wise to " unwisescale " beneficial to " harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" weak to " strong
" competent to " incompetent
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Soares Carneiro
Semantic Extremely good to extremely bad
differential " wise to " unwisescales " beneficial to " harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" weak to " strong
" competent to " incompetent
1982 Local elections
A D
Semantic
differential
scales
Extremely beneficial to extremely harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" competent to " incompetent
P S
Semantic
differential
scales
Extremely beneficial to extremely harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" competent to " incompetent
A P U
Semantic
differential
scales
Extremely Beneficial to extremely harmful
" honest to " dishonest
" competent to " incompetent
1983 General election
1982 Local elections format used for the four main parties:
CDS, PSD, PS and APU
(Attitude towards voting in the elections)
"Section 9 In this section I would like to know how
you feel about voting in the forthcoming
(Presidential; Local; General) elections.
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Please read the statement and cross the
square underneath the alternative in each
scale which corresponds closer to how you
feel".
1980 Presidential election
Statement: "to vote in the Presidential election will
be" •••
Semantic
differential
scales
Extremely good to extremely bad
" wise to " unwise
beneficial to " harmful"
1982 and 1983 elections
"to vote in the (Local; General) election
will be" •••
extremely positive to extremely negative
(Attitude towards voting for the candidates or parties)
"Section 10 - In this section I would like to know how
you feel about voting for (the two
candidates most likely to win the election;
the three main parties; the four main
parties). In order to answer please ·read
each statement and cross the square
underneath each alternative in each scale
which corresponds closer to how you feel".
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"to vote for (1) will be" ••••••.........
Extremely good to extremely bad
" wise to " unwise
beneficial to " harmful"
(1) name of presidential candidate in the 1980
Presidential election questionnaire and of
party in the 1982 and 1983 elections.
Separate statements were included for the
two presidential candidates and for each
party according to election.
(Beliefs about the opinions of trusted others on voting in
the election)
"Section 11 - In this section I would like to know
whether you think other people you know
want you to vote in the... (Presidential;
Local; General) election. Please read the
following statements and cross the
appropriate squares underneath each
alternative
"My family thinks I should vote in
the •••(Presidential; Local; General)
election"
Each statement included a category of
trusted other: family; friends; Church; and
was followed by a likely-unlikely scale.
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(Beliefs about the opinions of trusted others on voting for
each presidential candidate or each party)
"Section 12 This section is very similar to the one you
just completed. Now, I would like to know
what you think about whom your family,
friends and Church would wish you to vote
for. In order to answer please read the
following statements and cross the
appropriate squares underneath each
alternative".
"My family thinks I should vote for (1) "......
(1) name of candidate or party
Each statement included a category of
trusted other: family; friends; church;
with the name of each candidate or party,
depending on the election questionnaire.
Each statement was followed by a likely-
-unlikely scale.
(Attitude towards the four possible post-electoral
coalitions in the 1983 General election questionnaire)
"Section 13 - In this section I would like to know how
you feel towards the four possible post-
-electoral coalitions. In order to answer
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Personal data
"Section 13
please read the following statements and
cross the appropriate squares underneath
each alternative.
"A post-electoral coalition between the PS
and the APU would be" ••••••
Extremely good extremely badto
"A post-electoral coalition between the PS
and the PSD would be" ••••••
Extremely good extremely badto
"A post-electoral coalition between the PS,
the PSD and the CDS would be" ••••••
Extremely good extremely badto
"A post-electoral coalition between the PSD
and CDS would be" ••••••
Extremely good extremely badto
In this final section it would be helpful
if you could let me have a few personal
details by crossing the appropriate squares
in each sub-section.
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Male Female
Sex
Age group 18-21
22-24
25-34
35-44
55-64
above 65
YES NO
Level of education: Primary school
Secondary school
(up to 2nd year)
Secondary school
(up to 5th year)
Secondary school
(up to 7th year)
Technical school
University
Thank you
(End of questionnaire)
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